BANCROFT  LIBRARY 

JOHN   MURRAY   COL. 


United  States 

Commission  on  Industrial 
Relations 


Report  on  the  Colorado  Strike 


By  GEORGE  P.  WEST 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 
1915 


137 


• 


w  u. 


United  States 

Commission  on  Industrial 
Relations 


Report  on  the  Colorado  Strike 


By  GEORGE  P.  WEST 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 
1915 


,  6 


BABNAKD  &  MILLER  PRINT,  CHICAGO 
»13T 


BANCROFT  LIBRARY 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

Introduction  5 

I.     Causes  of  the  Strike 15 

II.  The  Refusal  of  a  Conference 85 

III.  Violence  and  Policing 101 

IV.  The  Colorado  Militia  and  the  Strike 107 

V.     The  Ultimate  Responsibility 139 

VI.     The  Situation  in  Colorado  After  the  Strike. .  .156 


INTRODUCTION. 


Of  the  conflicts  between  employers  and  workmen  that  oc- 
curred during  the  life  of  the  Commission  on  Industrial  Rela- 
tions, the  most  serious  and  portentous  was  that  which  followed 
the  strike  of  about  9,000  coal  miners  in  southern  Colorado. 

The  Commission  has  devoted  more  time  to  an  effort  to  as- 
certain the  causes  and  all  the  circumstances  of  the  Colorado 
strike  than  to  the  study  of  any  other  particular  situation,  not 
only  because  of  the  numbers  involved  and  the  wide  public  in- 
terest aroused,  but  because  the  struggle  in  Colorado  presented 
an  unequalled  opportunity  to  study  some  of  the  major  prob- 
lems that  must  be  considered  in  an  attempt  to  discover  the  un- 
derlying causes  of  industrial  unrest. 

To  understand  the  Colorado  situation  in  its  relation  to  the 
general  problem,  it  is  necessary  first  to  draw  a  rough  line  be- 
tween the  two  principal  classifications  into  which  industrial 
disturbances  fall.  On  the  one  side  are  the  spontaneous  re- 
volts and  the  organized  strikes  of  wage  earners  who  are  im- 
pelled to  act  by  the  pressure  of  economic  necessity,  or  by  the 
conviction  that  their  collective  power  is  sufficiently  great  to 
force  an  increase  in  wages  or  other  purely  material  advantage. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  line  are  those  revolts  that  are  animated 
primarily,  not  by  the  need  and  desire  for  higher  wages  and 
greater  material  blessings,  but  by  resentment  against  the  pos- 
session and  the  exercise  by  the  employer  of  arbitrary  power. 

The  struggle  in  Colorado  was  primarily  a  struggle  against 
arbitrary  power,  in  which  the  question  of  wages  was  second- 
ary, as  an  immediate  issue.  And  the  merits  of  the  strikers' 
cause  must  be  judged  by  an  answer  to  the  question  of  whether 
they  and  their  representatives  demanded  arbitrary  and  tyran- 
nical power  for  their  collective  organization,  or  whether  they 
sought  only  that  measure  of  control  over  their  own  lives  that 


is  guaranteed  by  the  spirit  and  letter  of  American  constitu- 
tions and  statutes. 

Involving  as  its  major  issue  the  demand  of  the  miners  for 
a  voice  in  determining  the  conditions  under  which  they 
worked,  the  Colorado  conflict  was  also  a  struggle  for  a  voice 
in  determining  political  and  social  conditions  in  the  communi- 
ties where  they  and  their  families  lived.  The  strikers  pas- 
sionately felt  and  believed  that  they  were  denied,  not  only  a 
voice  in  fixing  working  conditions  within  the  mines,  but  that 
political  democracy,  carrying  with  it  rights  and  privileges 
guaranteed  by  the  laws  of  the  land,  had  likewise  been  flouted 
and  repudiated  by  the  owners.  It  was  this  latter  belief  that 
gave  to  the  strikers  that  intensity  of  feeling  which  impelled 
them  to  suffer  unusual  hardships  during  their  stay  in  the  tent 
colonies,  and  which  gave  to  the  strike  the  character  more  of  a 
revolt  by  entire  communities  than  of  a  protest  by  wage  earn- 
ers only. 

In  judging  the  merits  of  the  miners7  demand  for  collective 
bargaining,  for  that  share  in  the  management  of  the  industry 
itself  which  is  called  industrial  democracy,  the  Colorado  strike 
must  be  considered  as  one  manifestation  of  a  world-wide 
movement  of  wage  earners  toward  an  extension  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  democracy  to  the  work  shop,  the  factory  and  the 
mine.  And  because  this  issue  is  not  local  or  peculiar  to  the 
particular  industry,  and  because  it  is  the  root  from  which  the 
other  issues  spring,  it  must  be  regarded  as  of  chief  impor- 
tance. 

Briefly  stated,  and  in  a  phrase  commonly  heard,  it  is  the 
issue  of  whether  or  not  the  owners  of  an  enterprise  command- 
ing the  labor  of  hundreds  or  thousands  of  men  have  the 
right  to  run  their  business  in  their  own  way,  without  consulta- 
tion with  or  dictation  from  their  employees,  or  their  em- 
ployees' chosen  agents. 

Closely  related,  however,  is  the  other  issue  of  whether  or 
not  political  democracy  and  that  degree  of  personal  liberty 
promised  by  American  institutions  existed  in  the  Colorado 
coal  camps,  of  whether  or  not  the  miners  and  their  families 


enjoyed  their  full  social  and  political  rights,  as  distinguished 
from  the  industrial  rights  for  which  also  they  contended.  It 
is  an  issue  that  has  arisen  time  and  again  in  communities 
given  over  to  a  single  industry,  or  to  closely-related  industries 
under  centralized  control,  and  it  raises  the  question  of  whether 
or  not  political  liberty  be  possible  in  a  community  where  every 
man's  livelihood  depends  on  the  good  will  and  the  favor  of 
a  handful  of  men  who  control  his  opportunity  to  work.  Ex- 
perience in  the  Colorado  coal  camps  and  in  many  similar  com- 
munities proves  that  all  the  safeguards  yet  devised  for  the 
free  exercise  of  the  popular  will  are  futile  to  prevent  political 
domination  when  corporations  or  individuals  control  abso- 
lutely the  industrial  and  economic  life  of  the  community.  The 
secret  ballot,  direct  primaries,  the  initiative,  referendum  and 
recall,  are  alike  powerless  to  secure  an  effective  means  of  ex- 
pression for  the  popular  will  and  interest.  Democratic  gov- 
ernment in  such  communities  can  be  defeated  without  resort 
to  illegal  practices  such  as  ballot  box  stuffing  and  corruption 
on  the  part  of  election  officials.  This  is  true  because  the 
right  of  suffrage  can  be  effectively  exercised  only  where  there 
exist  free  speech,  free  assembly,  and  a  free  press.  Not  even 
the  most  intelligent  groups  of  voters  can  be  informed  regard- 
ing their  rights  and  interests  in  relation  to  the  issues  and 
candidacies  of  a  political  campaign  unless  there  be  free  dis- 
cussion and  agitation,  and  these  things  are  impossible  where 
free  speech,  free  assembly,  and  a  free  press  are  denied.  These 
three  essentials  of  democratic  government  can  be  denied  with 
ease  by  a  corporation  or  individual  possessed  of  the  power  to 
discharge  an  employee  without  cause.  Company  spies  can 
easily  identify  employees  who  express  offensive  political  opin- 
ions, who  read  newspapers  or  periodicals  that  express  politi- 
cal views  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  employer,  or  who  at- 
tend public  meetings  that  are  addressed  by  speakers  or  candi- 
dates opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  employer. 

It  is  true  that  a  few  states  provide  for  the  transmission  to 
each  voter  of  short  printed  arguments  for  and  against  certain 
measures  on  which  the  people  are  to  ballot.  This  is  done  only 
when  the  initiative,  referendum  and  recall  are  invoked,  and 


8 

the  practice  has  not  been  extended  to  issues  involved  in  candi- 
dacies. But  it  cannot  be  considered  seriously  as  a  substitute 
for  active  agitation  through  personal  and  public  discussion 
and  a  free  press.  This  is  true  even  for  the  most  intelligent 
of  communities.  But  many  large  groups  most  in  need  of  leg- 
islative and  executive  consideration  from  the  political  govern- 
ment are  not  yet  sufficiently  familiar  with  the  language  to  un- 
derstand and  to  weigh  short  printed  arguments,  although  they 
might  be  quite  capable  of  arriving  at  an  intelligent  decision  if 
they  could  meet  together,  formally  and  informally,  for  a  free 
discussion  of  the  issues. 

And  because  the  denial  of  political  liberty  in  such  a  com- 
munity rests  firmly  on  arbitrary  control  of  the  opportunity  of 
the  wage  earner  to  work,  it  is  plain  that  political  and  social 
domination,  where  it  exists  in  such  cases,  is  but  the  child  of 
industrial  domination,  of  arbitrary  control  in  the  workshop. 
Thus  it  is  apparent  that  the  paramount  issue  in  this  and  simi- 
lar strikes  is  the  demand  for  a  more  democratic  control  of  the 
industry  itself.  For  political  and  social  liberties  in  isolated 
and  privately-controlled  communities  like  the  Colorado  coal 
camps  can  be  secured  only  through  the  securing  of  a  measure 
of  industrial  liberty.  By  industrial  liberty  is  here  meant  an 
organization  of  industry  that  will  insure  to  the  individual 
wage  earner  protection  against  arbitrary  power  in  the  hands 
of  the  employer. 

The  Colorado  coal  mining  industry  presents  an  instance  of 
the  development  of  natural  resources  in  isolated  and  unset- 
tled territory  by  private  capital  organized  in  large  companies 
and  operating  on  a  large  scale.  The  industry  had  attained  a 
considerable  development  thirty  years  ago,  and  many  of  the 
camps  are  from  fifteen  to  thirty  years  old.  The  testimony  of 
operators  that  at  the  outset  it  was  necessary  for  the  owners 
to  perform  all  the  functions  of  the  civil  government  and  in 
addition  to  supervise  all  the  activities  of  community  life  is 
plausible  and  worthy  of  credence.  But  to  justify  the  continu- 
ance up  to  the  present  of  this  all-inclusive  company  control, 
it  is  necessary  to  show  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  coal  camps 


9 

were  unwilling  or  unfitted  to  perform  for  themselves  those 
functions  which  ordinarily,  in  an  American  community,  belong 
to  the  citizenship.  Before  considering  this  question  further, 
it  will  be  well  to  discuss  a  proposal  frequently  advanced  as  a 
remedy  for  private  domination  in  such  communities. 

In  addition  to  other  arguments  in  favor  of  public  ownership 
of  such  natural  resources  as  coal  mines,  proponents  of  public 
ownership  urge  that  only  the  State  or  Federal  Government  can 
be  permitted  to  wield  the  power  that  necessarily  is  lodged  with 
the  management  of  a  newly-created  industrial  community  situ- 
ated in  isolated  and  unsettled  territory.  The  subject  of  pri- 
vate ownership  of  such  resources  in  its  relation  to  industrial 
unrest  is  considered  elsewhere  by  the  Commission.  It  -need 
not  be  considered  here.  For  while  public  ownership  doubtless 
would  have  prevented  many  of  the  evils  that  arose  in  Colo- 
rado, the  issue  is  in  reality  between  the  workmen  and  the  man- 
agement, and  public  ownership  with  the  same  men  holding 
control  and  responsibility  might  have  offered  no  solution. 
The  important  thing  is  to  discover  how  the  workshop  and  the 
mine  can  be  organized  in  relation  to  the  wage  earners  in  such 
fashion  that  the  employees  may  be  assured  of  justice  and  the 
greatest  possible  degree  of  liberty,  regardless  of  where  the 
title  to  the  property  rests.  Unless  this  is  done,  there  can  be 
no  guarantee  of  industrial  justice  and  peace.  For  the  experi- 
ence of  certain  European  countries  where  state  ownership  ex- 
ists proves  that  public  ownership  alone  is  no  cure  for  indus- 
trial evils. 

Coming  as  amazing  evidence  of  the  repudiation  of  American 
principles  by  certain  small  but  powerful  groups,  is  the  allega- 
tion frequently  heard  during  the  Colorado  controversy  that 
the  inhabitants  of  the  coal  camps,  being  largely  of  foreign 
birth  and  speech,  were  incapable  of  either  political  self-gov- 
ernment or  of  exercising  a  voice  in  determining  their  working 
conditions.  Such  an  acceptance  of  the  political  philosophy 
that  justified  slavery  half  a  century  ago  hardly  needs  serious 
consideration.  Granting  that  social  and  political  conditions 
in  the  coal  camps  could  be  worse  than  those  which  existed  un- 


10 

der  coal  company  domination,  and  granting  that  they  actually 
would  be  worse  under  a  truly  democratic  control,  the  nation 
even  then  could  not  complacently  tolerate  a  benevolent  despot- 
ism. But  no  such  concession  can  be  made.  There  is  ample 
testimony  to  prove  the  capacity  for  civic  and  social  progress 
inherent  in  the  populations  of  coal  mining  camps  composed 
just  as  were  those  of  southern  Colorado — of  a  small  minority 
of  English-speaking  miners  and  their  families  and  a  majority 
of  recently-arrived  Europeans.  Besides  the  testimony  of 
officials  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  who  have  studied  the 
needs  of  the  foreign-born  miners  and  who  have  watched  their 
progress,  the  Commission  has  the  following  significant  testi- 
mony from  Francis  S.  Peabody  of  Chicago,  a  mine  owner  who 
operates  on  a  scale  larger  than  that  of  any  of  the  Colorado 
companies : 

Commissioner  O'Connell:  In  the  non-union  days  you 
speak  of,  before  you  came  to  an  agreement,  what  was  the 
standard  of  the  miner's  living  as  compared  to  the  present 
time? 

Mr.  Peabody:  The  standard  of  the  work  is  very  much 
better  and  the  standard  of  his  living  very  much  better. 
There  has  been  a  wonderful  improvement,  and  I  am  very 
thankful  of  it,  too. 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  How  do  the  private  habits 
of  the  mine  workers  today  compare  with  the  private  hab- 
its of  the  mine  workers  of  1897? 

Mr.  Peabody:  From  my  knowledge  of  them — and  f 
am  with  them  a  great  deal,  I  have  been  building  mining 
towns,  and  so  forth — the  average  is  very  much  higher,  I 
think.  There  is  a  very  much  higher  class  of  men,  al- 
though, as  Mr.  Mitchell  said,  the  English  speaking  and 
Anglo-Saxon  element  is  diminishing  very  rapidly,  and  we 
are  taking  our  miners  from  southern  Italy  and  northern 
Italy,  the  Hungarians  and  the  Slavs,  and  so  forth,  a  very 
large  percentage  of  them.  We  are  losing  our  old  English 
and  Welsh  miners  very  largely. 


11 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  There  is  a  higher  degree 
of  sobriety  now  than  there  was? 

Mr.  Peabody:    I  think  so. 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  And  also  a  higher  grade  of 
morality  ? 

Mr.  Peabody:  I  think  so,  I  think  the  whole  standard 
of  the  miner  has  improved  greatly.  I  have  been  very 
much  interested  with  my  friend  (John)  Mitchell,  (former 
president  of  the  United  Mine  Workers),  in  going  to  min- 
ers' houses,  to  see  his  picture  hanging  there  rather  en- 
shrined. He  is  rather  typical  of  a  higher  being.  I  am 
not  joking  in  this.  I  am  very  serious.  I  am  very  fond 
of  Mitchell  and  I  think  his  work  and  the  work  that  has 
been  done  has  elevated  the  whole  standard  of  their  lives. 
Mitchell  is  there  more  as  an  ideal  than  as  a  person.  He 
has  done  wonders  for  the  men  socially,  and  in  every  other 
kind  of  way.  They  are  no  longer  beasts,  as  many  of  those 
miners  were,  but  they  are  becoming  intelligent,  argumen- 
tative, distinct  human  beings. 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  Has  not  that  been  brought 
about  also  largely  through  the  increased  leisure  that  af- 
fords them  opportunities  for  cultivating  their  minds? 

Mr.  Peabody:    I  think  that  is  very  largely  so. 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  The  development  of  their 
work  in  the  unions? 

Mr.  Peabody:  Yes.  These  debating  societies,  and  the 
unions  are  debating  societies. 

It  should  be  noted  that  Mr.  Mitchell  was  in  charge  of  the 
Colorado  strike  of  1903-4,  which  in  bitterness  paralleled  that 
of  1913-14,  and  that  the  men  who  led  the  recent  strike  were 
lieutenants  and  associates  of  Mitchell. 

Again  in  his  testimony  before  the  Commission  Mr.  Peabody 
said: 

Commissioner  Delano:  I  judge  from  what  you  said 
about  the  improvement  of  the  miners,  do  you  ascribe  any 


12 

of  that  to  the  existence  of  the  organization  and  the  ex- 
istence of  the  agreement  that  the  organization  has  brought 
about  ?  Have  their  moral  standards  improved,  and  their 
living  standards  improved? 

Mr.  Peabody:  I  think  it  has  had  a  great  deal  to  do  with 
the  improvement,  their  officers,  and  talks  and  teachings  of 
their  officers,  the  fact  that  they  were  getting  better  wages, 
everything  has  added  to  that. 

The  Acting  Chairman:  Have  you  had  occasion  to  ob- 
serve— I  suppose  you  never  have  had  occasion  to  observe 
the  Italian  and  Polish  people  in  the  unorganized  places, 
as  to  how  they  compare  in  discipline,  and  so  on,  where 
they  are  not  organized? 

Mr.  Peabody:  Yes;  I  have  been  in  unorganized,  non- 
union villages,  where  the  standard  seems  to  be  lower  than 
the  same  class  of  men  that  I  find  in  our  own  districts, 
union  districts. 

Mr.  Peabody 's  testimony  is  corroborated  by  the  reports  of 
investigators  for  the  Commission,  who  have  visited  the  coal 
mining  towns  of  Pennsylvania  where  foreign-born  miners  are 
members  of  the  United  Mine  Workers.  (See  Perlman  report 
on  anthracite  region.) 

Assuming,  as  we  must,  that  the  miners  of  southern  Colorado 
are  capable  of  exercising  the  rights  guaranteed  every  man  by 
the  laws  of  the  land,  the  question  remains  whether  or  not  they 
have  hitherto  submitted  to  the  industrial,  political  and  social 
domination  of  the  companies  without  protest.  If  this  were 
the  fact,  then  the  revolt  of  1913-14  might  more  easily  be  at- 
tributed to  agitation  by  union  officials  from  other  districts  and 
not  to  the  miners'  deep-seated  resentment  and  their  determi- 
nation to  obtain  their  rights  and  liberties. 

The  history  of  the  coal  mining  industry  shows  that,  far  from 
living  complacently  under  company  rule,  the  Colorado  miners 
have  revolted  time  and  again  during  the  past  thirty  years. 
Strikes  have  occurred  each  ten  years  since  1883.  In  1903,  dur- 
ing John  Mitchell's  incumbency  as  president  of  the  United 


13 

Mine  Workers,  miners  in  the  same  camps  affected  by  the  re- 
cent strike  quit  work  for  similar  reasons  and  under  circum- 
stances very  much  resembling  those  of  the  1913  strike.  The 
report  of  the  United  States  Bureau  of  Labor  shows  that  the 
history  of  this  earlier  strike  was  almost  identical  with  the  his- 
tory of  the  strike  of  1913.  Strikers  and  their  leaders  were 
deported  from  the  state  by  the  military  authorities  of  Colo- 
rado; large  numbers  of  armed  guards  in  the  employ  of  the 
companies  terrorized  the  strikers '  communities  and  ruthlessly 
disregarded  their  civil  rights.  The  strike  was  defeated  by 
these  methods,  and  the  mines  were  re-opened  with  strikebreak- 
ers recruited  from  the  immigrant  population  of  non-union 
eastern  coal  mining  towns.  Lacking  as  they  were  in  radical 
or  revolutionary  background,  these  strike  breakers  themselves 
struck  ten  years  later. 

The  recurrence  of  these  strikes  as  evidence  of  the  miners' 
intense  dissatisfaction  is  strengthened  by  the  difficulties  that 
attended  their  efforts  to  organize  and  the  hardships  that  in- 
evitably were  to  be  faced  by  those  who  quit  work. 

In  considering  the  facts  that  will  be  here  presented,  too 
much  emphasis  cannot  be  laid  on  the  close  relationship,  al- 
ready pointed  out,  that  exists  between  the  purely  economic 
status  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  coal  camps  on  the  one  hand, 
and  their  social  and  political  status  on  the  other.  Nothing 
has  come  home  with  greater  force  in  the  course  of  the  investi- 
gations of  the  Commission  than  the  realization  that  men  and 
women  who  are  economically  subservient  cannot  be  politically 
free,  that  the  forms  of  democracy  and  the  guarantees  of  Amer- 
ican institutions  are  hollow  and  meaningless  in  communities 
where  the  many  must  depend  on  the  favor  of  the  few  for  the 
opportunity  to  obtain  food,  clothing  and  shelter. 

Nor  must  the  importance  of  the  issue  here  raised  be  mini- 
mized in  the  belief  that  the  Colorado  camps  stand  in  a  pe- 
culiar and  exceptional  case.  Not  only  are  many  great  indus- 
tries carried  on  under  similar  conditions,  with  entire  commu- 
nities depending  upon  enterprises  under  centralized  control, 
but  even  in  the  larger  industrial  centers,  the  opportunities  to 


14 

obtain  relief  from  oppressive  conditions  by  shifting  employ- 
ment are  rapidly  lessening.  The  Commission's  records  pre- 
sent evidence  (See  Los  Angeles,  transcript  of  hearing),  that 
a  city  of  more  than  350,000  may  be  brought  under  an  economic 
control  almost  as  arbitrary  as  that  charged  against  the  Colo- 
rado mine  operators.  And  while  in  this  city  the  wage  earners 
were  free  to  seek  relief  in  a  radical  political  movement,  their 
efforts  thus  far  have  failed,  because  the  wage  earners  found 
themselves  a  minority  in  a  community  where  the  majority 
proved  ignorant  of  and  indifferent  to  the  issues  involved.  • 

It  is  believed  that  public  opinion  is  all-powerful,  and  that 
more  is  to  be  hoped  from  an  intelligent  public  understanding 
of  the  issues  involved  in  such  instances  than  from  any  other 
agency.  For  there  is  no  influence  strong  enough  to  prevent 
an  irresistible  popular  demand  for  effective  remedies  if  the 
public  come  to  a  realization  that  the  principles  and  ideals  for 
which  men  fought  and  died  in  1776  and  1861  are  here  at  stake. 

Statements  of  fact  in  this  report  will  be  based  on  testimony 
given  before  the  Commission  at  public  hearings  in  Denver, 
New  York  and  Washington,  and  also  upon  documentary  evi- 
dence gathered  by  the  Commission  and  its  agents.  Wherever 
such  statements  seem  subject  to  controversy,  specific  reference 
will  be  made  to  the  authority. 

In  the  transcripts  of  public  hearings  and  other  records  of 
the  Commission  may  be  found  in  great  detail  all  of  the  uncon- 
troverted  facts  relating  to  the  strike,  as  well  as  the  contro- 
verted claims  of  the  principals  on  each  side,  and  this  report 
will  undertake  to  set  forth  an  analysis  of  the  facts  and  to 
emphasize  their  significance  without  recounting  the  history 
of  the  strike  in  greater  detail  than  is  needful  for  the  purpose. 


15 

CHAPTER  I. 

CAUSES  OF  THE  STRIKE. 

The  Colorado  strike  was  a  revolt  by  whole  communities 
against  arbitrary  economic,  political  and  social  domination 
by  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  the  smaller  coal 
mining  companies  that  followed  its  lead.  This  domination 
has  been  carried  to  such  an  extreme  that  two  entire  counties  of 
southern  Colorado  for  years  have  been  deprived  of  popular 
government,  while  large  groups  of  their  citizens  have  been 
stripped  of  their  liberties,  robbed  of  portions  of  their  earn- 
ings, subjected  to  ruthless  persecution  and  abuse,  and  reduced 
to  a  state  of  economic  and  political  serfdom.  Not  only  the 
government  of  these  counties,  but  of  the  state,  has  been 
brought  under  this  domination  and  forced  or  induced  to  do 
the  companies'  bidding,  and  the  same  companies  have  even 
flouted  the  will  of  the  people  of  the  nation  as  expressed  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States. 

Economic  domination  was  achieved  by  the  Colorado  Fuel 
&  Iron  Co.  and  its  followers  through  the  ruthless  suppression 
of  unionism,  accomplished  by  the  use  of  the  power  of  sum- 
mary discharge,  the  black  list,  armed  guards,  and  spies,  and 
by  the  active  aid  of  venal  state,  county  and  town  officials,  who 
placed  the  entire  machinery  of  the  law  at  the  disposal  of  the 
companies  in  their  persecution  of  organizers  and  union  mem- 
bers. 

This  economic  domination  was  maintained  by  the  compa- 
nies in  order  that  they  might  be  free  to  obey  or  disregard 
state  laws  governing  coal  mining  as  they  pleased;  arbitrarily 
determine  wages  and  working  conditions ;  and  retain  arbitrary 
power  to  discharge  without  stated  cause.  The  power  to  dis- 
charge was  in  turn  used  as  a  club  to  force  employees  and  their 
families  to  submit  to  company  control  of  every  activity  in  the 
mining  communities,  from  the  selling  of  liquor  and  groceries 
to  the  choice  of  teachers,  ministers  of  the  gospel,  election 
judges,  and  town  and  county  officials.  In  the  oases  of  several 


16 

companies,  the  suppression  of  unionism  was  used  also  to  deny 
checkweighmen  to  the  men  in  order  that  the  miners  might  be 
cheated  of  part  of  their  earnings. 

Political  domination  was  achieved  by  the  companies  by  the 
use  of  their  monopoly  of  employment  to  suppress  free  speech, 
free  press  and  free  assembly,  by  the  appointment  of  company 
officials  as  election  judges,  by  the  formation  of  a  political  part- 
nership with  the  liquor  interests,  and,  in  the  case  of  the  Colo- 
rado Fuel  &  Iron  Company,  also  by  the  expenditure  of  large 
sums  of  money  to  influence  votes  during  campaigns,  and  by  re- 
sort to  other  forms  of  fraud  and  corruption.  Where  a  public 
official  refused  to  do  their  bidding,  he  was  whipped  into  line 
through  pressure  from  interests  that  responded  to  the  eco- 
nomic power  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Company  and  its 
followers. 

This  political  domination  was  maintained  by  the  compa- 
nies in  order  that  they  might  ignore  or  defy  state  laws  en- 
acted to  safeguard  the  interests  of  their  employees,  prevent 
legislation  by  state  or  county  unfavorable  to  their  interests 
and  obtain  such  legislation  as  they  wished,  control  coroners 
and  judges  and  thus  prevent  injured  employees  from  collect- 
ing damages;  and  flagrantly  disregard  the  constitutional  and 
statutory  guarantees  that  otherwise  would  have  prevented 
them  from  procuring  the  imprisonment,  deportation  or  killing 
of  union  organizers  and  strikers. 

The  policies  and  acts  of  the  executive  officials  of  the  Colo- 
rado Fuel  &  Iron  Company,  and  of  the  other  companies  that 
acted  with  them,  had  the  hearty  support  and  endorsement  of 
the  greatest  and  most  powerful  financial  interest  in  America, 
that  of  John  D.  Rockefeller,  and  his  son,  John  D.  Rockefeller, 
Jr.,  who  controlled  the  company  through  ownership  of  ap- 
proximately 40  per  cent  of  its  stocks  and  bonds.  Letters  from 
Mr.  Rockefeller,*  Jr.,  heartily  approving  of  his  company 's  re- 
fusal to  meet  representaives  of  the  strikers,  of  the  measures 
taken  to  suppress  the  strike,  and  of  the  coercion  of  the  gov- 


*The  name   "Mr.   Rockefeller"  is  hereafter   used  to   designate     Mr.  Rocke- 
feller,  Jr. 


17 

ernor  that  resulted  in  throwing  the  state  troops  on  the  side 
of  the  owners,  were  shown  not  only  to  executive  officers  of 
his  company,  but  to  other  operators  who  followed  its  lead,  and 
his  support  contributed  largely  to  the  unyielding  and  lawless 
policy  that  finally  resulted  in  the  horrors  of  the  Ludlow  massa- 
cre and  the  intervention  of  the  federal  government. 

After  the  system  of  political  and  economic  absolutism  out- 
lined above  had  driven  the  miners  to  revolt,  the  owners  not 
only  obstinately  refused  to  admit  the  possibility  of  any  griev- 
ance, but  at  a  time  when  they  could  have  prevented  a  strike 
by  merely  granting  a  conference  to  the  union  officials,  they 
chose  instead  to  refuse  the  conference  and  in  doing  so  made 
themselves  responsible  for  the  disasters  and  tragedy  that  fol- 
lowed. Letters  from  the  president  and  chairman  of  the  ex- 
ecutive board  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  to  Mr. 
Rockefeller's  office  show  that  these  officers  fully  realized  the 
gravity  of  the  situation  before  the  strike,  and  also  that  they 
believed  a  strike  could  have  -been  averted  by  the  mere  grant- 
ing of  a  conference.  Yet  their  refusal  even  to  meet  repre- 
sentatives of  the  union  had  from  the  beginning  the  warm  ap- 
proval and  endorsement  of  Mr.  John  D.  Rockefeller,  Jr. 

The  refusal  of  the  operators  to  accede  to  any  plan  for  set- 
tlement involving  a  personal  meeting  between  themselves  and 
the  strike  leaders  or  any  slightest  recession  from  their  orig- 
inal attitude  continued  throughout  the  strike,  and  eventually 
took  the  form  of  a  rejection,  amounting  to  a  rebuff,  of  a  plan 
that  was  urged  upon  them  by  the  president  of  the  United 
States  and  that  was  supported  by  the  public  opinion  of  the 
Nation.  This  continued  and  persistent  defiance  of  the  pub- 
lic interest,  as  that  interest  was  urged  upon  them  by  the  high- 
est representative  of  the  people,  continued  to  have  the  sup- 
port and  endorsement  of  Mr.  Rockefeller,  without  which 
there  is  doubt  that  it  could  have  been  sustained. 

Mr.  Rockefeller  not  only  rebuffed  the  President  by  de- 
nying his  earnest  request,  but,  if  the  letters  of  his  agents  may 
be  relied  upon,  he  apparently  deceived  the  President  and  the 
public  by  means  of  the  Company's  letter  of  rejection.  This 


18 

letter  was  written  by  President  Welborn  in  collaboration  with 
Mr.  Ivy  L.  Lee,  a  member  of  Mr.  Rockefeller 's  personal  staff, 
whom  he  had  sent  to  Colorado  for  the  purpose.  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller's personal  staff  in  New  York  had  become  impressed 
with  the  strong  public  sentiment  supporting  the  President's 
proposal,  and  in  drafting  their  letter  of  rejection  to  the  Presi- 
dent. Messrs.  Welborn  and  Lee  inserted  the  following: 

A  plan  to  secure  harmonious  relations  in  some  indus- 
tries or  sections  of  the  country  would  not  necessarily  ap- 
ply to  our  peculiar  conditions.  We  are  now  developing 
an  even  more  comprehensive  plan,  embodying  the  results 
of  our  practical  experience,  which  will,  we  feel  confident, 
result  in  a  closer  understanding  between  ourselves  and 
our  men.  This  plan  contemplates  not  only  provision  for 
the  redress  of  grievances,  but  for  a  continuous  effort  to 
promote  the  welfare  and  the  good  will  of  our  employees. 

This  letter  was  signed  by  Mr.  Welborn  and  was  dispatched 
on  September  18,  1914.  On  the  following  day,  September  19, 
Mr.  Welborn  wrote  to  Mr.  Murphy,  Mr.  Rockefeller's  personal 
attorney  in  New  York: 

I  appreciate  your  very  thoughtful  letter  of  the  16th 
inst.,  with  suggestions  for  consideration  IN  THE  EVENT 

OF  ITS  BEING  NECESSAEY  TO  PKOPOSE  SOME  PLAN  TO  TAKE  THE 
PLACE  OF  THAT  PRESENTED  TO  US  BY  THE  PRESIDENT. 

Every  statement  of  fact  contained  in  the  foregoing  sum- 
mary will  be  established  in  this  report  by  quotations  from  the 
correspondence  or  testimony  of  responsible  executive  officials 
of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  of  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller and  members  of  his  personal  staff.  If  this  company  is 
mentioned  more  frequently  than  others  it  is  because  the  Colo- 
rado Fuel  &  Iron  Company  was  the  largest  operator  in  Colo- 
rado, and  admittedly  led  the  others  in  formulating  and  carry- 
ing out  policies  during  the  strike. 

As  a  result  of  the  failure  of  the  strike  and  the  political  ac- 
tivity of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  its  associ- 


19 

ates  in  the  campaign  of  1914,  the  power  of  the  coal  companies 
in  Colorado  is  today  greater  than  ever  before.  The  Commis- 
sion is  told  by  Mr.  W.  L.  Mackenzie  King,  expert  on  industrial 
relations  for  Mr.  Rockefeller,  Jr.,  that  Mr.  Rockefeller's  will 
and  conscience  are  today  the  most  potent  factor  to  be  consid- 
ered in  any  effort  to  bring  about  an  improvement  of  condi- 
tions. While  physical  and  material  conditions  in  the  coal 
camps  may  be  improved  to  some  extent  as  a  result  of  the  pub- 
licity given  to  existing  abuses,  these  improvements,  if  they 
come,  will  be  granted  as  a  charity,  and  there  is  as  yet  no  indi- 
cation that  the  inhabitants  of  the  coal  camps  are  nearer  the 
achievement  of  industrial  and  political  democracy  than  they 
were  when  the  strike  began.  On  the  other  hand,  the  arrest, 
prosecution  and  conviction  of  union  officials  and  strikers,  with 
the  aid  of  attorneys  and  detectives  in  the  employ  of  the  Colo- 
rado Fuel  &  Iron  Company,  and  by  direction  of  public  officials 
placed  in  office  largely  through  the  company 's  influence,  indi- 
cate plainly  that  the  reverse  is  true.  How  the  Colorado  Fuel 
&  Iron  Company  obtained  the  new  lease  of  political  power  by 
which  it  procured  these  prosecutions  is  well  shown  by  the  fol- 
lowing extract  from  the  testimony  of  Mr.  L.  M.  Bowers,  chair- 
man of  the  executive  department  of  the  company,  given  be- 
fore the  Commission  im  Washington  on  May  24.  Mr.  Bowers 
had  testified  that  the  Company  turned  150  men  out  of  its 
offices  on  election  day  to  work  for  prohibition,  which  was 
bound  up  with  the  candidacies  of  Mr.  Carlson  for  governor 
and  Mr.  Farrar  for  attorney  general.  Both  these  candidacies 
were  successful. 

Mr.  Bowers:  Let  me  explain.  I  don't  mean  we  turned 
them  out  to  carry  the  election.  It  was  on  election  day, 
but  we  were  out  on  the  campaign  and  had  a  fight  on  and 
had  practically  no  funds  to  carry  on  the  campaign,  and 
they  wanted  men  to  do  the  work,  to  do  the  ward  work 
and  distribute  literature  and  all  that  sort  of  thing;  and 
the  coal  operators,  not  only  the  coal  operators  but  every- 
body that  was  interested  in  the  question  of  prohibition 
at  the  election  turned  out  their  office  men,  and  I  had  been 
— by  the  way  I  had  nothing  to  do  with  picking  out  that 


20 

one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  and  I  did  not  know  it  until 
the  next  day  after  they  had  been  out. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Didn't  you  use  the  prohibition 
sentiment  that  was  strong  in  the  State  to  get  support  for 
what  you  called  the  law  and  order  platform,  that  was, 
for  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  the  others 
to  aid  in  the  ruthless  prosecution  of  the  strikers  and  the 
union  officers,  and  a  relentless  policy  of  suppressing  those 
men? 

Mr.  Bowers:  It  was  all  interlinking  and  locked  to- 
gether. 

The  company's  deep  interest  in  prohibition  quite  slips 
President  Welborn's  mind  when  he  writes  to  Mr.  Rockefeller 
the  following  exultant  letter,  dated  Nov.  6,  1914: 

My  Dear  Mr.  Rockefeller : 

According  to  the  figures  received  today,  which  are  prac- 
tically complete,  the  plurality  of  Carlson,  Republican  can- 
didate for  governor,  over  Patterson,  is  approximately 
33,000.  The  plurality  of  Farrar,  Democratic  candidate 
for  attorney  general,  over  his  next  opponent,  the  Repub- 
lican, is  almost  38,000. 

Farrar  is  the  present  incumbent  in  the  office  to  which 
he  has  just  been  elected,  and  has  been  about  the  only  re- 
liable force  for  law  and  order  in  the  State  House.  His 
re-election  serves  to  emphasize  the  sentiment  in  favor  of 
law  and  order,  expressed  in  the  election  of  the  main  part 
of  the  Republican  ticket. 

Mr.  Farrar  has  been  very  actively  engaged  for  several 
months  in  connection  with  the  work  of  grand  juries  in 
various    coal    counties,    where    indictments    have    been 
brought  against  those  who  participated  in  the  rioting. 
Very  truly  yours, 

(Signed)    J.  F.  WELBORN. 


21 

Mr.  Rockefeller  also  forgets  the  prohibition  cause,  on  ac- 
count of  which  Mr.  Bowers  says  150  men  were  turned  out  of 
the  Company 's  office  as  election  workers.  He  writes : 

Dear  Mr.  Welborn : 

I  have  just  returned  to  the  city,  after  an  absence  of 
several  weeks  in  the  South  with  my  wife,  and  find  your 
letter  of  Nov.  26th  regarding  the  gratifying  plurality  f  ©r 
Carlson  for  Governor  and  Farrar  for  Attorney  General. 
It  would  seem  that  the  election  of  this  Republican  Gov- 
ernor and  the  re-election  of  this  Democratic  Attorney 
General,  both  of  whom  have  established  clear  records  as 
to  their  strong  stand  for  law  and  order,  would  indicate 
that  the  sentiment  of  the  people  of  Colorado  is  for  law 
and  order,  quite  irrespective  of  party  lines. 

Very  cordially, 
(Signed)     JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER,  JR. 

In  pursuance  of  the  "law  and  order "  policy  on  which  they 
were  elected,  Governor  Carlson  and  Attorney  General  Far- 
rar have  proceeded  vigorously  with  the  prosecution  of  union 
officials  and  strikers.  Their  most  conspicuous  success  came 
with  the  conviction  on  a  charge  of  murder  in  the  first  degree 
of  Mr.  John  R.  Lawson,  member  of  the  executive  board  of 
the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  and  the  most  conspicu- 
ous Colorado  official  of  that  organization.  Mr.  Lawson  is  an 
old  resident  of  Colorado.  He  had  worked  his  way  from 
breaker  boy  to  a  position  where  he  commands  the  respect  and 
friendship  of  large  numbers  of  the  state's  best  citizens.  He 
has  appeared  twice  before  the  Commission,  and  members  of 
the  Commission  and  its  agents  have  investigated  carefully  his 
record  and  character.  As  a  consequence,  he  is  believed  to  be 
a  man  of  exceptionally  high  character  and  a  good  citizen  in 
every  sense  of  the  term.  The  judge  before  whom  he  was  tried 
was  appointed  by  Governor  Carlson  after  serving  the  Colo- 
rado Fuel  &  Iron  Company  as  attorney  and  assisting  in  the 
preparation  of  cases  against  strikers.  The  panel  from  which 
the  jury  was  drawn  was  selected  by  the  Sheriff  of  Las  Ani- 


22 

mas  County,  an  official  whose  sympathies  have  been  with  the 
mine  owners  from  the  beginning.  Much  of  the  evidence  on 
which  he  was  convicted  came  from  men  in  the  employ  of  a  de- 
tective agency  retained  by  the  coal  companies.  The  killing 
of  John  Nimmo,  a  mine  guard,  by  the  strikers  during  one  of 
the  many  skirmishes  between  them  and  the  deputies  was  the 
crime  for  which  Mr.  Lawson  was  convicted.  No  effort  was 
made  to  prove  that  he  fired  the  fatal  shot.  He  was  held  re- 
sponsible for  the  dea.th  of  Nimmo  because  he  was  leading 
the  strike  and  was  at  the  Ludlow  tent  colony  on  the  day  of 
the  battle.  Nimmo  was  one  of  a  small  army  of  deputy  sher- 
iffs, employed  and  paid  by  the  coal  companies  and  deputized 
by  subservient  sheriffs  who  made  little  or  no  effort  to  investi- 
gate their  records.  Thus  Sheriff  Jefferson  Farr  of  Huerfano 
County  testified  before  this  Commission  that  the  men  to 
whom  he  gave  deputies '  commissions  might  have  been,  so  far 
as  he  knew,  red-handed  murderers  fresh  from  the  scene  of 
their  crimes.  That  many  guards  deputized  in  this  illegal 
fashion  and  paid  by  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  were 
men  of  the  lowest  and  most  vicious  character  has  been  clearly 
established.  That  their  function  was  to  intimidate  and  harass 
the  strikers  had  been  demonstrated  in  the  strike  of  1903, 
1904,  and  had  been  made  apparent  early  in  the  present  strike 
by  the  shooting  to  death  of  Gerald  Lippiatt,  a  union  organizer, 
in  the  streets. of  Trinidad  immediately  after  the  calling  of  the 
strike,  by  a  Baldwin-Felts  detective  employed  by  the  Colo- 
rado Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  its  associates  and  deputized 
by  the  sheriff  of  Las  Animas  County.  In  fact  it  was  to  these 
deputies,  then  masquerading  as  national  guardsmen,  that  na- 
tional guard  officers  attempted  to  attribute  the  murder,  loot- 
ing and  pillage  that  accompanied  the  destruction  of  the  Lud- 
low tent  colony  of  strikers  later  in  the  strike. 

On  August  17  the  Supreme  Court  of  Colorado  issued  an 
order  prohibiting  Judge  Granby  Hillyer,  who  presided  at  Mr. 
Lawson 's  trial,  from  presiding  at  other  trials  of  strikers  or 
strike  leaders,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  been,  just  prior  to 
his  appointment,  an  attorney  for  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron 
Company  and  the  other  operators.  The  Court  also  issued  a 


23 

writ  of  supersedas  permitting  the  Lawson  case  to  come  be- 
fore it  on  its  merits. 

The  prosecution  and  conviction  of  Mr.  Lawson  under  these 
circumstances,  and  his  sentence  to  life  imprisonment  at  hard 
labor,  marked  the  lowest  depths  of  the  prostitution  of  Colo- 
rado's government  to  the  will  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron 
Company  and  its  associates.  It  is  the  crowning  infamy  of 
all  the  infamous  record  in  Colorado  of  American  institutions 
perverted  and  debauched  by  selfish  private  interests.  It  is 
anarchism  stripped  of  every  pretense  of  even  that  chimerical 
idealism  that  fires  the  unbalanced  mind  of  the  bomb  thrower. 
It  is  anarchism  for  profits  and  revenge,  and  it  menaces  the 
security  and  integrity  of  American  institutions  as  they  seldom 
have  been  menaced  before. 

Attorney  General  Farrar's  bias  in  favor  of  the  owners  and 
his  conception  of  fairness  is  well  shown  by  his  comment  on  the 
grand  jury  which  met  at  Trinidad  in  August,  1914,  and  which 
under  his  direction  returned  indictments  against  124  strikers 
and  strike  leaders.  Of  this  jury  Mr.  Farrar  testified  before 
the  Commission  in  Denver: 

I  desire  to  say  here  that  regardless  of  the  reports  which 
have  been  made,  I  have  never  seen  a  more  fair-minded 
body  of  men  gathered  together  under  conditions  such  as 
prevailed  there  than  were  the  twelve  men  who  consti- 
tuted that  grand  jury,  and  the  charges  which  were  made 
that  they  were  absolutely  one-sided  and  partisan  are  abso- 
lutely without  foundation  whatever. 

Following  is  the  composition  of  this  grand  jury  as  reported 
by  Mr.  John  A.  Fitch  of  the  staff  of  The  Survey,  an  investi- 
gator of  established  reliability  and  fairness : 

J.  S.  Caldwell,  proprietor  of  a  shoe  store.  Formerly 
with  the  Colorado  Supply  Company,  the  company  store 
department  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Company. 

James  Roberts,  public  trustee.  Secretary  to  F.  R-.  Wood, 
president  of  the  Temple  Fuel  Company. 


24 

Charles  Rapp,  assistant  cashier  Trinidad  National  Bank, 
of  which  W.  J.  Murray,  general  manager  of  the  Victor- 
American  Fuel  Company  is  stockholder  and  director. 
Formerly  with  Colorado  Supply  Company. 

Henry  C.  Cossam,  rancher.  Deputy  sheriff  since  April 
25,  1914.  Participated  in  one  of  the  so-called  battles. 

J.  H.  Wilson,  real  estate  and  insurance  agent.  Deputy 
sheriff  since  September  30,  1909.  In  charge  of  the 
deputies  who  attacked  the  Forbes  tent  colony  October 
17,  1913. 

William  C.  Riggs,  rancher,  whose  son,  W.  E.  Riggs,  has 
been  a  deputy  sheriff  since  January  20,  1911,  and  was 
in  some  of  the  battles  in  the  fall  of  1913. 

J.  W.  Davis,  a  Trinidad  barber. 

D.  J.  Herron,  life  insurance  agent  in  Trinidad. 

E.  E.  Phillips,  rancher,  Hoehne,  Colo. 
John  Webber,  a  Trinidad  merchant. 

Frank  Godden,  proprietor  Hotel  St.  Elmo,  Trinidad. 
David  West,  justice  of  the  peace,  Aguilar,  Colo. 

Mr.  Farrar's  bias  is  further  indicated  by  these  additional 
extracts  from  his  testimony  at  Denver: 

Chairman  Walsh:  What  steps,  if  any,  did  you  take  to 
ascertain  whether  or  not  the  military  authorities  and 
other  authorities  of  the  strike  down  there  were  acting  in 
conformity  with  the  constitution  and  statutes  of  the  State, 
and  whether  or  not  the  civil  authorities  were  being  de- 
prived in  any  way  of  their  powers? 

General  Farrar:  Very  little.  During  the  time  the  mili- 
tia was  there,  I  was  not  in  touch  with  the  situation  in  an 
official  capacity,  except  as  it  came  to  me  through  the 
Governor  with  the  exception  of  one  or  two  instances. 
General  Chase  and  I  did  not  have  any  conference.  He 
was  at  Trinidad,  and  during  the  time  the  militia  was  in 
the  field  I  was  not  at  Trinidad  although  on  two  occasions 
I  sent  my  deputy  down  to  Trinidad,  in  order  to  be  able 


to  assist  along  certain  lines  which  were  then  under  dis- 
cussion. And  I  therefore  say  that  my  relationship  with 
the  military  authorities  was  largely  indirectly  through 
the  Governor.  I  did,  of  course,  know  in  a  general  way 
what  was  being  done  down  there,  and  what  lines  were 
being  followed;  but  it  was  not  a  definite  daily  report  or 
information  coming  to  me.  I  will  say  further  in  that  re- 
spect that  there  were  a  number  of  attorneys  in  the  Na- 
tional Guard,  and  that  some  of  these  were  advising  Gen- 
eral Chase  as  to  the  local  situation.  My  advice  was,  of 
course,  of  a  more  general  nature  and  was  always  to  the 
Governor  with  the  exception  of  the  two  occasions  when 
General  Chase  and  I  met  in  conference  here. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  the 
testimony  taken  before  the  Military  Commission,  of  which 
Major  Boughton  was  the  head,  was  preserved? 

General  Farrar:  No,  I  know  nothing  of  it.  I  have 
never  seen  the  testimony  and  can  not  answer  your  ques- 
tions. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Did  your  office  make  any  effort  to 
ascertain  whether  or  not  the  civil  rights  of  any  person 
had  been  violated  or  abused? 

General  Farrar:  You  mean  by  this  Military  Commis- 
sion? 

Chairman  Walsh:    Yes,  by  the  Military  Commission. 
General  Farrar:    Yes. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Was  there  any  such  abuse  or  viola- 
tion? 

General  Farrar:  Not  that  I  was  able  to  learn.  Now 
I  must  qualify  that  by  saying  that  I  have  not  seen  the  tes- 
timony and  my  information  concerning  it  is  of  a  general 
nature.  *  *  * 

Asked  by  Chairman  Walsh:  "Have  you  ever  gone  over 
the  list  (of  National  Guardsmen)  to  ascertain  whether 
or  not  the  law  had  been  violated  in  reference  to  the  en- 


26 

rollment  of  the  men  in  the  mine?"  he  replied:    "Only 
through  consulting  the  officers  in  charge  of  that  matter. ' ' 

Chairman  Walsh:  What  steps,  if  any,  have  been  taken 
by  your  office  to  investigate  the  occurrence  at  Ludlow  of 
April  20,  1914? 

General  Farrar:  I  have  taken  every  opportunity  or 
every  step  which  opportunity  afforded  me.  As  stated  be- 
fore I  did  not  have  and  have  not  seen  the  testimony — the 
evidence  taken  by  the  Military  Court  Martial,  relative  to 
that  question.  *  *  * 

Chairman  Walsh:  I  am  asked  to  inquire  of  you  if  you 
know  about  the  looting  of  saloons  and  the  destruction  and 
confiscating  of  liquors  in  the  Snodgrass  store  at  Ludlow, 
also  the  complete  destruction  of  bakeries,  rooming  houses 
and  private  residences  at  Ludlow  by  the  militia? 

General  Farrar:    I  know  nothing  of  it. 

General  Farrar  did  give  his  attention  to  the  question  of 
whether  or  not  the  State  troops  acted  legally  under  Governor 
Ammon's  original  orders,  prohibiting  them  from  acting  as 
escorts  for  imported  strikebreakers.  He  testified  before  this 
Commission  that  he  went  to  Governor  Ammons  and  advised 
him  that  such  a  policy  was  not  justified  by  law  and  should  be 
abandoned. 

The  same  authorities  who  conducted  this  and  other  success- 
ful prosecutions  of  strikers  have  taken  no  steps  to  prosecute 
Lieutenant  K.  E.  Linderfelt  of  the  Colorado  National  Guard, 
or  other  members  of  the  guard  who  took  part  in  the  wanton 
slaughter  of  three  unarmed  strikers  held  prisoners  at  Lud- 
low, and  in  the  burning  of  the  Ludlow  tent  colony  which  re- 
sulted in  the  death  by  suffocation  and  burning  of  thirteen 
women  and  children.  Yet  at  the  coroner's  inquest  a  doctor 
who  examined  the  body  of  Louis  Tikas,  one  of  the  slain  strik- 
ers, testified  that  a  blow  on  the  head,  dealt  by  Lieut.  Linder- 
felt with  the  stock  of  his  rifle,  was  so  severe  that  it  might  have 
caused  death  even  had  Tikas  not  been  shot  three  times  through 
the  body  as  he  lay  prostrate  on  the  ground  by  men  under  Lin- 


27 

derfelt's  command.  It  is  true  that  Lieut.  Linderfelt  and  other 
members  of  the  guard  were  tried  by  a  court  martial  composed 
of  their  fellow  officers,  and  that  trifling  demotions  in  rank 
were  assessed  as  punishment.  Nor  have  the  same  authorities 
taken  steps  to  prosecute  officials  and  directors  of  the  Colorado 
Fuel  and  Iron  Company,  in  spite  of  evidence  gathered  by  the 
Commission,  and  which  has  become  common  knowledge,  that 
these  officials  through  their  agents  and  subordinates  created 
a  private  army  of  armed  guards  and  later  procured  the  enlist- 
ment of  these  gunmen  in  the  militia,  and  of  well- substantiated 
charges  that  these  disreputable  agents  of  the  company  in  the 
guise  of  militiamen  committed  various  crimes  from  robbery, 
burglary  and  arson  to  murder. 

The  prosecution  of  Mr.  Lawson  and  many  other  strikers  and 
union  officials  was  undertaken  and  conducted  in  compliance 
with  the  stand  taken  by  the  present  Governor  and  the  present 
Attorney  General  during  their  campaign  for  election  in  favor 
of  "law  and  order. "  Their  conduct  since  taking  office  must 
be  considered  a  confirmation  of  the  charge  made  by  their 
political  opponents  during  the  campaign  that  in  standing  for 
"law  and  order "  they  were  in  reality  standing  for  the  coal 
operators  against  the  strikers,  for  industrial  absolutism 
against  industrial  democracy,  and  that  their  conception  of 
maintaining  law  and  order  was  the  ruthless  suppression  of 
the  strike  and  imprisonment  or  execution  of  the  men  who  dared 
to  lead  it,  this  to  serve  as  an  object  lesson  to  others  who  might 
attempt  to  lead  a  similar  revolt  in  the  future. 

This  report  has  gone  at  some  length  into  the  present  situa- 
tion in  Colorado  before  proceeding  with  a  discussion  of  the 
strike  itself,  in  order  that  the  reader  may  understand  at  the 
outset  that  the  problems  involved  in  the  strike  are  present 
problems,  and  of  more  than  academic  and  historical  interest. 

Industrial  and  political  absolutism  might  have  continued 
indefinitely  in  southern  Colorado  without  attracting  the  atten- 
tion of  the  nation  had  it  not  been  for  the  existence  of  a  strong 
and  aggressive  labor  organization  to  which  the  miners  could 
turn  for  leadership  and  financial  assistance.  This  organiza- 


28 

tion  is  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  an  international 
union  with  approximately  400,000  members  in  this  country 
and  Canada.  It  was  represented  in  Colorado  by  Mr.  Lawson, 
a  member  of  the  executive  board,  Mr.  John  McLennan,  presi- 
dent of  District  15,  Mr.  E.  L.  Doyle,  secretary  of  District  15, 
and  by  other  organizers  and  officials  of  local  unions.  For  three 
years  preceding  the  strike  in  the  southern  field,  members  of 
the  union  employed  in  the  northern  Colorado  coal  field  had 
been  on  strike  and  engaged  in  a  losing  struggle  with  the  mine 
owners  in  that  field.  This  strike  involved  comparatively  few 
men  and  was  comparatively  insignificant. 

Officials  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  were  pledged  to  efforts 
to  extend  the  principles  of  collective  bargaining  and  industrial 
democracy  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  coal  mining  districts 
where  they  were  not  applied.  Familiar  with  conditions  exist- 
ing in  the  camps  of  southern  Colorado,  and  knowing  the  in- 
tense dissatisfaction  of  the  miners,  officials  of  the  union,  in 
the  summer  of  1913,  sent  organizers  into  the  district  to  in- 
crease the  union  membership,  and  at  the  same  time  began  an 
effort  to  obtain  a  conference  with  officials  of  the  mining  com- 
panies. Frank  Hayes,  vice  president  of  the  national  organi- 
zation, came  to  Colorado  and  formed  a  policy  committee  com- 
posed of  himself,  Mr.  Lawson,  Mr.  McLennan  and  Mr.  Doyle. 
Their  first  act  was  to  call  upon  Governor  Ammons  and  re- 
quest him  to  use  his  efforts  to  bring  about  a  conference  with 
the  leading  operators.  Governor  Ammons  endeavored  to  ar- 
range such  a  meeting  and  conferred  a  number  of  times  with 
Mr.  Welborn,  Mr.  Osgood,  and  Mr.  Brown,  representing  re- 
spectively the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Company,  the  Victor- 
American  Fuel  Company,  and  the  Rocky  Mountain  Fuel  Com- 
pany. They  refused  to  meet  with  the  union  representatives, 
on  the  ground  that  such  a  meeting  would  mean  recognition  of 
the  union. 

Failing  in  this  effort,  Governor  Ammons  sent  Deputy  Labor 
Commissioner  Edwin  V.  Brake  to  the  mining  districts  to  make 
an  investigation,  with  a  view  to  averting  a  strike.  Mr.  Brake 
arrived  in  Trinidad,  August  16th,  and  conferred  with  officers 


29 

and  directors  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  and  with  labor 
leaders  and  local  officials  of  the  company.  He  returned  to 
Denver  on  August  23,  and  reported  to  Governor  Ammons 
that  Trinidad  was  filled  with  armed  guards  and  detectives, 
that  one  of  the  company's  detectives  had  shot  and  killed  a 
union  organizer  on  the  street,  and  that  unless  something  were 
done  at  once,  an  outbreak  was  inevitable,  as  the  feeling  among 
the  miners  was  intense.  He  recommended  that  the  Governor 
send  for  the  sheriffs  of  the  two  counties,  and  insist  that  they 
disarm  every  man  in  the  district,  and  that  the  Governor  should 
remove  them  from  office  if  they  refused. 

Officials  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  have  testified  that 
they  were  anxious  to  avoid  a  strike,  because  of  the  certainty 
of  violence,  bloodshed,  and  suffering,  and  because  the  re- 
sources of  the  national  organization  had  been  depleted  by 
strikes  in  other  states.  On  August  26,  1913,  the  Policy  Com- 
mittee sent  the  following  letter  to  every  coal  operator  in  the 
district : 

Dear  Sir : 

For  many  years  the  coal  miners  of  Colorado  have  been 
desirous  of  working  under  union  conditions,  and  as  you 
no  doubt  know,  have  made  this  desire  known  on  innumer- 
able occasions,  a  large  number  of  them  being  discharged 
because  of  their  wishes  in  this  respect. 

While  we  know  your  past  policy  has  been  one  of  keen 
opposition  to  our  union,  we  are  hopeful  at  this  time  that 
you  will  look  at  this  matter  in  a  different  way,  and  will 
meet  with  us  in  joint  conference  for  the  purpose  of 
amicably  adjusting  all  points  at  issue  in  the  present  con- 
troversy. We  are  no  more  desirous  of  a  strike  than  you 
are,  and  it  seems  to  us  that  we  owe  it  to  our  respective 
interests,  as  well  as  the  general  public,  to  make  every 
honest  endeavor  to  adjust  our  differences  in  an  enlight- 
ened manner. 

It  ought  to  be  evident  to  yourself  and  your  associates 
that  Colorado  cannot  stand  alone  in  opposition  to  our 
movement.  The  operators  of  Wyoming,  Montana,  Wash- 


30 

ington,  Oklahoma,  Kansas,  Arkansas,  Missouri,  Texas, 
and  Iowa,  embracing  all  the  important  coal  producing 
states  west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  have  been  working 
under  contracts  with  our  union  for  years,  and  it  goes 
without  saying  that  the  operators  in  the  above  mentioned 
States,  who  once  held  the  same  opinion  concerning  our 
union  that  you  now  seem  to  hold,  are  at  this  time  well 
satisfied  with  our  organization,  and  are  much  pleased  over 
the  security  and  stability  given  to  the  industry  through 
the  medium  of  the  trade  agreement. 

Why  oppose  us  here,  spending  millions  of  dollars  in 
an  industrial  conflict  for  no  good  purpose?  Why  is  it 
not  possible  and  practical  for  you  to  do  in  this  state  what 
the  operators  in  all  the  neighboring  states  have  already 
done? 

We  feel  sure  that  you  appreciate  the  gravity  of  this 
situation,  and  will  do  your  part  to  meet  it  at  this  time, 
when  no  sting  will  be  left  behind,  which  is  always  the  re- 
sult of  a  strike  settlement. 

Let  us  meet  now  as  friends  and  proceed  to  settle  this 
entire  controversy  with  honor  to  ourselves,  with  credit 
to  our  people,  and  with  faith  in  each  other. 

Hoping  you  will  favor  us  with  a  prompt  reply  we  beg 
to  remain, 

Sincerely  yours, 

POLICY  COMMITTEE. 

With  the  exception  of  two  small  operators,  the  mine  owners 
did  not  reply  to  this  request  for  a  conference.  On  September 
8, 1913,  the  Committee  addressed  a  second  letter  to  the  opera- 
tors, notifying  them  that  the  miners  would  hold  a  conven- 
tion in  Trinidad  September  15,  and  inviting  them  to  attend. 
The  Committee  stated  that  this  was  a  final  effort  for  peace, 
and  expressed  the  belief  that  if  the  operators  would  meet  them 
in  joint  convention,  all  differences  would  be  amicably  adjusted. 
None  of  the  operators  replied  or  attended  the  convention. 

In  the  meantime,  Secretary  Wilson  of  the  Department  of 


31 

Labor  of  the  Federal  Government,  had  sent  Mr.  Ethelbert 
Stewart  to  the  offices  of  Mr.  Rockefeller  in  New  York,  in  the 
hope  of  obtaining  the  latter 's  aid  in  averting  a  strike.  Mr. 
Stewart  was  unable  to  see  Mr.  Rockefeller,  but  was  informed 
by  one  of  his  attorneys  that  the  entire  matter  was  being  han- 
dled by  the  executive  officials  of  the  company  in  Colorado. 
Mr.  Stewart  then  went  to  Colorado  and  endeavored  to  bring 
about  a  conference  between  the  operators  and  the  union  offi- 
cials. The  operators  refused  to  consider  such  a  conference. 
On  September  15  the  convention  of  miners  was  held  at  Trin- 
idad. Whether  or  not  the  men  who  sat  in  this  convention  and 
who  voted  for  the  strike,  were  representatives  of  the  great 
body  of  miners,  is  a  subject  of  controversy.  It  is  regarded  as 
relatively  unimportant,  in  its  bearing  on  the  state  of  mind  of 
the  mining  communities,  and  their  attitude  toward  a  strike. 

Spies,  camp  marshals,  and  armed  guards  infested  the  min- 
ing camps  and  the  city  of  Trinidad,  and  the  miner  who  might 
wish  to  attend  such  a  convention,  or  to  attend  local  meetings 
for  the  selection  of  delegates,  knew  that  to  do  so  would  be 
to  incur  prompt  discharge  and  expulsion  from  the  town. 

In  Huerfano  County  alone,  326  men,  many  imported  from 
other  states,  had  been  commissioned  as  deputy  sheriffs  by 
Sheriff  Jefferson  Farr  prior  to  September  1.  Sheriff  Farr 
admitted,  before  this  Commission,  that  for  all  he  knew  they 
might  have  been  red-handed  murderers,  fresh  from  the  scenes 
of  their  crimes,  and  that  they  were  employed,  armed,  and  paid 
by  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  the  other  large 
companies.  The  first  violence  had  already  occurred  in  the 
killing  of  Gerald  Lippiatt,  a  union  organizer,  who  was  shot 
down  on  a  street  in  Trinidad  by  a  detective  in  the  employ  of 
the  operators. 

The  convention  voted  to  call  a  strike  for  September  25, 1913. 
On  that  day,  from  8,000  to  10,000  miners,  comprising  from  40 
to  100  per  cent  of  the  employees  at  the  various  camps,  packed 
their  meager  household  belongings  on  carts  and  wagons,  and, 
accompanied  by  their  women  and  children,  moved  down  the 
canyons  through  a  drenching  fall  of  snow,  sleet,  and  rain,  to 


32 

the  tent  colonies  that  had  been  established  by  the  union  offi- 
cials. This  sudden  exodus  became  necessary  because,  in 
many  of  the  coal  camps,  the  companies  owned  every  house 
and  every  foot  of  ground.  No  more  eloquent  proof  could  be 
given  of  the  intense  discontent  of  the  miners  and  their  fami- 
lies, and  of  their  determination  to  endure  any  hardship  rather 
than  remain  at  work  under  existing  conditions. 

From  the  day  when  it  became  apparent  that  there  was  no 
hope  of  obtaining  a  conference  with  the  operators,  or  of  gain- 
ing relief  for  the  miners  without  a  strike,  officials  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  placed  themselves,  and  the  resources  of  their 
national  organization  at  the  disposal  of  the  miners,  and  as- 
sumed full  charge  of  the  conduct  of  the  strike. 

Those  strikers  who  had  not  previously  joined  the  union 
were  enrolled  on  their  arrival  in  the  tent  colonies,  and  addi- 
tional local  unions  were  formed,  the  members  electing  their 
own  officers.  A  system  of  strike  benefits  was  instituted,  pay- 
ments coming  from  the  funds  of  the  national  organization. 
Officials  of  the  union  ordered  a  supply  of  tents  for  the  colo- 
nies, and  when  the  strikers  arrived,  the  newly-created  com- 
munities were  organized  for  community  life.  Mr.  Lawson 
spent  much  of  his  time  with  the  strikers  in  their  tent  colonies, 
endeavoring  by  personal  influence  to  maintain  harmony  and 
good  spirits  within  the  colonies,  and  to  discourage  the  more 
reckless  from  acts  of  violence. 

The  part  played  by  officials  of  the  United  Mine  Workers, 
just  before  and  immediately  after  the  strike  was  called,  has 
been  recorded  at  this  point  because  of  the  allegation  of  the 
operators  that  the  strike  was  caused  solely  by  the  activity  of 
these  officials,  and  was  forced  on  their  employes  against  the 
latter 's  will.  The  conclusion  here  reached  is  that  the  agita- 
tion, leadership,  and  financial  assistance  given  by  the  United 
Mine  Workers  of  America,  caused  the  strike  only  in  the  sense 
that  they  hastened  and  made  more  effectual  a  revolt  against 
intolerable  conditions. 

Disregarding,  for  the  present,  the  seven  formal  demands  of 
the  strikers,  this  report  will  first  take  up  the  alleged  causes  of 


33 

the  strike,  as  set  forth  in  the  Brief  for  the  Striking  Miners, 
filed  with  a  sub-committee  of  the  Committee  on  Mines  and 
Mining,  House  of  Representatives,  Sixty-third  Congress,  by 
Horace  N.  Hawkins,  attorney  for  the  United  Mine  Workers, 
and  E.  P.  Costigan  and  James  H.  Brewster,  special  counsel 
for  the  strikers  before  the  Congressional  Committee.  In  this 
brief  the  strikers  set  forth  five  alleged  causes,  as  follows : 

1.  Ignorance  of  the  owners  of  the  great  coal  produc- 
ing properties  concerning  actual  conditions  under  which 
their  employees  live  and  labor. 

2.  The  lack  of  any  proper  sense  of  personal  responsi- 
bility on  the  part  of  those  owners,  for  what  is  wrong 
in  those  conditions. 

3.  The  maintenance  by  the  coal-mining  operators  of 
a  modern  system  of  monopolistic  feudalism,  with  many 
of  the  evil  features  of  the  old  feudalism,  but  without  many 
of  those  features  which  made  it  somewhat  beneficent. 

4.  The  insistence  by  the  operators  upon  their  right  to 
conduct  a  vast  coal-producing  business, — a  business  in 
reality  affected  with  a  public  interest, — regardless  of  how 
their  conduct  may  affect  society  at  large,  and  as  if  it  were 
a  small  private  business. 

5.  The  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  the  operators  to 
concede  to  their  employees  the  right  of  effective  organi- 
zation, while  themselves  maintaining  a  complete  combi- 
nation and  organization. 

The  first  two  charges  are  closely  related,  and  the  last  three 
are  similarly  related.  Taken  together,  they  constitute  a 
charge  that  the  owners  of  the  mining  properties,  while  them- 
selves exhibiting  ignorance  and  indifference  regarding  the 
welfare  of  the  thousands  of  men  employed  in  the  industry,  at 
the  same  time  insisted  on  denying  to  these  men  the  right  to 
organize  in  order  that  they  might  themselves,  through  col- 
lective action,  seek  redress,  either  directly  or  through  the 


34 

government,  for  the  evils  that  arose  under  this  absentee,  irre- 
sponsible, and  ignorant  ownership. 

That  the  leading  mine  owners  were,  in  fact,  ignorant  of  the 
conditions  under  which  the  miners  and  their  families  worked 
and  lived,  is  clearly  established  by  the  evidence.  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller, Jr.,  the  most  influential  single  owner,  had  not  visited 
Colorado  for  ten  years,  at  the  time  of  the  strike,  nor  had  he 
attended  a  directors '  meeting  during  that  period.  Testifying 
before  the  Congressional  Committee  and  before  this  Commis- 
sion, he  said  that  he  had  "not  the  slightest  idea"  of  what 
wages  the  miners  received,  of  what  rent  the  company  charged 
them  for  their  houses,  or  of  other  details  vitally  affecting 
their  welfare.  He  excused  himself  on  the  plea  that  in  choos- 
ing Mr.  Bowers  as  chairman  of  the  Executive  Board,  and 
Mr.  Welborn  as  President  of  the  company,  he  had  selected 
men  in  whose  judgment,  fairness  and  humanity  he  had  great 
confidence,  and  that  there  his  duty  ended.  In  striking  con- 
trast with  this,  utter  ignorance  of  actual  working  and  living 
conditions  in  the  coal  camps,  was  the  detailed  information 
furnished  to  Mr.  Rockefeller  by  Messrs.  Bowers  and  Welborn, 
regarding  the  progress  of  their  successful  efforts  to  break 
the  strike. 

Such  details  as  wages,  working  conditions,  and  the  political, 
social,  and  moral  welfare  of  the  15,000  or  20,000  inhabitants 
of  his  coal  camps,  apparently  held  no  interest  for  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller, for  as  late  as  April,  1914,  he  professed  ignorance  of 
these  details.  Yet  he  followed,  step  by  step,  the  struggle  of 
his  executive  officials  to  retain  arbitrary  power,  and  to  pre- 
vent the  installation  of  machinery  for  collective  bargaining, 
by  which  abuses  might  automatically  be  corrected,  and  he 
supported  and  encouraged  this  struggle  in  every  letter  he 
wrote  to  his  agents. 

The  very  suggestion  that  a  miner  in  southern  Colorado 
could  have  appealed  to  Mr.  Rockefeller  personally  for  the 
removal  of  a  grievance,  is  an  absurdity  that  need  not  be  con- 
sidered. Indeed,  an  authorized  representative  of  the  United 
States  Government,  who  called  on  Mr.  Rockefeller  before  the 


35 

strike  at  his  office  in  New  York  City,  succeeded  in  seeing  only 
one  of  his  attorneys,  and  by  this  attorney  he  was  told  that  the 
questions  at  issue  in  Colorado  must  be  handled  by  the  execu- 
tive officials  on  the  ground. 

In  Colorado  the  executive  officials  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  & 
Iron  Company,  and  the  owners  and  officials  of  the  other  lead- 
ing companies,  maintained  their  offices  in  Denver,  200  miles 
north  of  the  mines,  which  they  seldom  visited.  Neither  Mr. 
Bowers  nor  Mr.  Welborn  was  charged  with  the  actual  opera- 
tion of  the  mines,  and  knew  little  about  this  part  of  the  busi- 
ness. Operations  were  in  charge  of  Mr.  Weitzel,  manager  of 
the  fuel  department,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Pueblo, 
still  many  miles  from  the  mining  camps.  Mr.  Weitzel  visited 
the  mines  "not  frequently,"  and  received  reports  in  turn 
from  assistant  managers  and  superintendents.  He  did  not 
talk  with  the  coal  miners.  He  did  have  a  personal  acquaint- 
ance with  the  mine  superintendents,  "except  possibly  one  or 
two." 

Thus  there  existed  a  condition  wherein  all  personal  rela- 
tionship and  personal  responsibility  vanished  at  some  point 
in  the  long  procession  of  intermediaries  standing  between  the 
miner  in  his  room  underground,  and  the  directors  and  own- 
ers in  New  York.  His  personal  contact  seldom  got  beyond 
the  foreman  or  pit  boss,  himself  responsible  for  results  to  a 
superintendent,  who  in  turn  was  responsible  to  an  assistant 
manager,  and  so  on  up  the  scale  until  the  needs  and  aspira- 
tions and  well-being  of  6,000  miners  and  their  families  ceased 
to  exist  as  pressing  realities  for  the  responsible  officials  whose 
word  was  law  in  these  communities. 

Indeed,  the  testimony  and  letters  of  Mr.  Bowers  will  clearly 
show  that  those  improvements  and  concessions  which  had 
been  granted  by  the  company  prior  to  the  strike,  such  as  the 
eight  hour  day,  the  semi-monthly  pay  day,  and  the  notice  in- 
viting miners  to  select  check  weighmen,  were  granted  from 
motives  which  must  be  regarded  as  selfish,  and  in  which  a 
desire  for  the  welfare  of  the  miners  was  secondary  at  best. 

The  record  shows,  then,  that  Mr.  Rockefeller,  controlling 


36 

the  company  that  admittedly  led  in  fixing  policies  for  the 
Colorado  operators,  had  no  knowledge  of  actual  conditions  in 
the  coal  camps,  and  assumed  no  personal  responsibility  for 
the  welfare  of  his  employees.  It  shows,  further,  that  he  did 
not  maintain  this  aloof  attitude  after  the  strike  began,  but 
threw  all  his  great  influence  behind  the  executive  officials  in 
support  of  their  stubborn  resistance  to  the  demand  of  the 
men  for  collective  bargaining  through  the  only  effective  or- 
ganization at  their  disposal. 

The  record  further  shows  that  responsible  executive  offi- 
cials in  Denver  lacked  personal  knowledge  of  living  and  work- 
ing conditions  in  the  coal  camps,  and  personal  touch  with  the 
miners,  in  almost  the  same  degree  as  did  the  controlling  direc- 
tors and  stockholders.  Their  information  came  almost  en- 
tirely at  second  hand,  in  the  reports  of  subordinates  who  them- 
selves received  much  of  it  at  second  hand  from  local  officials. 

It  establishes  clearly  the  charge  that  a  great  gulf  of  ignor- 
ance, which  can  be  explained  only  by  indifference,  stood  be- 
tween any  responsible  owner  or  manager,  and  an  understand- 
ing of  the  actual  needs  and  conditions  of  the  miners.  In  this 
respect  the  situation  was  not  different  from  that  which  exists 
in  other  industries  conducted  on  a  large  scale  by  large  corpor- 
ations. 

This  lack  of  knowledge  of  actual  conditions,  and  of  personal 
touch  with  their  employees,  on  the  part  of  the  owners  of  large 
industrial  corporations,  presents  one  of  the  most  serious  prob- 
lems of  industrial  relations,  and  is  in  itself  a  convincing 
argument  that  strong  labor  unions  and  effective  machinery 
for  collective  bargaining,  must  be  not  only  permitted,  but 
encouraged  and  insisted  upon  in  such  industries. 

The  Eev.  Eugene  S.  Gaddis,  superintendent  of  the  socio- 
logical department  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Company, 
during  the  strike  and  until  February,  1915,  testified  before 
the  Commission,  May  19,  1915 : 

For  several  years  prior  to  the  fifteen  months'  "war" 
in  Colorado,  neither  Bowers  nor  Welborn  were  cognizant 
of  policies  and  practices  in  dealing  with  the  miners,  ex- 


37 

cept  as  represented  to  them  by  inferior  officers.  Mr. 
Bowers  took  the  position  that  to  grant  the  right  of  appeal, 
with  the  type  of  characters  with  whom  they  had  to  deal, 
was  to  invite  chaos, — appeals  to  Welborn,  if  they  were 
considered  at  all,  would  only  emphasize  the  severity  of 
the  regime.  He  told  me,  his  men  in  the  Boston  Building 
did  not  take  complaints  over  each  other's  heads;  and 
that  the  camp  regime  was  the  same. 

I  am  glad  to  say  that  I  know  Mr.  Welborn  disagreed 
with  this  position.  A  '  *  down-the-canyon "  verdict  was 
not  likely  to  be  reversed  at  the  office  of  the  general  boss, 
for  he  is  the  king  bolt  of  the  machine  that  must  be  kept 
running  smoothly.  The  superintendent  can  easily  erect 
a  wall  between  himself  and  the  division  manager,  which 
only  calloused  temerity  would  tackle.  At  the  bottom  of 
the  pit  with  pick  and  shovel,  the  miner  frequently  found 
a  grafting  pit  boss  on  his  back.  The  camp  superinten- 
dents as  a  whole  impress  me  as  most  uncouth,  ignorant, 
immoral,  and  in  many  instances,  the  most  brutal  set  of 
men  that  we  have  ever  met.  Blasphemous  bullies. 

From  the  foregoing  there  cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt  that 
the  strikers  were  fully  within  the  facts  when,  in  their  brief  to 
the  Congressional  Committee,  they  charged,  first,  that  the 
owners  of  the  great  coal-mining  properties  were  ignorant 
concerning  the  actual  conditions  under  which  their  employees 
live  and  labor ;  and,  second,  that  there  was  a  lack  of  any  proper 
sense  of  personal  responsibility  on  the  part  of  these  owners 
for  what  is  wrong  in  those  conditions. 

As  the  other  underlying  causes  of  the  strike,  the  strikers 
charged:  "the  maintenance  by  the  operators  of  a  modern  sys- 
tem of  monopolistic  feudalism,  with  many  of  the  evil  features 
of  the  old  feudalism,  but  without  many  of  those  features  which 
made  it  somewhat  beneficent ;  the  insistence  by  the  operators 
upon  their  right  to  conduct  a  vast  coal-producing  business, — 
a  business  in  reality  affected  with  a  public  interest, — regard- 
less of  how  their  conduct  may  affect  society  at  large,  and  as 


38 

if  it  were  a  small  private  business ;  and  the  unwillingness  on 
the  part  of  the  operators  to  concede  to  their  employees  the 
right  of  effective  organization,  while  themselves  maintaining 
a  complete  combination  and  organization. " 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out  how  inseparable  are  the 
economic  elements  and  the  political  elements  of  a  system  of 
feudalism  such  as  that  charged  by  the  strikers  in  Colorado, 
and  the  three  alleged  causes  of  the  strike  stated  in  the  fore- 
going must  be  considered  in  their  relation  one  to  the  others. 
For  suppression  of  unionism  led  to  political  domination,  and 
political  domination  enabled  the  continued  suppression  of 
any  attempt  to  organize. 

That  the  operators  of  southern  Colorado  denied  their  men 
the  right  of  collective  bargaining,  is  admitted.  They  refused 
to  enter  into  conference  or  negotiation  with  officials  of  the 
only  labor  organization  to  which  their  men  could  have  be- 
longed, and  insisted  that  they  alone  must  determine  wages 
and  working  conditions,  dealing  with  each  miner  as  an  indi- 
vidual, and  giving  him  no  recourse  if  he  became  dissatisfied, 
except  to  quit  his  employment,  pack  his  belongings,  and  with 
his  family  leave  his  home  and  community  to  seek  work  else- 
where. 

This  freedom  to  quit  his  job  and  remove  himself  and  his 
family  to  another  State,  said  Mr.  John  C.  Osgood,  chief  exec- 
utive and  owner  of  the  Victor- American  Fuel  Company,  is  suf- 
ficient in  itself,  and  other  protection  is  not  needed.  Mr.  Osgood 
repudiated  the  entire  principle  of  collective  bargaining,  de- 
claring that  even  were  the  United  Mine  Workers  incorporated 
and  financially  responsible  as  an  organization,  he  would  refuse 
to  deal  with  them. 

During  the  strike  Mr.  Osgood  shared  with  Mr.  Welborn, 
president  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company,  the  lead- 
ership of  the  operators  in  formulating  and  carrying  out  poli- 
cies, and  at  least  during  the  critical  period  of  the  strike  they 
worked  in  perfect  harmony.  It  seems  fair  to  accept  his  posi- 
tion as  more  nearly  representing  that  of  the  operators  as  a 
whole,  than  the  rather  vague  and  general  declaration  of  some 


39 

of  the  other  mine  owners,  that  they  accept  the  general  prin- 
ciple of  collective  bargaining  but  refuse  to  deal  with  the  par- 
ticular union  here  involved,  for  particular  reasons.  Certainly 
Mr.  Welborn's  objections  to  recognizing  the  United  Mine 
Workers  are  urged  on  grounds  that  would  apply  equally  as 
well  to  any  organization  that  could  be  imagined  to  exist  in 
the  same  field. 

The  reasons  assigned  by  the  operators  for  refusing  to  deal 
with  the  United  Mine  Workers  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 
That  it  is  an  illegal  and  criminal  organization. 
That  it  violates  its  contracts. 

That  efficiency  is  diminished,  output  limited,  and  acci- 
dents increased  when  authority  is  divided  between  the 
management  and  the  union. 

That  the  union  is  unnecessary  for  the  protection  of  the 
miners '  interests,  because  better  conditions  exist  under 
a  non-union  regime. 
That  there  is  no  appreciable  demand  for  unionism  by 

the  miners. 

That  it  violates  the  freedom  of  its  members. 
That  the  union  seeks  an  unwarranted  interference  with 
the  owner's  right  to  manage  his  property  as  he  sees  fit. 

To  prove  the  illegality  of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  the 
operators  quote  a  decision  by  Judge  Dayton,  of  the  Federal 
Court  of  West  Virginia,  which  has  been  since  overruled  by  a 
unanimous  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.  This  charge, 
lodged  against  an  organization  that  is  regularly  recognized 
and  negotiated  with  by  the  employers  of  400,000  coal  miners 
in  this  country  and  Canada,  and  that  numbers  among  its  mem- 
bers a  cabinet  officer,  and  a  distinguished  public  official  of  the 
State  of  New  York,  hardly  requires  further  consideration.  It 
was  lodged  early  in  the  strike,  as  one  of  the  reasons  for  the 
initial  refusal  to  meet  representatives  of  the  Union  in  confer- 
ence, and  therefore  does  not  require  here  a  discussion  of  al- 
leged lawless  acts  committed  by  union  officials  during  the 
present  strike. 


40 

The  following  statement  regarding  the  United  Mine  Work- 
ers is  from  the  pen  of  Prof.  Edwin  R.  A.  Seligman,  of  Colum- 
bia University,  an  economist  whose  attitude  in  the  Colorado 
strike  has  been  indorsed  as  fair  by  the  President  of  the  Colo- 
rado Fuel  &  Iron  Company : 

The  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  is  not  an  irre- 
sponsible organization ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  numerically 
the  strongest  union  in  the  world ;  it  has  a  membership  of 
more  than  400,000  paying  dues  to  it;  it  is  established  in 
practically  every  coal-producing  state  in  our  country,  and 
in  practically  every  mining  province  in  Canada;  75  per 
cent  of  all  coal  miners  on  this  continent  are  employed 
under  the  terms  of  contracts  which  the  organization  nego- 
tiates with  mine  owners;  the  relations  existing  between 
the  miners  and  operators  are  cordial  and  friendly;  the 
officers  of  the  miners '  union  are  men  of  high  character 
and  marked  ability.  Mr.  John  P.  White,  the  president,  is 
recognized  by  employers  in  the  coal  industry  as  a  man 
of  high  ideals,  great  intelligence,  and  unquestioned  hon- 
esty. Mr.  Frank  J.  Hayes,  the  vice  president,  is  equally 
well  regarded.  Mr.  Green,  the  secretary-treasurer,  is  the 
majority  leader  in  the  Ohio  State  senate,  and  speaker  pro 
tempore  of  that  body.  Are  these  the  kind  of  labor  lead- 
ers to  be  encouraged  or  to  be  frowned  down?  (New  York 
Times  Annalist  for  First  Week  of  May,  1914.) 

The  violation  of  contracts  by  local  unions  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  is  an  evil  that  shows  itself  with  more  or  less 
frequency  in  fields  where  the  Union  is  recognized.  Even  the 
Colorado  operators  who  had  had  union  experience,  including 
General  Manager  Weitzel,  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron 
Company,  admit  that  the  union  officials  endeavor  in  good  faith 
to  prevent  contract  breaking,  and  they  blame  the  local  unions 
and  the  local  leaders.  They  also  charge  that  union  politics 
at  times  enters  into  the  failure  of  even  the  highest  officials  to 
use  their  utmost  endeavors  to  prevent  such  violations. 

Similar  charges  have  been  made  before  the  Commission  by 


41 

operators  in  other  states.  Thus  Mr.  Peabody,  of  Chicago,  testi- 
fied that  he  had  suffered  from  the  violation  of  contracts.  At  the 
same  time,  he  asserts  that  contracts  kept  90  per  cent  of  the  time 
are  better  than  no  contracts  at  all,  as  an  insurance  of  stabil- 
ity, and  that  he  would  not  willingly  go  back  to  non-union  con- 
ditions. He  further  admits  that  mine  owners  sometimes  break 
contracts  with  the  union,  thus  confirming  in  part  the  plea  of 
witnesses  for  the  United  Mine  Workers  that  violation  of  con- 
tract is  an  evil  that  exists  in  all  business  relations,  and  that 
the  union  is  on  a  parity  with  the  owners  in  the  record  of  such 
violations.  They  point  out  that  the  Colorado  operators  base 
one  of  their  principal  objections  to  the  union  on  the  union 
demand,  in  organized  fields,  that  the  union  dues  and  fines  be 
deducted  from  the  wages  due  to  miners,  and  paid  directly  by 
the  employer  to  the  union ;  and  they  urge  that  in  opposing  this 
custom,  the  operators  strike  at  the  most  effectual  means  by 
which  union  officials  may  prevent  violations  of  contract. 

The  charge  that  miners  protected  by  the  union  limit  output 
and  work  less  efficiently,  cannot  be  supported  by  evidence 
gathered  by  the  Commission.  On  the  contrary,  Mr.  Peabody 
testified  that  the  standard  of  efficiency,  sobriety,  and  morals 
had  risen  tremendously  since  the  miners  became  union  mem- 
bers. His  testimony  on  this  point  has  been  quoted  in  the 
introduction  to  this  report. 

That  the  existence  of  a  strong  union  slackens  discipline, 
and  thereby  contributes  to  an  increase  of  accidents,  is  a  charge 
with  slightly  more  backing.  Summary  dismissals  for  dis- 
obedience of  orders  designed  to  safeguard  against  accidents 
are  rendered  more  difficult.  Mr.  Peabody  makes  this  point 
against  the  unions  in  his  testimony.  Union  officials  assert 
that  the  charge  is  unjustified  by  the  facts,  and  they  point  to 
the  increase  in  intelligence  and  sobriety  that  has  taken  place 
in  organized  districts  through  the  influence  of  the  union.  They 
also  point  to  the  excessive  record  of  fatalities  in  the  non-union 
Colorado  mines,  a  record  higher  than  in  any  organized  dis- 
trict. They  assert,  further,  that  only  where  a  strong  union 
exists  can  legislation  safeguarding  the  mines  against  acci- 


42 

dent  be  obtained  and  enforced,  and  they  point  to  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  Colorado  companies  to  the  enactment  of  such  leg- 
islation. 

In  support  of  their  claim  that  a  union  is  not  required  for 
the  protection  of  the  men's  interests,  the  Colorado  operators 
urge  that  they  voluntarily  have  granted  concessions  and  im- 
provements. It  is  hard  to  believe  that  this  contention  is  made 
in  good  faith.  Letters  from  Mr.  Bowers  to  Mr.  Murphy  show 
that  concessions  and  improvements  were  granted  in  the  mines 
of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Compan^,  in  order  to  remove 
the  incentive  of  the  miners  to  join  the  union,  and  were  thus 
directly  brought  about  by  the  existence  of  the  union  in  other 
fields. 

Even  after  these  concessions  had  been  made,  the  wage  scale 
in  Colorado  remained  10  per  cent  below  the  scale  in  the  neigh- 
boring state  of  Wyoming,  where  the  mine  owners  recognize 
the  United  Mine  Workers  and  deal  with  strong  local  unions. 
The  following  extract  from  a  letter  from  Mr.  Bowers  to  Mr. 
Starr  J.  Murphy,  of  Mr.  Rockefeller's  personal  staff,  conclu- 
sively proves  the  part  played  by  the  existence  elsewhere  of 
strong  unions  in  determining  conditions  in  Colorado.  It 
was  written  on  September  19, 1913,  four  days  before  the  strike 
began : 

We  have  spent  a  great  deal  of  time,  and  studied  with  a 
good  deal  of  care,  all  the  questions  in  connection  with  la- 
bor unions  among  miners  and  men  employed  by  indus- 
trial corporations  during  the  past  two  or  three  years, 
anticipating  in  time  having  to  meet  the  demands  of  union 
labor.  We  follow  the  eastern  rules  of  mining  as  to  wages, 
prices  per  ton  and  the  several  different  features  that  ob- 
tain in  the  mining  industries,  both  where  union  and  non- 
union labor  is  employed. 

We  have  found  it  desirable  to  take  up  from  time  to 
time  these  questions  that  were  likely  to  lead  to  contro- 
versy and  study  them  from  every  angle,  and  where  we 
could  meet  them  by  making  certain  economic  changes 
^without  loss  we  have  taken  the  initiative  in  their  appli- 


43 

cation  in  this  mining  district.  We  have  heen  opposed  by 
some  of  our  competitor  operators,  whose  notions  of  fair- 
ness are  in  our  opinion  somewhat  lopsided,  but  our  posi- 
tion among  them  was  such  that  we  have  been  able  to  in- 
augurate and  carry  out  these  changes  without  serious 
criticism  on  the  part  of  these  competitors.  Today,  they 
are  patting  us  on  our  backs. 

We  studied  the  eight-hour  problem  which  we  knew 
would  come  up  in  the  form  of  bills  in  the  Legislature  and 
would  be  pushed  through  by  agitators  on  the  ground  who 
were  backing  them,  so  we  anticipated  these  matters  and 
experimented  with  eight  hour  labor.  *  *  *  Generally 
speaking,  we  found  that  working  our  mines  eight  hours 
saved  us  in  overhead  expenses  and  in  other  ways  enough 
to  offset  any  loss  that  might  come  from  an  eight  instead 
of  a  nine  or  ten  hour  day  in  many  of  our  mines.  After 
this  had  been  thoroughly  settled  in  our  minds,  we  estab- 
lished an  eight  hour  day  for  all  coal  miners,  complying 
with  the  union  rules  in  that  respect,  but  operating  as  non- 
union mines.  *  *  *  Another  question  that  we  knew 
would  come  up  in  case  of  agitation  was  the  semi-monthly 
pay. 

This  report  will  discuss  the  eight-hour  day  and  the  semi- 
monthly pay  day  later.  It  is  enough  here  to  point  out  that  the 
semi-monthly  pay  was  required  by  the  laws  of  Colorado,  which 
the  company  had  previously  violated  and  ignored,  at  the  time 
when  it  was  granted,  and  that  the  people  of  Colorado  had  de- 
clared for  an  eight-hour  law  many  years  before.  This  fact 
is  not  mentioned  in  the  letter  quoted  above,  and  apparently 
Mr.  Eockefeller's  agents  were  not  animated  by  any  sudden 
respect  for  law  when  they  ordered  these  changes,  but  solely 
by  their  desire  to  defeat  unionization. 

The  allegation  of  the  operators  that  their  employees  did  not 
desire  to  join  the  union  or  to  go  on  strike  is  best  answered  by 
the  fact  that  8,000  miners,  according  to  Mr.  Bowers'  own 
estimate,  left  their  homes  with  their  wives  and  children  on 


44 

September  23  and  moved  down  the  canyons  through  a  snow 
storm  to  take  up  their  residence  in  the  tent  colonies.  That 
8,000  miners  could  have  been  intimidated  by  a  handful  of 
union  organizers  into  taking  this  step  is  unbelievable.  In 
the  case  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company,  President 
Welborn's  own  estimate  is  that  70  per  cent  of  their  miners 
struck. 

The  complaint  of  the  operators  that  the  United  Mine  Work- 
ers proposed  to  invade  the  personal  liberty  of  the  miners  is 
based  on  the  custom  of  the  union  in  other  fields  of  insisting  on 
the  so-called  check-off  system.  Under  this  system,  the  em- 
ployer deducts  union  dues  and  fines  from  the  wages  of  miners 
on  pay  days,  and  turns  the  money  thus  collected  over  to  the 
union  treasurer.  By  this  method  it  is  possible  to  force  every 
miner  to  join  the  union,  and  to  penalize  him  for  violating  union 
rules.  Both  union  officials  and  mine  owners  in  organized 
fields  have  indorsed  the  scheme  as  the  only  effective  means  of 
enforcing  compliance  with  contracts  and  agreements  between 
the  owners  and  the  workmen,  and  of  preventing  the  enjoyment 
of  union  advantages  by  miners  who  are  unwilling  to  pay  their 
share  toward  the  cost  of  these  advantages.  The  check-off 
system,  where  it  exists,  is  a  subject  of  more  controversy  among 
members  and  officials  of  labor  unions  than  among  mine  own- 
ers, who  usually  recognize  its  advantages  in  enforcing  com- 
pliance with  contracts  and  preventing  unauthorized  local 
strikes.  For  the  operators  of  southern  Colorado  to  urge  it 
as  one  of  the  objections  which  animated  their  opposition  to 
the  union  is  disingenuous  in  the  extreme.  Without  touching 
here  on  other  ways  in  which  these  operators  have  disregarded 
the  rights  and  liberties  of  their  miners,  it  is  enough  to  point 
out  that  they  have  not  hesitated  to  deduct  from  their  em- 
ployees' wages  hospital  fees  and  other  charges  not  voluntarily 
incurred  by  the  miners. 

It  is  in  the  last  objection  that  has  been  cited  that  the  real 
cause  of  the  operators'  refusal  to  negotiate  is  to  be  found. 
*  '  The  union  seeks  an  unwarranted  interference  with  our  right 
to  manage  our  properties  as  we  see  fit. ' '  To  concede  to  their 


45 

employees  a  voice  in  determining  wages,  hours  and  working 
conditions  within  the  mines,  and  self-government  in  their 
towns  and  villages,  was  a  proposal  intolerable  to  men  who  for 
years  had  ruled  the  mines  and  the  mining  communities  with 
arbitrary  and  unchallenged  power. 

After  alleging  inferior  quality  of  output  and  limitation  of 
the  right  to  discharge  as  specific  objections  to  the  union,  Mr. 
Bowers  in  a  letter  already  quoted  sums  up  the  evils  of  union- 
ism as  "numerous  requirements  that  practically  take  away 
the  mines  from  the  control  of  the  owners  and  operators,  and 
place  them  in  the  hands  of  these,  in  many  cases,  disreputable 
agitators,  socialists  and  anarchists. " 

And  Mr.  Welborn,  asked  ' '  Do  you  think  that  society  has  no 
interest  in  the  mining  of  that  coal,  that  it  is  your  business ! ' ' 
replied :  "  I  am  very  sure  it  is  my  business. ' '  But  he  admits 
that  without  a  union  men  are  at  the  mercy  of  the  employer. 

This  defense  of  the  denial  of  the  right  to  organize  comes  so 
as  an  echo  from  the  past  that  it  seems  unnecessary  to  discuss 
here  the  broad  principles  that  every  enlightened  employer, 
economist  and  layman  accepts,  and  which  point  to  collective 
bargaining  as  the  only  approach  to  a  solution  of  the  problems 
of  industry  and  democracy.  Instead,  this  report  will  point 
out  the  actual  results  of  such  denial  in  the  mines  and  towns  of 
southern  Colorado,  and  in  doing  this  will  present  evidence 
bearing  also  on  the  charge  that  the  operators  maintained  a 
system  of  feudalism  and  the  charge  that  they  conducted  their 
enterprises  without  regard  for  the  welfare  of  society.  For 
both  the  existence  of  a  modern  feudalism  and  the  operators* 
disregard  of  the  welfare  of  society  must  be  attributed,  in  the 
last  analysis,  to  the  absence  of  machinery  for  effective  col- 
lective bargaining. 

With  no  strong  union  in  the  field  to  limit  their  power  to 
discharge  without  cause,  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Com- 
pany had  used  this  power  to  build  up  a  powerful  political 
machine  for  the  absolute  control  of  town  and  county  govern- 
ment and  the  partial  control  of  the  state  government.  This 
control  was  in  turn  used  to  keep  out  union  organizers  and  to 
break  strikes.  Thus  a  vicious  circle  was  drawn,  industrial 


46 

control  leading  to  political  control,  and  political  control  main- 
taining industrial  control.  How  the  company 's  political  dom- 
ination was  achieved  is  described  with  great  frankness  in  the 
following  letter  from  Mr.  Bowers  to  Mr.  Charles  0.  Heydt, 
secretary  to  Mr.  Rockefeller,  Jr.  It  is  dated  May  13,  1913: 

The  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Company  for  many  years 
were  accused  of  being  the  political  dictator  of  southern 
Colorado,  and  in  fact  were  a  mighty  power  in  the  entire 
state.  When  I  came  here  it  was  said  that  the  C.  F.  &  I. 
Co.  voted  every  man  and  woman  in  their  employ  with- 
out any  regard  to  their  being  naturalized  or  not;  and 
even  their  mules,  it  used  to  be  remarked,  were  registered 
if  they  were  fortunate  enough  to  possess  names.  Any- 
how, a  political  department  was  maintained  at  a  heavy 
expense.  I  had  before  me  the  contributions  of  the  C.  F. 
&  I.  Co.  for  the  campaign  of  1904,  amounting  to  $80,605.00, 
paid  out  personally  by  President  Hearne.  All  the  vouch- 
ers and  checks  I  have  examined  personally,  all  of  which 
were  payable  to  Albert  A.  Miller,  upon  which  he  drew  the 
currency  and,  it  is  said,  handed  the  money  over  to  Mr. 
Hearne,  who  paid  it  out.  So  far  as  I  can  discover,  not 
one  particle  of  good  was  accomplished  for  the  company ; 
but  Mr.  Hearne  was  an  aspirant  for  the  position  of  United 
States  senator  and  devoted  a  vast  amount  of  time  and 
money  with  this  end  in  view,  I  have  no  doubt. 

The  company  became  notorious  in  many  sections  for 
their  support  of  the  liquor  interests.  They  established 
saloons  everywhere  they  possibly  could.  This  depart- 
ment was  managed  by  one  John  Kebler,  a  brother  of  the 
one-time  president  of  the  company,  who  died  about  the 
time  I  came  here,  a  victim  of  his  own  intemperate  habits. 
A  sheriff,  elected  by  the  votes  of  the  C.  F.  &  I.  Co.  em- 
ployees, and  who  has  been  kept  in  office  a  great  many 
years,  established  himself  or  became  a  partner  in  six- 
teen liquor  stores  in  our  coal  mines.  To  clean  up  the 
saloons  and  with  them  the  gambling  hells  and  houses  of 
prostitution,  has  been  one  of  the  things  that  Mr.  Welborn 


47 

and  I  have  devoted  an  enormous  amount  of  time  to  dur- 
ing the  past  five  years.  The  decent  newspapers  ever- 
lastingly lampooned  the  C.  F.  &  I.  Co.  at  every  election ; 
and  I  am  forced  to  say  the  company  merited,  from  a 
moral  standpoint,  every  shot  that  was  fired  into  their 
camp. 

Since  I  came  here  not  a  nickel  has  been  paid  to  any 
politician  or  political  party.  We  have  fought  the  saloons 
with  all  the  power  we  possess.  We  have  forbidden  any 
politician  from  going  into  our  camps,  and  every  subordi- 
nate official  connected  with  the  company  has  been  for- 
bidden to  influence  our  men  to  vote  for  any  particular 
candidate.  We  have  not  lobbied  in  the  Legislature,  but 
have  gone  directly  to  the  Governor  and  other  able  men 
and  have  demanded  fair  treatment. 

Mr.  Bowers'  assurance  that  the  company  had  relinquished 
its  political  control  some  time  prior  to  May  13  is  disproved  by 
a  great  deal  of  conclusive  testimony,  including  letters  and 
tsetimony  by  Mr.  Bowers  himself.  His  account  of  the  active 
part  taken  by  the  operators  in  the  campaign  of  1914  for  "law 
and  order, ' '  has  already  been  quoted.  At  the  hearing  in  May, 
1915,  Commissioner  O'Connell  read  to  him  the  following  ex- 
tract from  the  testimony  of  former  United  States  Senator 
T.  M.  Patterson,  given  at  Denver  in  December,  1914: 

The  men  employed  by  the  large  mining  companies  have 
been  used  to  gain  political  power.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
it  is  the  deliberate  purpose  of  these  companies  to  con- 
trol the  officials  of  the  counties  in  which  they  are  operat- 
ing, and  to  have  a  great  influence  in  the  selection  of 
judges  and  in  the  constitution  of  the  courts.  In  this  pur- 
pose they  have  been  successful.  Election  returns  from 
the  two  or  three  counties  in  which  the  large  companies 
operate  show  that  in  the  precincts  in  which  the  mining 
camps  are  located  the  returns  are  nearly  unanimous  in 
favor  of  the  men  or  measures  approved  by  the  companies, 
regardless  of  party.  The  companies  know  whom  they 


48 

want  elected,  and  do  not  hesitate,  judging  from  the  re- 
sults, to  let  their  men  know. 

Then  followed  this  dialogue: 

Commissioner  O'Connell:  This  is  the  opinion  of  one 
of  your  reputable  citizens  who  was  interested  in  bring- 
ing about  a  settlement,  and  he  says  that  the  courts,  the 
ballot  boxes,  and  the  political  situation  were  dominated 
entirely  and  in  the  hands  of  the  coal  companies  of  Colo- 
rado. That  is  Senator  Patterson. 

Mr.  Bowers:  I  do  not  think  that  any  man  in  the  state 
of  Colorado  knows  better  than  Senator  Patterson  that 
it  has  been  under  the  domination  of  the  Democratic  party 
for  years  and  years  and  years,  and  if  these  scoundrels  are 
in  there,  and  he  has  been  the  leader  of  the  Democratic 
party  for  years,  and  they  put  the  scoundrels  in  there,  on 
whom  does  it  rest?  Not  on  Mr.  Rockefeller  or  on  me. 

Commissioner  O'Connell:  You  concede  that  situation 
is  true  then? 

Mr.  Bowers:  I  have  to  admit  that  in  certain  counties 
that  condition  does  exist ;  I  do  not  dispute  it. 

Commissioner  O'Connell:  In  the  counties  where  these 
coal  companies  operate,  they  have  the  judges  and  sher- 
iffs, and  through  the  sheriffs  can  select  the  jurors,  as  was 
testified  to  in  the  evidence  before  us  of  Sheriff  Farr  him- 
self, and  by  others  before  us  as  to  how  the  juries  were 
selected;  how  the  election  commissioners  were  appointed 
and  sometimes  where  they  did  not  show  up  at  a  certain 
precinct,  Sheriff  Farr  said:  "You  and  you  act  as  elec- 
tion commissioner  today. "  I  ask  you,  Mr.  Bowers,  as  a 
man  of  great  affairs  and  dealing  with  big  business  an^ 
big  financial  affairs,  if  you  think  a  poor  humble  minei\ 
without  any  great  amount  of  money,  without  any  prop- 
erty behind  him,  or  any  influence,  has  any  chance  of  get- 
ting justice  in  a  situation  of  that  kind? 

Mr.  Bowers:    Why,  no;  no  one  need  to  ask  that.     I 


49 

know  those  poor  fellows  in  there  ought  to  have  the  sup- 
port of  every  decent  man  there  is  to  the  end  that  their 
rights  are  protected,  and  they  will  get  that  treatment 
from  me. 

Further  light  on  the  company's  control  of  politics  after 
1907  is  shed  by  the  testimony  of  Attorney  General  Parrar  of 
Colorado,  given  in  Denver  in  December,  1914.  It  is  particu- 
larly significant  because  of  the  close  co-operation  and  political 
friendship  between  him  and  the  company  since  the  strike 
began.  He  is  testifying  as  to  an  investigation  of  conditions 
in  Huerf  ano  County  made  by  him  in  the  autumn  of  1913 : 

Chairman  Walsh:  What  did  you  ascertain,  briefly,  as 
to  the  condition  there  so  far  as  the  political  control  was 
concerned — alleged  political  control  by  the  company? 

General  Farrar:  I  found  a  very  perfect  political  ma- 
chine, just  as  much  a  machine  as  Tammany  in  New  York ; 
just  as  much  of  a  machine  as  you  will  find  in  any  of  the 
places  where  a  great  many  voters  are  susceptible  to  an 
organization  of  that  character.  I  found  that  the  head 
of  this  political  machine  is  the  sheriff,  that  it  was  car- 
ried along  lines  very  similar  to  those  maintained  in  Tam- 
many ;  that  is,  it  had  a  system  of  relief  in  cases  of  need, 
had  a  system  of  giving  rewards  to  these  people,  and  I 
think,  briefly  speaking,  the  term  machine  covers  the  situa- 
tion. Just  such  a  machine  as  you  people  may  have  in 
your  own  states  or  your  own  cities. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Did  you  ascertain  from  what 
sources  money  came  to  assist  in  organizing  and  maintain- 
ing it? 

General  Farrar:  I  was  not  able  to  place  that  definitely. 
I  believe  that  the  machine  probably — well,  I  cannot  say 
that  it  existed  with  the  help  of  the  coal  company;  I  be- 
lieve rather  it  existed  through  its  power  as  a  machine 
over  the  coal  company.  That  is,  I  cannot  be  sure  which 
was  cause  and  which  was  effect,  but  there  was  undoubt- 
edly some  relationship  between  the  two,  but  whether  or 


50 

not  any  money  was  ever  used,  I  have  absolutely  no 
knowledge  at  all. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Is  there  a  law  in  this  state  which 
prevents  or  prohibits  the  use  of  money  by  corporations 
in  elections? 

General  Farrar:  Not  that  I  recall  right  now,  Mr. 
Walsh. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Did  you  ascertain  whether  or  not 
the  result  of  the  work  of  this  machine  was  to  control  the 
actions  of  coroners'  juries  in  cases  where  death  resulted 
from  accidents  in  the  mines,  and  also  to  control  the  actions 
for  damages,  for  personal  injuries,  that  might  be  brought 
in  the  courts  of  those  counties? 

General  Farrar:  No,  my  investigation  did  not  lead 
me  into  that  at  that  time,  and  particularly  with  reference 
to  coroners '  inquests  at  that  time  no  suggestion  was  made 
with  reference  to  that.  In  fact,  Mr.  Walsh,  I  am  a  Demo- 
crat. That  organization  was  Eepublican,  and  I  went  down 
there  as  a  Democrat  to  try  and  work  the  thing  out  from  a 
Democratic  standpoint ;  and  the  evidence  did  not  come  to 
me  from  the  industrial  standpoint  at  that  time. 

Chairman  Walsh:  This  was  purely  an  investigation 
from  the  standpoint  of  politics? 

General  Farrar:    Well,  that  phase  of  it  was,  yes. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Did  it  come  under  your  jurisdiction 
to  make  an  investigation  as  to  whether  the  mining  laws 
of  the  state  were  being  obeyed? 

General  Farrar:    No. 

There  is  also  the  testimony  of  Jesse  C.  Northcutt,  now  an 
attorney  for  the  Colorado  .Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  thl 
other  coal  operators,  and  active  in  the  prosecution  of  Mr. 
Lawson  and  other  members  of  the  union.  In  a  speech  at 
Lamar,  Colo.,  delivered  October  10, 1912,  Mr.  Northcutt,  speak- 
ing of  the  political  activity  of  the  company,  said : 


51 

Up  there  a  few  men  get  together  in  a  room  some  days 
before  the  convention.  They  have  already  fixed  up  whom 
the  delegates  to  the  convention  shall  be.  They  have  prob- 
ably given  the  local  superintendent  of  the  mines  the  num- 
ber of  delegates  to  which  that  community  will  be  entitled. 
They  do  not  tell  him  whom  to  bring.  He  knows  he  is  to 
select  a  certain  number  of  delegates  who  are  to  come  in 
and  follow  the  dictation  of  a  single  man  whose  name  is 
given  to  them  before  they  leave.  He  goes  around  and 
picks  out  Jim  Archuleta  and  some  others,  and  says  to 
them,  "I  want  you  to  go  down  to  a  convention  tomor- 
row, down  to  Trinidad  to  a  convention,  and  you  see  Mr. 
So-and-So  and  do  as  he  tells  you,"  knowing  that  these 
delegates  will  come  in  and  do  as  they  are  told,  a  meeting 
of  four  or  five  leaders  is  held  and  they  proceed  to  make 
the  slate:  "We  will  take  for  County  Clerk  So-and-So; 
he  is  a  good  man  for  the  purpose. "  Some  other  man 
says,  "But  still,  I  think  probably  some  time  within  the 
last  eight  or  ten  months  he  had  some  trouble  with  some 
pit  boss,"  and  there  is  just  a  suspicion  if  the  company 
likes  him.  He  isn't  right  with  the  company  and  they 
don't  want  him;  he  goes  off  the  slate,  and  so  it  is  from 
bottom  to  top  the  candidates  are  selected,  not  with  a  view 
to  their  fitness,  not  with  a  view  to  their  ability  to  dis- 
charge their  duty,  not  with  a  view  to  their  integrity,  but 
"are  they  satisfactory  to  the  company?" 

Since  he  accepted  employment  with  the  operators  Mr. 
Northcutt,  while  admitting  the  authenticity  of  this  speech, 
has  testified  before  the  Commission  that  the  conditions  he 
describes  in  the  foregoing  have  ceased  to  exist. 

And  a  more  subtle,  but  no  less  effective  control  over  the 
state  government,  even  prior  to  the  election  of  1914,  is  shown 
in  the  letters  of  Mr.  Bowers  to  Mr.  Rockefeller,  reporting  the 
operators'  success  in  forcing  the  Governor  to  give  them  the 
use  of  the  state  troops  in  escorting  imported  strikebreakers 
to  their  mines.  These  letters  are  quoted  in  full  in  a  later 
chapter  dealing  with  the  militia. 


52 

Equally  conclusive  in  proving  that  the  political  domination 
of  the  company  has  continued  and  exists  today  is  the  testi- 
mony of  the  Rev.  Eugene  S.  Gaddis,  head  of  the  sociological 
department  of  the  company  until  February,  1915,  and  in- 
dorsed by  President  Welborn  in  April,  1915,  as  an  i '  earnest, 
faithful  worker  and  a  Christian  gentleman."  Reverend  Mr. 
Gaddis  testified  before  the  Commission  in  Washington  in 
May,  1915,  that  the  company's  political  control  in  the  coal 
camps  was  plainly  evident  during  the  campaign  of  1914;  that 
Sheriff  Jeff  Farr  was  still  in  the  saddle  as  political  ally  of  the 
company;  that  word  was  passed  by  company  officials  advis- 
ing employees  for  whom  to  vote ;  that  this  advice  was  accom- 
panied by  vague  threats ;  and  that  he  personally  saw  delegates 
to  the  convention  at  Trinidad  enter  the  office  of  the  company 
and  confer  with  its  officials. 

Eeverend  Mr.  Gaddis  testified  on  May  19, 1915 : 

There  could  scarcely  be  a  closer  relation  right  now, 
and  has  been  for  years,  between  the  C.  F.  &  I.  Co.  and 
Mr.  Farr  and  his  clique. 

Commissioner  O'Connell:  Now,  that  being  the  situa- 
tion in  that  part  of  Colorado,  do  you  wonder  that  the  citi- 
zens, the  men  and  women  that  have  a  right  to  vote,  feel 
that  they  can  get  no  results,  no  justice  from  the  mere 
matter  of  casting  a  ballot,  in  that  county,  on  any  ques- 
tion that  they  are  interested  in,  either  morally,  indus- 
trially, financially  or  otherwise? 

Dr.  Gaddis :  I  think  it  has  been  very  thoroughly  driven 
home  to  them. 

Commissioner  O'Connell:  So  the  matter  of  voting  for 
them,  if  they  vote,  is  a  matter  of  form? 

Dr.  Gaddis:    It  is  a  waste  of  time. 

Commissioner  O'Connell:  It  was  a  custom  that  has 
grown  up,  so  that  Jeff  Farr  could  see  them  go  to  the  bal- 
lot box,  and  if  they  didn't  they  would  lose  their  jobs  the 
next  day?  Was  that  the  condition? 

Dr.  Gaddis:    Very  likely. 


53 

While  the  testimony  and  letters  quoted  above  throw  much 
light  on  the  methods  by  which  political  control  was  obtained 
by  the  companies,  they  do  not  set  forth  with  entire  clearness 
two  of  the  principal  sources  of  the  companies'  power.  These 
are  the  right  to  discharge  summarily  and  without  stated 
cause ;  and  the  private  ownership,  by  the  companies,  of  every 
foot  of  land  and  of  every  building  in  many  of  the  largest  min- 
ing towns. 

The  operators  have  admitted  freely  that  men  would  not  be 
accepted  or  retained  in  their  employ  who  talked  unionism  or 
who  answered  the  operators'  description  of  "agitators."  To 
detect  employees  who  were  objectionable  .to  the  company, 
spies  were  employed  and  a  system  of  espionage  maintained. 
The  character  of  men  employed  in  this  capacity  by  the  Colo- 
rado Fuel  &  Iron  Company  was  so  objectionable  that  even 
Mr.  Bowers,  the  highest  executive  official,  told  the  Commis- 
sion that  he  complained  to  the  other  officials.  Mr.  Bowers 
referred  to  them  as  "cut  throats. "  He  testified  that  his  asso- 
ciates regarded  him  as  a  "tenderfoot"  and  were  not  im- 
pressed by  his  complaints. 

Not  only  could  miners  be  discharged  summarily  for  ex- 
pressing union  sympathies,  but  local  superintendents  were 
able  to  penalize  miners  at  will  by  assigning  them  to  places  in 
the  mines  where  the  work  was  unusually  difficult,  dangerous 
or  unprofitable. 

Much  testimony  was  given  before  the  Congressional  Com- 
mittee by  strikers  and  others  regarding  the  arbitrary,  and 
brutal  conduct  of  camp  marshals  or  guards  who  were  em- 
ployed by  the  companies  and  who  acted  under  color  of  author- 
ity. This  testimony  was  corroborated  and  supplemented  by 
Jack  McQuarrie,  who  acted  for  six  years  as  undersheriff  of 
Huerfano  County. 

Former  United  States  Senator  Patterson  has  the  follow- 
ing to  say  regarding  summary  discharge  of  "agitators," 
when  he  was  on  the  stand  before  the  Commission  in  Denver: 

Mr.  Osgood  spoke  about  not  keeping  agitators.    Most 
anybody  comes  under  the  head  of  an  agitator  that  has  an 


54 

independent  expression  upon  any  subject  that  affects  in- 
dustry. Now  there  is  no  question  in  the  world  but  that 
for  years  the  member  of  the  union  that  found  his  way 
into  those  mines, — take  for  instance  the  mine  of  Mr.  Os- 
good, — if  it  was  discovered  that  he  was  a  member  of  the 
union,  and  lisped  upon  the  subject  of  the  union,  they 
found  a  way  to  get  rid  of  him. 

Free  speech  in  informal  and  personal  intercourse  thus  was 
denied  the  inhabitants  of  the  coal  camps.  There  is  conclu- 
sive testimony  that  it  also  was  denied  to  public  speakers. 
Obviously,  union  organizers  would  not  be  permitted  to  enter 
the  camps  and  address  meetings.  The  Reverend  Mr.  Gaddis, 
head  of  the  sociological  department  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  & 
Iron  Company  before  and  during  the  strike,  testified  that 
periodicals  permitted  in  the  camps  were  censored  in  the  same 
fashion. 

Thus,  with  "  cut- throats "  employed  as  spies  to  ferret  out 
employes  expressing  objectionable  opinions,  the  operators 
were  able  to  use  their  power  of  summary  discharge  to  deny 
free  speech,  free  press  and  free  assemblage,  to  prevent  po- 
litical activity  contrary  to  their  interests,  and  affirmatively  to 
control  the  political  activities  of  employees  for  the  suppres- 
sion of  popular  government  and  the  winning  of  political  con- 
trol. 

But  in  the  Colorado  camps  the  loss  of  his  job  was  not  the 
only  penalty  that  might  be  arbitrarily  inflicted  on  the  miner 
who  refused  to  do  the  company's  bidding.  Many  of  the  min- 
ing towns  were  situated  on  land  owned  by  the  employing  com- 
pany. No  bit  of  ground  and  no  house  could  be  occupied  ex- 
cept by  consent  of  the  company,  which  discouraged  home- 
building  and  refused  to  sell  lots  for  the  purpose,  even  to  their 
oldest  employees.  The  fact  that  some  of  the  closed  camps 
have  flourished  for  thirty  years  disposes  of  the  operators' 
claim  that  home  ownership  by  the  miners  would  be  imprac- 
ticable and  unprofitable.  In  these  towns,  of  which  the  names 
of  twelve  were  given  by  Mr.  Welborn  as  the  property  of  the 
Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  alone,  the  company  owns  not 


55 

only  the  miners'  dwellings,  but  the  church,  school,  store,  and 
saloon  buildings.  Miners  and  their  families  bought  every 
article  of  food,  clothing,  and  household  supplies  at  stores 
owned  by  the  company,  and  from  which  large  profits  were 
drawn.  The  Company  either  sold  a  concession  to  sell  liquor 
to  its  employees  at  a  yearly  rate  of  so  much  for  each  man 
employed  in  the  camp,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Victor- American 
Fuel  Company,  or  rented  the  saloon  building  at  a  yearly 
rental  amounting  in  one  instance  to  one-half  of  the  original 
cost  of  the  building,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  & 
Iron  Company.  Thus  the  company  became  in  effect  a  benefi- 
ciary of  the  liquor  traffic.1 

A  church  building  could  not  be  erected  in  a  closed  camp 
without  the  consent  of  the  company,  and  the  company  as- 
sumed the  right  to  compel  the  dismissal  of  ministers  of  the 
gospel  who  opposed  company  policies  or  interests.  Thus  Mr. 
Welborn,  writing  to  Mr.  Rockefeller's  attorney  and  personal 
aid  in  New  York,  Mr.  Starr  J.  Murphy,  under  date  of  Octo- 
ber 31,  1914,  says  of  the  minister  in  one  of  the  Company's 
closed  towns: 

At  the  time  of  the  Ludlow  affair  the  minister  was  very 
outspoken  in  his  criticism  of  the  coal  companies,  but 
seemed  to  regret  his  action  when  informed  of  the  facts 
concerning  that  disturbance.  He  has  socialistic  tenden- 
cies, however,  and  I  have  been  informed  that  his  wife  is 
a  Greek,  yet  they  may  both  be  perfectly  honest.  * 
We  have  thought  some  of  changing  the  minister  at  Sun- 
rise, but  have  refrained  from  taking  a  course  that  would 
be  unfair  to  him,  or  would  indicate  a  prejudice  against 
him  because  of  what  may  have  been  simply  indiscreet 
statements  in  connection  with  the  Ludlow  outbreak. 

The  "Ludlow  outbreak"  here  referred  to  is  the  occurrence 


1 — Saloons  operated  in  this  fashion  were  reopened  after  the  Federal  troops 
were  withdrawn  in  December,  1914,  by  consent  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  & 
Iron  Company  although  the  Company  professed  that  its  interest  in  the 
political  campaign  of  the  preceding  fall  was  born  of  its  ardent  wish 
for  prohibition.  (See  Gaddis  testimony.) 


56 

of  April  20,  1914,  in  which  five  strikers,  one  boy,  and  thirteen 
women  and  children  in  the  strikers'  tent  colony  were  shot  to 
death  by  militiamen  and  guards  employed  by  the  coal  compa- 
nies or  suffocated  and  burned  to  death  when  these  militiamen 
and  guards  set  fire  to  the  tents  in  which  they  made  their 
homes.  One  militiaman  was  killed  in  the  same  *  '  affair. ' ' 

The  minister  who  thus  escaped  dismissal  is  the  Reverend 
Daniel  McCorkle,  who  presided  over  the  church  at  Sunrise, 
Wyoming,  where  the  Company  operated  iron  mines.  Sunrise 
is  more  than  300  miles  from  the  strike  zone,  and  it  is  extreme- 
ly unlikely  that  any  person  in  the  strike  zone  had  ever  heard 
of  his  sermon  denouncing  the  Ludlow  massacre  until  the  let- 
ter quoted  above  was  made  public  by  the  Commission.  From 
a  knowledge  of  conditions  in  the  southern  Colorado  camps, 
it  may  be  concluded  that  had  the  Reverend  Mr.  McCorkle 
preached  such  a  seromn  within  the  strike  zone  he  would  have 
been  summarily  dismissed. 

Control  of  the  schools  within  the  closed  camps  was  no  less 
absolute.  Mine  superintendents  and  other  company  officials 
dictated  the  selection  of  teachers  and  procured  the  dismissal 
of  teachers  to  whom  they  objected.  Reverend  Mr.  Gaddis, 
whose  experience  as  head  of  the  sociological  department  of 
the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  gave  him  excellent  oppor- 
tunity to  judge,  testified  before  the  Commission  that  this  Com- 
pany control,  exercised  by  local  officials,  had  been  used  to  get 
rid  of  competent  teachers  who  refused  to  be  subservient,  and 
to  appoint  teachers  who  were  incompetent. 

Thus  employees  were  forced  not  only  to  depend  on  the  fa- 
vor of  the  Company  for  the  opportunity  to  earn  a  living,  but 
to  live  in  such  houses  as  the  Company  furnished,  to  buy  such 
food,  clothing  and  supplies  as  the  Company  sold  them,  to  ac- 
cept for  their  children  such  instruction  as  the  companies 
wished  to  provide,  and  to  conform  even  in  their  religious 
worship  to  the  Company's  wishes. 

Under  these  conditions,  the  miner  who  was  discharged  by 
the  pit  boss  or  superintendent  lost  his  house  and  his  right  to 


57 

remain  in  the  community  at  the  same  time  that  he  lost  his 
employment. 

The  extent  of  control  in  these  camps  is  shown  in  the  fol- 
lowing extract  from  the  testimony  of  the  Reverend  Mr.  Gad- 
dis: 

Commissioner  O'Connell:  What  are  the  facilities  for 
these  closed  camps  having  churches  and  schools  and 
places  of  amusement? 

Dr.  Gaddis:  They  have  just  what  the  Company  fur- 
nishes them.  No  one  can  go  in  there  without  the  consent 
of  the  Company  for  any  purpose;  it  is  different  in  a 
closed  camp,  religious  or  otherwise. 

Chairman  Walsh:     Can  ministers  go  in  and  preach? 

Dr.  Gaddis:  He  has  to  secure  the  consent  of  at  least 
the  superintendent. 

Even  the  polling  -places  in  the  closed  camps  were  located 
on  ground  owned  by  the  Company.  If  the  votes  of  their  em- 
ployees were  not  sufficiently  numerous  to  offset  those  of  out- 
siders in  the  same  precinct,  entrance  to  the  closed  camps  and 
the  polling  places  could  be  denied  to  voters  not  under  the 
Company's  control,  or  the  territory  could  be  reprecincted  in 
such  fashion  as  to  exclude  these  voters. 

While  company  ownership  of  homes,  stores,  churches, 
schools  and  saloons  greatly  aided  the  mine  owners  in  building 
up  and  maintaining  their  arbitrary  political  and  economic 
power,  it  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  substantially  the 
same  result  could  have  been  attained  by  means  of  their  mon- 
opoly of  employment  and  their  power  to  discharge  arbitrarily 
without  stated  cause. 

Having  described  the  methods  by  which  political  control 
was  obtained,  this  report  will  now  outline  those  uses  of  this 
power  that  have  a  direct  bearing  on  industrial  conditions. 
These  were  the  disregard  of  state  mining  laws;  the  preven- 
tion of  legislation  unfavorable  to  the  companies ;  the  obtain- 
ing of  favorable  legislation;  the  control  of  coroners  and 
courts ;  and  the  control  of  sheriffs,  constables  and  militia. 


58 

Most  important  of  all  benefits  enjoyed  by  the  companies  as 
a  result  of  their  political  control  was  the  aid  of  subservient 
public  officials  in  denying  agitators  or  union  officials  access  to 
the  camps,  during  peace,  and  in  intimidating,  arresting,  im- 
prisoning and  killing  strikers  and  their  leaders  during  strikes. 
This  use  of  political  control  by  the  companies  is  more  impor- 
tant than  their  use  of  it  to  ignore  mining  laws  or  to  prevent 
the  collection  of  damages  for  personal  injuries,  for  the 
reason  that  it  has  effectually  prevented  the  unionization  of 
the  mines.  This  unionization  would  have  given  the  miners 
an  economic  weapon  with  which  they  themselves  could  have 
forced  compliance  with  the  law  and  by  which  they  could  have 
speedily  broken  the  hold  of  the  companies  on  government,  by 
limiting  the  power  of  discharge,  and  thus  establishing  free 
speech,  a  free  press  and  free  assembly,  and  encouraging 
healthy  discussion  and  agitation. 

This  report  will  later  outline  the  extent  to  which  political 
influence  was  used  after  the  strike  began  to  defeat  the  miners ' 
organization.  But  we  are  dealing  now  with  causes  of  the 
strike,  and  it  will  be  sufficient  here  to  show  how  efforts  to 
effect  an  organization  of  miners  before  the  strike  began  were 
hampered  or  defeated  by  the  companies  through  their  use  of 
public  officials. 

Evidence  on  this  point  could  be  presented  here  in  great 
volume.  The  history  of  the  earlier  strike  of  1903-04  is  full 
of  instances  of  the  use  of  the  civil  power  of  the  counties  and 
the  military  power  of  the  State  to  imprison  and  deport  strike 
leaders  and  thus  to  defeat  the  ends  of  the  strikers.* 

Testimony  from  union  officials,  strikers  and  apparently  un- 
biased witnesses  before  the  Congressional  Committee  and  the 
Commission  on  Industrial  Kelations  all  points  to  the  exist- 
ence of  a  system  of  policing  by  company  agents  which  closed 
the  mining  towns  to  union  organizers,  active  members  of  the 
union,  and,  in  fact,  to  any  person  whom  the  local  authorities 
regarded  as  undesirable.  A  federal  grand  jury  which  met  at 
Pueblo  early  in  the  strike  and  which  heard  testimony  from  a 

*See  report  of  Carroll  D.  Wright,  U.  S.  Commissioner  of  Labor. 


59 

large  number  of  witnesses  had  the  following  to  say  in  its  re- 
port: 

Many  camp  marshals,  whose  appointment  and  salaries 
are  controlled  by  local  companies,  have  exercised  a  sys- 
tem of  espionage  and  have  resorted  to  arbitrary  powers 
of  police  control,  acting  in  the  capacity  of  judge  and  jury 
and  passing  the  sentence:  "Down  the  canyon  for  you," 
meaning  thereby  that  the  miner  so  addressed  was  dis- 
charged and  ordered  to  leave  the  camp,  upon  miners  who 
had  incurred  the  enmity  of  the  superintendent  or  pit  boss 
for  having  complained  of  a  real  grievance  or  for  other 
cause.  These,  taken  with  brutal  assaults  by  camp  mar- 
shals upon  miners,  have  produced  general  dissatisfaction 
among  the  latter.  Miners  generally  fear  to  complain  of 
real  grievances  because  of  the  danger  of  their  discharge 
or  of  their  being  placed  in  unfavorable  position  in  the 
mines. 

Union  organizers  were  not  only  barred  from  the  mining 
camps ;  they  were  harassed  and  arrested  without  cause  even 
in  county  seats,  where  the  companies  owned  at  most  only  small 
amounts  of  property.  Mr.  John  McQuarrie,  undersheriff  of 
Huerfano  County  from  1903  until  1909,  and  special  agent  for 
the  Colorado  and  Southern  Railroad  in  the  coal  mining  dis- 
trict until  October,  28,  1913,  gave  the  Congressional  Commit- 
tee a  specific  instance  of  the  methods  used  to  keep  union  or- 
ganizers out  of  the  field.  Mr.  McQuarrie  was  discharged  by 
the  Colorado  &  Southern  Railroad  more  than  a  month  after 
the  strike  began  on  complaint  of  President  Welborn  of  the 
Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  that  he  was  too  friendly  with 
the  strike  leaders.  When  he  gave  the  following  testimony  he 
was  employed  by  attorneys  for  the  United  Mine  Workers. 

By  Mr.  Costigan:  Q.  Did  he  (Sheriff  Jeff  Farr) 
ever  speak  of  his  relations  with  those  coal  companies? 

A.  He  makes  a  brag — he  don't  deny  the  fact  that  he 
is  a  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Co.  man — that  anything  they 
want  he  will  do. 


60 

Q.  He  has  made  that  statement,  has  he,  in  your  pres- 
ence? 

A.  He  has  made  that  statement  hundreds  of  times  in 
my  presence  and  always  impressed  on  me  the  necessity 
of  standing  in  and  being  a  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  man. 
*  *  There  was  a  great  many  things  that  he  put  up 
to  me  that  I  wouldn't  do.  I  never  done  anything  there 
that  I  was  ashamed  of.  I  regret  very  much,  that  I  stayed 
with  him  the  length  of  time  I  did,  being  the  class  of  man 
that  he  is.  Everything  that  I  done  there  was  straight. 
I  never  went  out  and  beat  people  over  the  head  as  some 
of  his  men  have;  as,  for  instance,  there. is  a  case  of  thi* 
man  Lawson.  Jeff  Farr  came  to  me  and  asked  me,  says-^ 

By  Mr.  Costigan:  Q.  You  refer  to  John  B.  Lawson 
here! 

A.  John  B.  Lawson.  In  1906  Farr  came  to  me  and 
wanted  me  to  "get"  Lawson  in  some  way.  I  told  him 
no,  I  didn't  want  to  do  any  of  that  kind  of  work.  Says  I, 
"If  you  have  a  warrant  for  Lawson,  give  it  to  me  and 
I  will  get  him,  but  I  don't  want  to  do  no  crooked  work, 
Jeff. ' '  The  next  day  I  went  out  to  serve  the  summonses — 
it  was  just  before  the  fall  term  of  the  district  court 
*  *  *  and  when  I  returned  the  next  night  Lawson 
was  in  the  county  jail.  Well,  I  went  over  to  the  office  and 
met  Jeff  and  Severio  Martinez — Severio  Martinez  was 
the  night  marshal  of  Walsenburg.  I  asked  what  Lawson 
was  downstairs  there  for — had  seen  the  mittimus  on  the 
desk — the  mittimus  was  on  the  desk  for  me  to  enter  up  in 
the  sheriff's  office.  They  began  to  laugh  and  told  me  how 
Lawson  came  in  there. 

Q.    Who  told  you? 

A.  Jeff  and  Severio  Martinez.  They  said  that  they 
had  "framed  up"  on  him.  They  had  caught  him  on  the 
upper  end  of  Main  Street  as  he  was  going  out  of  town 
that  night  and  stuck  a  gun  in  his  pocket  and  arrested  him 
for  carrying  concealed  weapons.  The  gun  was  an  old 
gun  that  had  laid  around  the  sheriff's  office  for  a  long 


61 

while*    He  had  already  been  sentenced  to  30  days  in  the 

county  jail  and  $50  fine. 

*  #  *  #  # 

Q.  Do  you  know  what  the  real  reason  for  his  arrest 
was — was  that  stated  in  a  conversation  with  Sheriff  Farr? 

A.    Well,  he  was  an  organizer. 

Q.    For  what? 

A.  The  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  and  he  had 
been  trailed  around  and  watched.  You  see,  Reno  always 
sends  out  a  description — 

Congressman  Austin:  Just  state  who  Reno  is  so  the 
record  will  show. 

A.  W.  H.  Reno,  the  chief  detective  or  special  agent  for 
the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.,  used  to  furnish  a  de- 
scription of  all  organizers  that  came  into  the  district  or 
was  suspected  of  being  an  organizer,  and  in  that  way 
Sheriff  Farr  would  always  have  his  men  look  out  for 
them  and  run  them  out  of  the  county  and  make  things 
disagreeable  for  them  the  moment  they  would  spot  them. 

Q.    Was  that  the  fact  in  regard  to  Mr.  Lawson? 

A.     That  was  the  fact  in  regard  to  Mr.  Lawson. 

Q.    He  was  followed  for  a  long  time? 

A.  He  and  any  other  organizer  that  ever  came  into 
the  district.  Gamier  was  followed — he  was  there  about 
the  time  that  Lawson  was — he  was  followed  also. 

This  report  will  later  show  how  the  companies'  political  in- 
fluence was  effectively  used  to  defeat  the  strike  when  finally 
it  came  in  spite  of  the  difficulties  and  dangers  faced  by  em- 
ployees who  tried  to  organize. 

Having  established  their  control  of  public  officials  and  suc- 
cessfully prevented  the  organization  of  their  employes,  the 
companies  found  little  difficulty  in  disregarding  the  laws  that 
had  been  enacted  by  the  state  legislature  to  protect  the  inter- 
ests of  the  miners.  As  in  other  instances  that  have  come  to 
the  attention  of  the  Commission,  laws  proved  almost  if  not 


62 

quite  worthless  when  not  supported  by  a  strong  and  aggres- 
sive organization  of  the  men  in  whose  interests  they  were 
enacted. 

Four  of  the  seven  formal  demands  of  the  strikers  were 
for  the  enforcement  of  state  laws,  which  they  alleged  had 
been  persistently  violated  by  the  operators.  These  demands 
were:  (1)  An  eight-hour  working  day  for  all  classes  of  labor 
in  and  around  the  coal  land  and  at  coke  ovens.  (2)  A  check- 
weighman  at  all  times  to  be  elected  by  the  miners  without  any 
interference  by  company  officials.  (3)  The  right  to  trade  at 
any  store  they  please  and  the  right  to  choose  their  own  board- 
ing places  and  their  own  doctor.  (4)  a,  Enforcement  of  the 
Colorado  mining  laws ;  ft,  abolition  of  the  notorious  and  crim- 
inal guard  system  which  has  prevailed  in  the  mining  camps  ol 
Colorado  for  many  years.1 

Miners  employed  in  the  coal  and  metalliferous  mines  of 
Colorado  began  their  fight  for  an  eight-hour  day  for  under- 
ground workers  in  1895.  The  Supreme  Court  in  that  year 
advised  the  Legislature  that  an  eight-hour  law  would  be  un- 
constitutional. The  State  platforms  of  all  parties  in  1900  de- 
clared for  a  constitutional  amendment,  and  such  an  amend- 
ment was  submitted  by  the  Legislature  in  1901  and  was  adopt- 
ed by  popular  vote  in  November,  1902.  The  vote  was  72,980 
to  26,266,  and  the  majority  in  favor  of  the  amendment  was 
greater  than  that  given  to  any  other  of  the  seven  measures 
submitted  at  the  same  election.  This  constitutional  amend- 
ment read : 

Section  250.  The  General  Assembly  shall  provide  by 
law  and  shall  provide  suitable  penalties  for  the  violation 
thereof,  for  a  period  of  employment  not  to  exceed  eight 
hours  within  any  twenty-four  hours  *  *  *  for  persons 
employed  in  underground  mines. 


1— The  other  formal  demands  were  for  recognition  of  the  Union;  a  10  per 
cent  advance  in  wages  on  the  tonnage  rate  and  a  day  scale  practically 
in  acord  with  the  Wyoming  day  wage  rate;  and  payment  of  all  narrow 
and  dead  work,  including  brushing,  timbering,  removing  flaws  and  hand- 
ling impurities. 


63 

The  will  of  the  people  as  expressed  in  this  mandate  to  the 
Legislature  was  defeated  during  the  session  of  1903  by  the 
activity  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  other  large 
smelting  and  mining  corporations.  Eight  different  bills  were 
introduced  and  none  passed.  So  great  was  the  scandal  cre- 
ated by  this  failure  to  comply  with  the  constitutional  mandate 
that  at  an  extra  session  of  the  Legislature  during  the  following 
summer,  called  for  other  purposes,  each  house  adopted  a  reso- 
lution blaming  the  other  house  for  the  failure. 

In  1905  a  bill  was  passed  providing  for  the  eight-hour  day 
to  apply  only  to  coal  miners. 

In  1911  an  eight-hour  bill  applying  to  all  classes  of  under- 
ground labor  was  passed  by  the  Legislature,  but  the  companies 
obtained  sufficient  signatures  to  a  referendum  petition  to  pro- 
cure its  submission  to  the  people.  At  the  same  time  they 
initiated  another  eight-hour  bill  applying  only  to  workers 
whose  employment  was  continuously  in  contact  with  noxious 
fumes,  gases  and  vapors.  The  voters  of  Colorado  adopted 
both  measures  in  the  fall  of  1912,  but  the  conflict  between  them 
led  to  discussion  and  doubt,  and  they  were  repealed  in  favor  of 
a  new  bill  that  was  enacted  by  the  1913  Legislature  and  which 
went  into  effect  April  3,  1913. 

For  eleven  years  after  the  people  of  the  State  had  ordered 
the  enactment  of  an  eight-hour  law,  the  companies  success- 
fully defied  the  popular  will  and  succeeded  in  blocking  the  en- 
forcement of  effective  legislation.  When  at  last  they  granted 
the  eight-hour  day,  in  March,  1913,  we  have  the  word  of  Mr. 
Bowers  that  it  was  not  respect  for  this  popular  will,  but  the 
desire  to  defeat  unionization,  that  actuated  them.  No  more 
convincing  evidence  could  be  obtained  of  the  necessity  for 
economic  organization  by  the  workers  to  vitalize  and  make 
effective  their  political  power. 

Of  all  the  specific  grievances  of  the  miners  growing  out  of 
economic  and  political  domination  by  the  employers,  one  of  the 
most  serious  was  the  denial  of  checkweighmen  at  the  mine 
scales  and  the  consequent  lack  of  adequate  assurance  that 
the  miners  were  being  paid  for  all  the  coal  they  mined.  There 


64 

was  not  only  a  lack  of  such  assurance;  there  was  actual  and 
deliberate  cheating  of  miners  by  many  of  the  coal  operators,  if 
we  may  take  the  word  of  Mr.  Bowers,  chief  executive  of  the 
Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company.  This  uncertainty  and  suspi- 
cion as  to  whether  or  not  they  were  being  paid  in  full  for  the 
coal  mined  contributed  as  much  to  the  sense  of  injustice  and 
acute  dissatisfaction  under  which  the  miners  labored  as  any 
other  specific  abuse.  The  testimony  of  striking  miners  before 
the  Congressional  Committee  shows  that  they  firmly  believed 
themselves  to  have  been  the  victims  of  petty  cheating  and 
larceny  practiced  by  the  companies,  and  that  they  felt  helpless 
to  protest.  Yet  by  a  state  law  enacted  in  1897  the  miners  were 
given  a  right  to  employ  checkweighmen  whenever  they  desired 
to  do  so. 

Mr.  Bowers  vigorously  denied  that  his  company  cheated  its 
men  in  the  weighing  of  coal.  We  may  admit  the  honest  inten- 
tion of  the  higher  officials  of  this  company  without  accepting  it 
as  proof  that  its  miners  were  not  actually  cheated.  If  the  low 
opinion  of  the  company's  superintendents  and  minor  officials 
expressed  by  the  company's  superintendent  of  sociological 
work  is  justified,  it  would  still  be  an  open  question  whether  or 
not  these  lesser  officials  practiced  short  weighing  in  order  to 
make  a  favorable  showing  of  production  costs,  or  to  penalize 
certain  miners  to  the  benefit  of  others. 

But  regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  miners  at  a  particular 
mine  or  group  of  mines  were  actually  cheated,  there  still  ex- 
isted a  substantial  grievance  if  they  were  denied  the  means 
of  assuring  themselves  that  such  was  not  the  case  and  were 
forced  to  depend  absolutely  on  the  honesty  of  the  employer. 
This  is  admitted  by  operators  who  have  testified  before  the 
Commission.  (See  Weitzel.) 

The  widespread  practice  of  cheating  miners  is  admitted  as 
to  other  operators  in  the  testimony  given  by  Mr.  Bowers  at 
Washington  on  May  24, 1915. 

Chairman  Walsh:    Then  there  were  just  two  bad  fel- 
lows that  went  in  there  cheating  the  miners  f    *    *    * 


65 

Mr.  Bowers:  I  think  there  were  quite  a  good  many 
more  of  them. 

Chairman  Walsh:  How  do  yon  think  these  miners  could 
get  justice,  if  a  lot  of  mine  owners  were  cheating  them  in 
the  weights  of  the  coal  that  they  dug  out  of  the  ground, 
unless  they  had  an  organization  powerful  in  number,  and 
somewhat  powerful  financially! 

Mr.  Bowers:  I  had  power  enough  to  stop  it.  *  *  * 
My  attention  was  called  to  it  particularly  by  the  fact  that 
some  of  our  friends  *  *  *  in  the  railway  were  getting 
cut  prices  on  their  coal,  and  it  seemed  that  any  straight 
fellow,  as  long  as  there  was  not  more  than  5  cents  a  ton 
profit  on  railroad  coal,  it  seemed  to  be  particularly  diffi- 
cult for  a  company  to  make  10  cents. 

Chairman  Walsh:    Something  crooked? 

Mr.  Bowers:  I  think  so.  I  said  to  Mr.  Welborn,  "How 
can  we  stop  them  stealing  the  coal  from  the  miners." 

Chairman  Walsh :  And  also  cutting  under  your  prices  ? 

Mr.  Bowers:  Yes,  sir,  also  cutting  under  our  prices, 
and  we  only  made  5  cents  a  ton. 

Chairman  Walsh:  You  became  convinced  there  was 
something  wrong? 

Mr.  Bowers:  Yes,  sir,  and  how  we  could  end  it. 
Chairman  Walsh:   That  is,  for  the  miners? 

Mr.  Bowers:  Ourselves  and  the  miners  and  all  con- 
cerned. The  man  that  works  for  me  is  as  much  my 
brother  as  the  man  that  I  work  for.  You  have  no  doubt 
about  that,  have  you ? 

Chairman  Walsh:   I  would  not  like  to  say.    Go  ahead. 

Mr.  Bowers:  Now,  then,  we  talked  it  over,  and  I  said, 
"How  about  these  checkweighmen ? ' ' 

Chairman  Walsh:   Who  did  you  say  that  to? 

Mr.  Bowers:  Mr.  Welborn,  and  I  guess  to  the  executive 


66 

board.  *  *  *  Now,  I  know  very  well,  by  my  own  talks 
and  interviews  with  our  men,  and  with  the  checkweigh- 
men,  that  the  checkweighmen  had  been  optional  with  the 
miners.  I  had  talked  with  many  miners  in  regard  to  it. 
We  discussed  it,  and  I  think  I  suggested  in  a  letter 
*  *  *  that  our  own  miners  know  that  the  Colorado  Fuel 
&  Iron  Company  are  willing  and  desire  that  the  miners 
have  their  own  checkweighmen.  The  newer  men  were 
coming  in;  the  old  men  knew;  and  that  the  newer  men 
might  not  be  advised  of  that,  so  that  we  stated  here  that  it 
is  the  desire  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  that 
our  miners  secure  and  have  their  own  checkweighmen. 

Chairman  Walsh :  Was  that  at  the  time  you  discovered 
this  cheating? 

Mr.  Bowers:  Yes,  sir,  just  at  that  time.  *  *  *  We 
agreed  on  that  circular,  and  it  was  written  in  six  lan- 
guages, and  posted  at  the  mines  and  at  their  working 
places,  and  *  *  *  I  understood  from  several  sources 
that  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company,  and  your  humble 
servant,  had  been  damned  with  great  severity.  Of  course, 
immediately  they  saw  that  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Com- 
pany— it  spread  all  over  the  camp,  what  could  those  fel- 
lows do  with  that  kind  of  a  circular  in  there?  *  *  * 

Chairman  Walsh:  Did  the  workmen  for  the  other  com- 
panies demand  checkweighmen? 

Mr.  Bowers:    L  think  they  did.    *     *     * 
Chairman  Wralsh:   Did  you  see  what  effect  this  had? 
Mr.  Bowers:   The  effect  was  that  your  humble  servant 
got  damned. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Among  the  coal  operators? 
Mr.  Bowers:  Yes,  sir,  I  understand,  but  I  did  not  hear 
them. 

The  circular  was  posted  in  April,  1912,  but  apparently  it  had 
little  effect.  Mr.  Welborn  testified  before  the  Commission  in 
Denver  that  checkweighmen  had  not  been  employed,  except  in- 


67 

termittently,  while  Mr.  Osgood,  chairman  of  the  board  of  the 
Victor-American  Company,  testified  that  a  checkweighman 
had  been  continuously  employed  at  only  one  mine.  Both  offi- 
cials declared  that  their  companies  did  not  object  to  the  em- 
ployment of  checkweighmen,  and,  indeed,  rather  favored  it. 

Mr.  Bowers'  testimony  quoted  above  leaves  serious  doubt 
that  the  miners,  employed  either  by  his  company  or  the  others, 
understood  that  they  were  free  to  elect  checkweighmen  and 
to  demand  that  the  companies  accept  them.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  inference  of  this  testimony  is  strong  in  support  of 
the  assertions  of  striking  miners  that  they  believed  they  would 
risk  discharge  if  they  asked  for  checkweighmen.  For,  accord- 
ing to  Mr.  Bowers,  the  posting  of  this  circular  created  some- 
thing of  a  sensation  and  led  to  agitation  in  other  camps.  If 
the  company's  acquiescence  in  the  employment  of  checkweigh- 
men were  a  matter  of  common  knowledge,  it  seems  strange 
that  the  posting  of  the  notice  should  have  angered  other  op- 
erators and  caused  them  to  condemn  Mr.  Bowers. 

Granting  that  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  had 
obeyed  the  law  of  1897  prior  to  the  posting  the  circular  fif- 
teen years  later,  it  is  obvious  from  Mr.  Bowers'  testimony 
that  the  operators  who  "damned"  him  had  failed  to  do  so. 

But  there  is  this  statement  from  the  testimony  of  the  Rev- 
erend Mr.  Gaddis : 

When  a  man  asked  for  a  checkweighman,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  the  super,  he  was  getting  too  smart. 

Commissioner  O'Connell:  And  he  got  what? 
Dr.  Gaddis:  He  got  it  in  the  neck,  generally. 

Dr.  Gaddis  is  here  referring  to  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron 
Company,  and  to  a  time  subsequent  to  the  posting  of  the 
notice. 

Here  again  the  legal  rights  of  the  miners  proved  worthless 
in  the  absence  of  a  strong  union.  In  denying  them  the  union, 
the  companies  denied  them  the  machinery  with  which  to  select 
a  checkweighman  in  whose  independence  they  could  place  their 


68 

confidence.  Fifty  or  one  hundred  or  five  hundred  disorganized 
men,  with  half  a  dozen  nationalities  represented  among  them, 
could  hardly  be  expected  to  meet  together  and  act  in  harmony 
on  the  selection  of  a  man  to  check  the  weights  of  their  coal, 
when  in  all  other  respects  they  were  forced  to  act  individually, 
and  were  denied  the  training  in  collective  action  which  only 
the  union  can  give. 

No  more  substantial  cause  for  resentment  could  be  imagined 
than  this  denial  to  the  miners  of  any  means  to  insure  honest 
payment  of  wages.  And  in  denying  the  right  to  organize,  the 
companies  must  be  convicted  of  doing  just  this.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  conceive  of  the  citrus  fruit  growers  in  California  send- 
ing their  oranges  and  lemons  to  the  eastern  market  unweighed 
or  unnumbered,  and  accepting  the  figures  of  the  jobbers  in  the 
East  as  a  basis  for  payment.  Yet  the  situation  would  be  anal- 
ogous to  that  endured  by  the  Colorado  miners. 

Regarding  the  strikers '  demand  for  the  right  to  trade  where 
they  pleased,  the  testimony  shows  that  mine  employees,  particu- 
larly in  closed  camps,  risked  the  displeasure  of  the  local  offi- 
cials, and  the  possibility  of  discharge,  if  they  did  not  trade  at 
the  company  stores.  These  stores  were  operated  through  sub- 
sidiary companies,  all  of  the  stock  of  which  was  owned  by  the 
mining  companies.  They  earned  very  large  profits.  Presi- 
dent Welborn  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  testified 
that  the  stores  of  that  company  earned  more  than  20  per  cent 
on  a  capital  of  $700,000.  In  about  half  the  camps  of  this  com- 
pany the  stores  had  no  competition.  Mr.  Osgood  of  the  Vic- 
tor-American Company  testified  that  the  stores  of  his  com- 
pany earned  20  per  cent. 

The  legislature  passed  a  law  in  1899  prohibiting  "any  ar- 
rangement by  which  any  person  may  issue  a  truck  order  or 
scrip  by  means  of  which  the  maker  may  charge  the  amount 
to  the  employer  to  be  deducted  from  the  wages  of  the  em- 
ploye. "  President  Welborn  testified  that  the  Colorado  Fuel 
&  Iron  Company  never  paid  wages  in  scrip,  but  that  scrip  was 
in  use  in  company  stores  until  1913.  If  a  man  wanted  to  draw 
on  his  wages  earned  but  not  paid,  said  Mr.  Welborn,  he  could 


69 

get  an  order  on  the  store  company,  and  if  he  did  not  expend 
the  full  amount  of  the  order  he  could  get  his  change  in  scrip, 
which  would  be  good  at  the  store  later. 

Superintendent  Snodgrass  of  the  Delagua  mine  of  the 
Victor- American  Fuel  Company  admitted  the  use  of  scrip, 
and  testified  before  the  Congressional  Committee  that  the, 
Company  regards  the  man  holding  scrip  as  under  a  contract 
to  spend  it  in  the  company  store. 

Whether  the  practice  of  the  companies  in  this  respect  was 
a  violation  or  merely  an  evasion  of  the  State  law  is  a  question 
that  has  not  been  definitely  answered  in  the  testimony. 

The  same  law  that  prohibited  use  of  scrip  made  unlawful 
"any  requirement  or  understanding,  whatsoever,  by  the  em- 
ployer with  the  employee  that  does  not  permit  the  employee 
to  purchase  the  necessaries  of  life  where  and  of  whom  he 
likes,  without  interference,  coercion,  let  or  hindrance. " 

The  Reverend  Eugene  S.  Gaddis,  superintendent  of  the 
sociological  department  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Com- 
pany until  February,  1915,  testified  before  the  Commission  in 
Washington  on  May  19,  1915: 

One  physician  who  had  served  the  Company  for  17  or 
18  years  declared  if  a  strike  is  called,  the  Colorado  Supply 
Co.  (the  store  subsidiary  of  the  C.  F.  &  I.  Co.)  will  be 
responsible.  A  man  filling  one  of  the  highest  positions 
in  a  local  camp  received  a  letter  of  inquiry,  as  to  why  he 
did  not  trade  at  the  Company  store.  His  reply  contained 
his  resignation  (not  accepted),  but  that  he  would  trade 
where  he  thought  best,  A  local  doctor  estimated  he  could 
only  afford  to  buy  50  per  cent  of  his  groceries  in  camp. 
Lessees  of  company  hotel  buildings  did  not  feel  free  to  buy 
staple  groceries,  except  at  "the  store." 

The  manager  of  the  fuel  department  instructed  the 
superintendent,  and  he  so  informed  me  about  three 
months  ago,  to  use  his  influence  to  have  employees  trade 
at  the  store.  A  few  months  ago  a  young  manager  asked 
the  wife  of  a  laborer  if  her  husband  wished  to  continue 


70 

working  in  that  place,  and  if  so,  their  grocery  business 
had  better  come  his  way.  A  mail  order  catalogue  from 
one  of  the  Chicago  houses  was  deposited  in  an  arroyo  in- 
stead of  the  hands  of  the  addressee,  who  was  a  man  well 
known  in  the  community. 

Store  managers  are  the  postmasters  in  most  places. 
For  years  it  has  been  the  custom  of  the  Eockef  eller  stores 
to  give  a  company  draft,  when  a  postal  order  was  so- 
licited, and  charge  the  U.  S.  Postal  rates.  The  amount  of 
money  the  Government  has  lost  by  this  trickery  would 
take  expert  accountants  many  days  to  foot  up. 

Since  the  close  of  the  great  strike  many  "gabfests" 
have  been  held,  in  which  the  managers  have  been  told  a 
" square  deal"  must  be  given  in  the  future.  Prices  in 
some  stores  have  dropped  10  per  cent,  and  10  per  cent 
more  would  still  leave  a  handsome  profit  for  Kockef eller 
in  the  mining  camp  groceries. 

In  at  least  half  of  the  mining  camps  the  company  stores 
had  no  competition,  except  itinerant  hucksters,  and  in  the 
buying  of  his  food  and  supplies,  the  miner  was  at  the  mercy  of 
the  company.  In  towns  fifteen,  twenty  and  thirty  years  old, 
this  absence  of  competition  can  only  be  ascribed  to  the  refusal 
of  the  companies  to  sell  land  for  homes  or  other  purposes,  and 
this  refusal  in  turn  appears  to  have  been  actuated  by  a  desire 
to  monopolize  the  merchandising  as  well  as  every  other  activ- 
ity of  the  community. 

Store  managers  were  closely  associated  with  mine  superin- 
tendents in  the  control  of  the  political  and  social  life  of  the 
camps,  and  it  seems  reasonable  to  infer  that  ambitious  local 
managers  enlisted  the  superintendents'  influence  to  swell  their 
business  and  improve  their  showing. 

Reverend  Mr.  Gaddis  estimated  the  percentage  of  the  aver- 
age miner's  wages  spent  at  the  company  store  as  30  or  35  per 
cent.  During  the  strike,  he  said,  an  employee  working  at  the 
company's  books  in  one  of  the  stores  told  him  the  strike 
breakers  were  paying  47  per  cent  of  their  earnings  to  the 
store. 


71 

The  temper  of  at  least  two  store  managers  for  the  same 
company  is  shown  by  this  additional  testimony  by  Mr.  Gaddis : 

A  store  manager-school  director  wished  to  remove  a 
lady  teacher  because  she  did  not  trade  with  him.  *  *  * 
A  store  manager's  daughter,  at  Morley,  below  legal  age, 
and  without  any  teacher's  certificate,  was  made  a  teacher 
against  the  protest  of  the  county  superintendent  and  the 
people  of  the  camp. 

In  the  same  letter  previously  quoted,  that  of  September  19, 
1913,  to  Mr.  Murphy,  Mr.  Bowers  writes: 

Another  question  was  the  accusation  that  miners  were 
forced  to  trade  at  the  Company  stores.  In  order  to  settle 
this  we  had  our  storekeepers  and  all  interested  say  to  our 
employees  that  they  were  welcome  to  trade  at  our  stores 
or  go  anywhere  they  wished,  as  the  money  was  their  own ; 
that  we  would  be  glad  if  they  would  trade  with  us,  though 
they  were  perfectly  free  to  trade  where  they  pleased  and 
no  man's  standing  would  be  changed  if  he  saw  fit  not  to 
trade  with  us. 

Granting  that  these  instructions  were  carried  out  by  the 
interested  storekeepers  both  in  letter  and  spirit,  merely  the 
giving  of  such  notice  speaks  eloquently  of  the  power  of  the 
company  over  its  employees.  But,  according  to  Dr.  Gaddis, 
they  were  ignored. 

While  the  camp  saloons  were  not  specifically  complained  of 
in  the  strikers'  formal  demands,  they  formed  part  of  the 
feudal  system,  and  the  following  extract  from  Reverend  Mr. 
Gaddis '  testimony  is  here  relevant : 

Only  a  few  years  ago  the  saloon  was  run  in  connection 
with  the  Company  store.  Bowers  divorced  such  an  un- 
holy alliance.  Now  some  of  the  most  prominent  and  best 
structures  in  the  camps  are  used  as  saloons.  In  1908 
there  were  eighty-two  saloons  in  twenty-five  camps  of  the 
Rockefeller  mines.  Twelve  of  these  saloons  operated  un- 
der lease  from  the  Company.  In  1913  within  a  circle 


72 

of  four  miles  diameter,  including  four  camp  villages, 
there  were  twenty-eight  saloons.  One  of  these  was  on 
Company  property  and  was  bringing  $1,500  rent  to  the 
credit  side  of  coal  production  for  that  camp. 

The  policy  of  the  Company  has  been  to  farm  out  their 
privilege  for  these  joints  to  human  ghouls,  who  operate 
them,  by  the  Camp  Marshal's  consent,  without  regard  to 
the  restrictive  statutes  of  the  state,  that  would  interfere 
with  their  business. 

At  Delagua,  not  a  C.  F.  &  I.  camp,  an  officer  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard  noticing  a  saloon  open  on  Sabbath,  said  to 
the  proprietor,  "Do  you  know  of  a  state  law,  which  pro- 
hibits keeping  saloons  open  on  Sunday  I" — same  policy 
was  pursued  on  C.  F.  &  I.  property — "Oh,  that's  all 
right, "  replied  the  liquor  vendor,  "I  am  justice  of  the 
peace  in  this  town  and  we  don 't  pay  much  attention  to  such 
things  as  State  laws. ' '  Sabbath  breaking  is  condoned  by 
local  officials;  selling  to  minors  and  drunkards  is  an  of- 
fense that  is  allowed  to  pass  without  protest.  A  saloon  and 
lodging  house  known  as  the  Metropolitan  Hotel  in  Trini- 
dad, was  used  as  an  employment  bureau.  The  manager 
was  an  employee  of  the  Company,  and  the  stock  of  liquors 
was  regularly  invoiced  by  their  traveling  auditor.  A  les- 
see of  a  camp  saloon  at  Morley  on  Company  property 
was  being  credited  $200  a  month  for  advancing  cash  to 
erect  the  building.  The  "  chamber  of  horrors "  which  a 
camp  saloon  presents  after  pay  day  is  so  pathetic  and 
shameful  that  it  must  be  seen  in  order  to  be  fully  com- 
prehended. 

One  of  the  largest  saloons  on  company  grounds  is  run 
by  an  Italian,  and  the  sheriff  of  Huerfano  County  is  his 
silent  partner.  In  the  face  of  a  vote  of  over  12,000  ma- 
jority placing  the  state  ban  on  the  liquor  business,  several 
camp  saloons  were  allowed  to  reopen  (after  the  strike) 
for  one  more  year  of  devastation.  Mr.  Bowers  told  me 
that  he  would  not  allow  a  camp  saloon  to  open  after  the 
vote  was  taken,  if  Mr.  Weitzel  would  concur.  Mr.  Weitzel 


73 

would  not  concur.  The  argument  that  the  Company  must 
conduct  a  high  grade  saloon,  in  order  to  prevent  dives 
from  starting  up  just  outside  our  property  line,  has  no 
weight  with  those  familiar  with  the  conduct  of  the  so- 
called  Company  protected  saloons.  One  ' t  super ' '  justified 
gambling  on  the  same  basis. 

The  saloon  in  the  House  camp  *  *  *  Mr.  Farr 
(Sheriff  Jeff  Farr  of  Huerfano  County),  is  a  partner  in-. 
About  one  mile  away  there  is  another  saloon  at  Lester. 
There  was  no  cause  for  opening  that  saloon  whatever. 
It  is  one  of  the  most  notorious  places  in  Colorado  to  de- 
grade and  debase  men,  and  I  think  that  Jeff  Farr's  in- 
fluence opened  that  saloon. 

Coupled  with  the  strikers '  demand  for  freedom  to  trade  was 
the  demand  that  they  be  allowed  to  choose  their  own  board- 
ing place  and  their  own  doctor.  Considered  as  parts  of  the 
feudalistic  system,  company  boarding  houses,  and  company 
doctors  contributed  their  share  to  a  situation  that  altogether 
was  intolerable  to  freemen.  Both  are  institutions  that  could 
be  maintained  on  a  basis  satisfactory  to  the  miners  if  a  strong 
union  existed  and  the  employees  could  effectively  voice  griev- 
ances as  to  this  as  well  as  to  other  features  of  company  man- 
agement. 

In  return  for  $1.00  a  month  deducted  from  his  wages,  with- 
out his  consent,  the  miner  received  medical  treatment  from 
the  company  doctor  stationed  at  the  mine,  and  if  badly  in- 
jured was  sent  to  a  hospital.  The  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Com- 
pany maintained  its  own  hospital  at  Pueblo,  while  the  Victor^ 
American  Fuel  Co.  used  the  Sisters  Hospital  at  Trinidad. 

Evidence  is  abundant  that  the  system  of  company  hospitals 
and  company  doctors  offered  just  cause  for  grievance.  At 
Sunrise,  Wyoming,  where  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  oper- 
ates an  iron  mine,  the  company  doctor  acted  with  shocking 
brutality  and  carelessness  in  his  treatment  of  miners  and  their 
families,  according  to  the  impressive  testimony  of  the  Rev- 
erend Daniel  McCorkle,  pastor  of  the  Sunrise  church.  Not 


74 

only  that,  but  the  company  permitted  him  to  deduct  fees  arbi- 
trarily fixed  by  himself  from  the  wages  of  employees  before 
those  wages  were  paid,  these  fees  being  for  services  not  cov- 
ered by  the  regular  fee  of  $1.00  per  month. 

Speaking  of  the  company  surgeons  in  charge  of  the  Pueblo 
hospital,  the  Reverend  Mr.  Gaddis  says: 

The  lack  of  comforts,  the  squalor  and  filth  of  the  camps, 
is  so  far  removed  from  these  gentlemen,  that  they  are 
little  touched  with  the  feeling  of  infirmity  for  those  who 
must  endure  the  hardships  of  camp  life.  An  appeal  to 
the  surgeon  general  for  relief  of  some  despicable  situ- 
ation seldom  meets  a  prompt  and  adequate  response. 

Dr.  Gaddis  is  speaking  here,  not  of  an  appeal  from  a  miner 
or  group  of  miners,  but  from  himself  as  head  of  the  com- 
pany^ sociological  department. 

Dr.  Gaddis  gives  further  information  regarding  sanitary 
conditions  in  the  camps  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Com- 
pany: 

A  camp  physician  thus  describes  a  certain  Italian  quar- 
ter at  Sopris:  "houses  up  the  canyon,  so-called,  of  which 
eight  are  habitable;  and  46  simply  awful;  they  are  dis- 
reputably disgraceful.  I  have  had  to  remove  a  mother  in 
labor  from  one  part  of  the  shack  to  another  to  keep  dry. ' ' 
The  C.  F.  &  I.  company  now  own  and  rent  hovels,  shacks 
and  dugouts  that  are  unfit  for  the  habitation  of  human 
beings  and  are  little  removed  from  the  pig  sty  make  of 
dwellings.  And  the  people  in  them  live  on  the  very  level 
of  a  pig  sty.  *  *  *  Frequently  the  population  is  so 
congested  that  whole  families  are  crowded  in  the  one 
room ;  eight  persons  in  one  small  room  was  reported  dur- 
ing the  year.  *  *  *  The  doctor  at  Walsen  describes 
the  conditions  of  the  buildings  there  last  summer  (1914). 
These  buildings  can  be  seen — no,  I  will  just  add  here—- 
These buildings  can  be  seen  today  at  Segundo,  Sopris, 
Berwind,  Morley,  Robinson  and  Crested  Butte.  The 
Walsen  camp  physician  reports  June  18,  1914,  forty- 


75 

seven  houses  in  Bed  Camp  are  not  suitable  for  occupancy. 

*  *     *     The  superintendent  at  Berwind,  under  date  of 
June  4,  1914,  reported,  or  the  camp  physician  reported, 
18  four-room  houses  unfit  for  occupancy.    At  Segundo 
there  are  73  one-room  shacks,  and  two  2-room  shacks. 
At  an  altitude  of  10,000  feet  in  Floresta  where  the  ther- 
mometer drops  to  an  extremely  low  register,  there  is  not 
a  plastered  house  to  be  found.     The  man  entrusted  to 
answer  the  lengthy  questionnaires  sent  out  from  Wash- 
ington, in  my  hearing,  was  instructed  to  fill  out  the  blank 
forms,  so  as  not  to  arouse  suspicion,  that  conditions  would 
fall  below  the  standards  suggested  by  the  interrogations. 

*  *     *     Dr.  Corwin,  who  was  the  manager  of  the  social 
department  said  to  me:     "I  want  you  to  fill  out  those 
blanks     *  *     you  know  more  about  these  things  than 
anybody, "  and  Mr.  Welborn  objected,  and  he  said,  "I 
want  you  to  do  that,  Doctor,  and  so  answer  the  questions 
that  in  camps  where  we  have  no  social  work,  or  most  of 
them,  they  would  not  investigate.       That  was  practically 
his  instruction. 

The  unsanitary  plight  of  large  portions  of  company 
property  is  due  very  largely  to  the  fact  that  the  hands 
of  the  camp  physician  are  tied  by  the  superintendent. 
For  a  man  who  has  made  hygienic  science  a  special  study, 
to  have  his  recommendations  thwarted  by  a  block-headed 
"  super, "  makes  the  general  boss  of  the  coal  regions  su- 
preme in  his  realm,  but  it  is  little  less  than  a  crime 
against  the  camp  population.  For  a  "  super "  to  tell  a 
doctor  who  has  made  a  request  for  the  protection  of  the 
health  of  the  neighborhood,  "Now,  you  are  knocking  me," 
all  but  makes  one  feel  they  would  like  to  have  a  virile 
pugilist  handy  to  place  some  genuine  knocks. 

The  physician  asked  the  super  to  have  the  camp  cleaned 
up,  and  no  time  should  have  been  lost  in  ridding  the  place 
of  its  malady  breeding  spots.  The  "super"  replied:  "I 
have  no  men  for  that  work."  *  *  *  I  have  been  im- 
pressed with  the  idea  that  the  awful,  omnipotent,  Czar- 


76 

like  authority  of  the  local  powers  that  be,  rendered  them 
capable  to  run  this  camp  without  any  of  my  suggestions. 

As  a  fruit  of  such  folly,  the  medical  report  for  all  camps 
and  plants  for  1912  and  1913  gave  151  cases  of  typhoid, 
or  nearly  three  a  week  for  the  entire  year.  For  more 
than  a  year  a  cesspool,  within  a  few  feet  of  the  com- 
pany's store,  was  allowed  to  relieve  itself  by  overflow- 
ing at  the  top  and  running  down  across  the  principal 
thoroughfare  of  the  camp.  Both  the  store  manager  and 
his  wife  had  been  down  with  typhoid.  This  stygian  situ- 
ation and  others  almost  as  offensive  were  reported  to  the 
head  of  the  medical  work,  and  was  passed  over  by  a  re- 
ply to  the  "kicker  " ;  "better  be  careful  or  you  will  step  on 
someone's  toes." 

Chairman  Walsh:  Is  this  just  an  isolated  instance,  or 
do  they  allow  the  hygienic  situation  to  go  unattended  in 
that  way  generally? 

Dr.  Gaddis:  In  some  of  the  camps  it  could  not  be 
worse,  and  in  some  it  is  very  good,  indeed.  *  *  *  We 
do  not  believe  that  more  repulsive  looking  human  rat 
holes  can  be  found  in  America  than  those  of  Berwind 

Canyon,  before  the  strike. 

#  #  #  #  * 

The  physicians  are  paid  a  salary  generally  including 
house  rent  and  coal  free.  They  are  to  give  gratuitous 
services  for  all  cases  except  those  of  confinement,  venereal 
diseases,  and  fight  bruises.  A  monthly  allowance  for 
drugs  of  3  cents  per  capita  is  also  furnished. 

The  apportionment  for  medicine  which  they  must  free- 
ly dispense,  is  entirely  inadequate  to  meet  their  needs. 
In  one  camp  the  doctor's  monthly  bill  for  drugs  was  $25 
or  more,  and  he  was  receiving  about  $12.00  for  such  ex- 
penses from  the  company.  This  arrearage  must  either 
be  paid  from  the  doctor 's  pocket,  or  from  the  extra  money 
he  receives  in  cases  above  noted,  or  from  neighborhood 
practice,  or  extortion,  which  is  sometimes  indulged.  BY 

A  SPECIAL  ORDER  FROM   THE   HEAD   OF   THE   MEDICAL  DEPART- 


77 

MENT  AT  PUEBLO,  THE  DOCTOR'S  CHARGES,  WHETHER  REASON- 
ABLE OR  EXTORTIONATE,  MAY  BE  DEDUCTED  FROM  THE  EM- 
PLOYEE'S PAY  CHECK. 

There  is  not  a  camp  hotel  or  boarding  house  in  a  C.  F. 
&  I.  camp  where  the  bed  rooms  are  heated;  men  suffer 
with  mountain  winters. 

PRESUMABLY   FOR   AN   OBJECT  LESSON   FOR   THE   WHOLE 

CAMP,  A  BILL  FOR  SERVICE  WAS  COLLECTED  THROUGH  THE  MINE 
OFFICE  BY  THE  COMPANY  PHYSICIAN,  WHEN  THE  FAMILY  HAD 
BEEN  SO  BOLD  AS  TO  CALL  IN  A  DOCTOR  OF  THEIR  OWN  CHOICE, 
AND  THE  FATHER  WAS  DISCHARGED  FOR  BEING  UNWILLING  TO 
PAY  IT.  THIS  CASE  WAS  REPORTED  TO  THE  DENVER  HEAD- 
QUARTERS, AND  NO  REDRESS  WAS  EVER  MADE. 

There  is  another  phase  of  the  company  hospital  system 
which  will  be  considered  later  in  this  report.  It  relates  to 
the  payment  of  adequate  compensation  for  personal  injuries 
received  by  employees  in  mine  accidents. 

The  next  formal  demand  of  the  strikers  having  to  do  with 
law  enforcement  was  a  general  demand  for  the  enforcement 
of  state  mining  laws.  Under  this  head  may  be  considered, 
the  law  requiring  a  semi-monthly  pay  day,  the  law  prohibit- 
ing discrimination  against  union  men;  and  the  law  against 
blacklisting;  although  the  last  two  are  not  strictly  mining 
laws,  but  apply  to  other  industries  as  well. 

The  semi-monthly  pay  day  was  required  by  a  statute  en- 
acted in  1901.  It  is  admitted  both  by  Mr.  Bowers  and  Mr. 
Welborn  that  the  law  was  violated  and  ignored  by  their  com- 
pany until  February  1,  1913.  Mr.  Bowers  writes  to  Mr.  Mur- 
phy later  in  1913  that  he  realized  it  was  a  matter  that  would 
come  up  in  the  event  of  agitation,  and  here  again  the  com- 
pany finally  began  to  obey  the  law,  twelve  years  after  it  took 
effect,  in  order  to  forestall  successful  agitation  by  union  or- 
ganizers, and  not  because  of  its  respect  for  law. 

In  1897  the  Colorado  legislature  enacted  a  law  making  it 
unlawful  for  any  individual  or  corporation  to  prevent  em- 
ployees from  forming  or  joining  any  lawful  labor  organiza- 


78 

tion,  union,  society,  or  political  party,  or  to  coerce  employees 
by  discharging  or  threatening  to  discharge  them  because  of 
their  connection  with  such  bodies.  Operators  have  denied 
that  this  law  was  violated,  but  its  frequent  and  deliberate 
violation  has  been  established  overwhelmingly,  by  the  testi- 
mony. Rev.  Mr.  McDonald,  a  Methodist  minister,  testified 
before  the  Congressional  Committee  that  he  saw  two  deputy 
sheriffs  "  herding "  three  miners  out  of  a  Victor- American 
camp,  and  on  inquiry  found  that  they  were  suspected  of  being 
union  men.  Such  testimony  could  be  extended  at  length.  Mr. 
Bowers  himself  has  testified  that  his  company  employed  ' '  cut 
throats "  as  spies  among  the  miners. 

Since  the  Colorado  strike,  a  similar  Kansas  statute,  forbid- 
ding discrimination  against  union  men,  has  been  declared 
unconstitutional  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court.  It 
had  not  been  so  declared  before  or  during  the  strike.  The 
operators  merely  ignored  it. 

Statutes  prohibiting  blacklisting  of  employees  were  enacted 
by  the  Colorado  legislature  in  1887, 1897,  and  1905.  Although 
President  Welborn  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and 
the  other  operators  deny  blacklisting,  it  is  charged  by  the 
Reverend  Mr.  Gaddis  in  his  testimony  before  the  Commission. 
And  John  McQuarrie,  former  under  sheriff  of  Huerfano 
County,  gave  undisputed  testimony  that  he  was  discharged 
by  the  Colorado  &  Southern  Railroad  on  complaint  of  Presi- 
dent Welborn  that  he  was  too  friendly  with  union  officials. 

The  use  of  the  companies '  political  power  to  influence  legis- 
lation has  already  been  shown  in  a  recital  of  the  history  of 
eight-hour  legislation.  The  record  does  not  contain  other 
specific  instances.  That  they  did  possess  power  to  influence 
legislation  by  town,  city  and  county  boards  in  Huerfano  and 
Las  Animas  counties  is  an  unavoidable  inference  from  the  tes- 
timony showing  the  extent  of  their  political  influence,  and  it 
is  reasonable  to  assume  that  this  power  was  used. 

It  remains  to  discuss,  among  the  purposes  for  which  politi- 
cal domination  was  used,  the  companies'  control  over  coro- 
ners, sheriffs,  and  juries  whose  duties  included  the  investiga- 


79 

tion  of  personal  injury  cases  or  the  awarding  of  damages  for 
these  injuries. 

Reports  of  the  State  Inspector  of  Coal  Mines  of  Colorado 
show  that  prior  to  1909  the  number  of  deaths  in  the  coal  mining 
industry  have  been  nearly  two  to  one  for  the  United  States  as 
whole  and  from  1909  to  1913,  about  three  and  one-third  to  one. 
According  to  this  official  (Mr.  James  Dalrymple), 

over  50  per  cent  of  all  the  fatal  accidents  are  avoidable. 
*  *  *  In  the  majority  of  accidents  the  deceased  or  in- 
jured person  is  held  responsible  because  of  negligence  on 
his  part.  I  do  not  agree  with  this  because  I  believe  in- 
competence, and  not  negligence,  is  the  cause,  and  the  per- 
son who  is  so  incompetent  that  he  knows  practically  noth- 
ing about  the  business  in  which  he  is  engaged,  and  is  able 
to  understand  practically  nothing  of  what  is  said  to  him 
by  those  in  charge,  should  not  be  held  responsible  for  acci- 
dents to  himself  or  others  through  his  actions. 

The  " incompetent"  miners  to  whom  Mr.  Dalrymple  refers 
were  imported  into  Colorado  in  1903,  1904  as  strike  breakers. 

Rev.  Mr.  Gaddis  gives  the  death  roll  of  the  Colorado  Fuel 
&  Iron  Co.,  in  major  explosions,  omitting  accidents  in  which 
only  one  or  two  lives  were  lost,  as  follows:  April  2,  1906, 
Quartro,  19  killed;  January  23,  1907,  at  Primero,  22  killed; 
May  5,  1907,  at  Engleville,  5  killed;  January  31,  1910,  at  Pri- 
mero, 76  killed;  October  8,  1910,  at  Starkville,  56  killed.  To- 
tal, 178  killed  in  five  years.  The  same  witness  testified: 

During  a  recent  period  of  a  little  over  two  years,  there 
were  nearly  180  violent  deaths  in  mines  of  Las  Animas 
County.  Within  a  period  of  eight  years  and  a  radius  of 
some  150  miles  of  Trinidad,  564  lives  were  crushed  out. 
In  1914,  statistics  presented  by  the  United  States  Bureau 
of  Mines,  charge  108  deaths  to  Colorado. 

For  three  years  past  the  number  of  violent  deaths  for 
every  1,000  employees  has  increased.  Fifty  per  cent  of 
these  fatal  accidents  are  preventable,  and  yet  an  adverse 
deliverance  of  a  coroner's  jury  was  but  once  levied 


80 

against  the  company  during  the  past  ten  years.  That 
perjury  before  the  coroner  is  common,  no  one  will  deny 
that  has  serious  regard  for  a  breach  of  the  ninth  com- 
mandment. 

A  few  weeks  ago  a  pit  boss  and  colored  miner  were 
killed  at  Walsen  by  two  runaway  cars.  It  was  a  topic 
of  conversation  among  the  men  of  this  camp,  that  the 
cars  had  not  a  double  coupling  as  required.  The  com- 
pany was  exculpated  before  the  jury,  and  the  '  '  super ' '  as- 
sured the  deputy  state  mine  inspectors  that  the  cars  were 
double  coupled.  A  few  weeks  after  that  incident  some 
fifty  colored  men  were  discharged  from  the  Walsen  mine, 
and  it  was  there  where  this  report  originated  that  the 
cars  were  single  coupled;  it  started  from  the  colored 
miners.  *  *  *  The  ' l  super ' '  was  required  to  reinstate 
the  men. 

Mr.  Welborn  and  Mr.  Weitzel  testified  that  the  Colorado 
Fuel  &  Iron  Company  had  begun  a  campaign  for  safety  and 
had  instituted  first-aid  and  mine-rescue  drills,  and  Mr.  Dal- 
rymple,  State  Inspector  of  Coal  Mines,  testified  that  this  com- 
pany was  better  than  the  others  in  making  efforts  to  avoid 
accidents.  But  the  testimony  shows  that  even  in  the  mines 
of  this  company  the  accident  rate  was  high.  Mr.  Welborn  and 
Mr.  Weitzel  attributed  the  high  rate  to  geological  and  at- 
mospheric conditions  in  Colorado,  which  increase  the  danger 
of  mine  explosions. 

Enough  has  been  clearly  established  to  prove  the  unusual 
need  in  southern  Colorado  of  a  fair  and  equitable  method 
of  fixing  compensation  for  the  injury  or  death  of  mine 
workers. 

The  testimony  shows  that  personal  injuries  suits  against 
the  companies  are  practically  unknown,  and  that  injured 
miners  or  the  widows  and  children  of  killed  miners  are  forced 
to  accept  whatever  compensation  the  attorneys  and  other 
agents  of  the  corporations  see  fit  to  give  them. 

President  Welborn  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  tes- 


81 

tified  that  the  amount  of  compensation  is  usually  determined 
by  consultation  between  Mr.  Herrington,  counsel  for  the  com- 
pany, and  himself,  with  the  advice  of  Mr.  Weitzel  or  any- 
one else  familiar  with  the  circumstances.  He  stated  that  the 
injured  man  "may  be  represented "  by  an  attorney  or  foreign 
consul.  In  the  last  half  dozen  years  Mr.  Welborn  did  not 
recall  more  than  two  or  three  personal  injury  suits  against 
the  company.  As  far  as  Mr.  Welborn  remembered,  the  state- 
ment is  correct  that  there  has  been  no  suit  against  the  com- 
pany in  Huerfano  county  for  twenty  years. 

The  method  of  drawing  coroners '  juries  in  Huerfano  county, 
where  Sheriff  Farr  was  the  political  partner  and  tool  of  the 
Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.,  is  described  as  follows  in  the  sworn 
testimony  of  John  McQuarrie,  under  sheriff  of  the  county 
from  1903  until  1909. 

Q.  Are  you  familiar  with  the  methods  by  which  cor- 
oner's and  other  juries  have  been  selected  in  Huerfano 
county? 

A.  Yes,  I  am.  Speaking  of  the  methods  of  drawing 
coroners'  juries,  I  was  always  instructed,  when  being 
called  to  a  mine  to  investigate  an  accident,  to  take  the 
coroner,  proceed  to  the  mine,  go  to  the  superintendent, 
and  find  out  who  he  wanted  on  the  jury.  That  is  the 
method  that  is  employed  in  selecting  a  jury  at  any  of  the 
mines  in  Huerfano  county. 

By  Congressman  Evans : 

Q.  I  find  in  the  coroner's  records  in  Trinidad  232  vio- 
lent deaths  between  January  1,  1910,  and  March  1,  1913. 
Of  these  cases,  recorded  by  the  coroner,  I  found  that  the 
names  of  the  jurors  were  given  in  30  cases  out  of  the 
232 ;  I  found  that  a  man  by  the  name  of  J.  C.  Baldwin 
was  foreman  of  the  jury, — the  coroner's  jury, — in  24  of 
the  30  cases  on  which  apparently  a  coroner's  inquest  was 
held.  Will  you  tell  me  who  J.  C.  Baldwin  is? 

A.     J.  C.  Baldwin  has  lived  in  Trinidad — I  have  lived 


82 

there  over  36  years,  and  Baldwin  has  been  there  about 
23.  He  is  a  gambler  and  bartender. 

Q.    What  political  position,  if  any,  does  he  hold? 

A.  For  the  last  five  or  six  years  he  has  acted  as  sec- 
retary for  the  Republican  county  central  committee.  He 
is  a  kind  of  pensioner,  and  in  addition  to  that  he  is  Dan 
Taylor's  right-hand  man  in  the  first  ward  and  foreman 
of  the  coroner's  juries. 

Mr.  McQuarrie  said  he  knew  of  no  case  where  the  company 
was  held  responsible  for  negligence  by  a  coroner's  jury,  and 
that  as  a  rule  the  juries  found  that  the  victim  met  his  death 
by  his  own  carelessness. 

Mr.  J.  H.  Patterson,  a  deputy  clerk  at  Walsenburg,  pre- 
sented to  the  Commission  in  Denver  a  certified  copy  of  the 
record  of  the  last  ninety  verdicts  rendered  by  coroners '  juries 
in  Huerfano  county.  These  ninety  verdicts  recorded  the 
deaths  of  109  persons,  of  whom  82  did  not  speak  English.  In 
only  one  verdict  of  the  90  was  the  mine  management  held  at 
fault,  and  85  of  them,  testified  Mr.  Patterson,  bore  the  lan- 
guage "his  own  negligence",  or,  "his  own  carelessness." 

Even  had  the  camp  physicians  and  the  hospital  system 
of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  been  maintained  at  a  large 
expense,  instead  of  being  entirely  supported  by  the  enforced 
contributions  of  employes,  it  is  apparent  from  this  record 
that  the  company  could  well  afford  such  expense  in  view  of 
its  immunity  from  personal  injury  suits  and  its  success  in 
using  the  law  against  injured  workmen  and  their  helpless 
families. 

In  the  election  of  November,  1914,  the  people  of  Colorado 
voted  on  a  measure  providing  that  assumption  of  risk  by  the 
employe  should  no  longer  stand  as  a  defense  in  personal  in- 
juries suits.  Although  this  measure  was  obviously  in  the  in- 
terest of  mine  employees,  sixteen  precincts  in  the  coal  fields 
returned  a  vote  of  912  against  the  measure  and  573  in  favor 
of  it. 

The  use  of  political  control  to  deny  justice  to  injured  work- 


83 

men  and  the  families  of  employees  killed  or  maimed  in  acci- 
dents must  be  regarded  as  the  most  dastardly  of  all  the 
unsocial  and  criminal  practices  that  caused  the  strike. 

Of  the  specific  demands  of  the  strikers  still  to  be  consid- 
ered there  remains  the  demands  for  higher  wages  and  pay- 
ment for  dead  work,  and  the  demand  for  the  abolition  of  the 
mine  guard  system.  The  belief  has  already  been  expressed 
that  the  question  of  wages  was  secondary  in  this  strike.  The 
Colorado  wage  scale  was  10  per  cent  lower  than  the  Wyoming 
scale,  where  mine  owners,  recognize  the  union.  There  is  much 
testimony  from  miners  and  their  representatives  that  the 
actual  earnings  were  extremely  low,  and  from  the  operators 
that  these  earnings  were  exceptionally  high.  It  is  difficult 
or  impossible  to  resolve  the  conflict  between  this  testimony 
from  evidence  in  the  possession  of  the  Commission.  No  opin- 
ion or  conclusion  on  the  merits  of  the  conflicting  claims  as  to 
the  miners  *  earnings  in  comparison  with  those  of  other  dis- 
tricts is  here  advanced.  Other  subjects  of  controversy  so  far 
overshadowed  the  question  of  wages  that  elimination  of  this 
question  would  not  have  changed  the  progress  of  events  in 
the  slightest. 

The  miners'  demand  for  the  abolition  of  the  mine  guard 
system  sprung  from  wide-spread  resentment  against  the  em- 
ployment by  the  companies,  as  peace  officers,  of  armed  men 
clothed  with  the  authority  of  town  marshals  and  deputy  sher- 
iffs and  with  the  still  greater  and  more  arbitrary  authority 
of  the  employing  company.  These  men  cooperated  with  spies, 
characterized  by  Mr.  Bowers  as  "  cut- throats  ",  in  keeping  the 
camps  rid  of  workmen  who  dared  to  exercise  the  right  of  free 
speech  and  to  talk  in  favor  of  unionism  or  who  were  otherwise 
offensive  to  the  company  officials. 

The  extent  of  the  mine  guard  system  and  the  readiness 
with  which  the  force  of  guards  could  be  increased  whenever 
their  employees  became  more  restive  and  discontented  than 
usual  is  well  shown  in  the  testimony  of  Sheriff  Jeff  Farr  before 
the  Commission  in  Denver. 

Witness  McQuarrie,  former   under    sheriff   of    Huerfano 


84 

county,  testified  that  Robert  Lee,  one  of  the  camp  marshals 
employed  by  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.,  was  a  violent  bully 
who  had  entered  the  homes  of  the  miners  without  cause  and 
insulted  their  women,  and  toward  whom  the  miners  and  their 
families  felt  an  intense  fear  and  hatred.  Many  of  Lee's  of- 
fensive acts,  said  Mr.  McQuarrie,  were  committed  while  he 
was  under  the  influence  of  liquor. 

Mr.  McQuarrie  testified  also  that  early  in  the  strike  he  took 
charge  of  a  force  of  about  forty  Texas  cowboys  and  gun- 
men who  had  just  arrived  in  Trinidad  from  Texas,  and  con- 
ducted them  to  Ludlow  after  Sheriff  Gresham  of  Las  Animas 
county  had  given  them  arms  and  deputy  sheriff's  commissions. 

The  Colorado  legislature  of  1913,  whose  deliberations  pre- 
ceded the  strike,  attempted  to  prevent  the  importation  of 
armed  guards  by  passing  a  law  requiring  that  any  person 
receiving  a  commission  as  deputy  sheriff  must  have  been  a 
resident  of  the  state  for  one  year  preceding  the  issuance  of 
the  commission.  This  law  did  not  take  effect  before  the 
strike,  because  employing  interests  invoked  the  referendum. 


85 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  REFUSAL  OF  A  CONFERENCE. 

This  report  has  related  the  efforts  of  officials  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  to  obtain  a  conference  with  the  leading 
operators  prior  to  the  calling  of  the  strike.  These  began 
with  an  attempt  to  arrange  a  conference  through  the  good 
offices  of  Governor  Ammons,  by  direct  appeal  in  conciliatory 
letters  sent  to  all  operators  on  August  26,  and  through  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States  Department  of  Labor,  acting 
after  assurances  that  a  strike  was  imminent  unless  such  a  con- 
ference could  be  arranged.  It  was  not  until  more  than  a  month 
had  been  spent  in  these  fruitless  endeavors,  and  until  it  be- 
came apparent  that  the  operators  would  not  so  much  as  enter 
the  same  room  with  representatives  of  the  Union,  that,  after  a 
final  written  request  for  an  interview  in  which  the  likelihood 
of  a  strike  was  plainly  stated,  the  union  officials  called  the 
convention  which  voted  for  a  strike. 

Spies  and  local  officials  had  kept  the  operators  fully  in- 
formed of  the  unrest  existing  in  the  coal  camps.  That  this 
unrest  was  of  long  standing  is  shown  by  Mr.  Bowers'  letter 
of  Sept.  19, 1913,  to  Mr.  Murphy,  in  which  he  tells  of  the  steps 
taken  within  the  preceding  year  or  two  to  forestall  agitation. 
Before  the  strike  began  Mr.  Welborn  wrrote  to  a  director  in 
New  York,  Mr.  J.  H.  McClements,  expressing  the  writer 's 
anxiety  and  predicting  that  most  of  the  men  would  go  out  if 
a  strike  were  called. 

In  his  letter  of  Sept.  19  to  Mr.  Rockefeller's  office,  Mr. 
Bowers  makes  the  significant  admission  that  the  operators 
believed  they  could  avoid  the  strike  by  merely  granting  a 
conference  to  the  union  officials.  He  writes : 

The  strike  is  called  for  the  23rd,  but  it  is  thought  on 
the  part  of  a  good  many  operators  that  the  officials,  antici- 
pating being  whipped,  will  undertake  to  sneak  out  if  they 
can  secure  even  an  interview  with  the  operators,  which 


86 

so  far  they  have  been  unable  to  do,  thus  boasting  before 
the  public  that  they  have  secured  the  principal  point; 
namely,  recognition  of  the  union. 

It  was  three  days  before  the  date  of  this  letter  that  Mr. 
Rockefeller  in  New  York  had  declined  to  see  Mr.  Ethelbert 
Stewart,  of  the  United  States  Department  of  Labor,  and  in- 
stead had  directed  his  attorney,  Mr.  Murphy,  to  receive  Mr. 
Stewart  and  to  refer  him  to  the  executive  officials  in  Colorado. 

In  the  light  of  Mr.  Bowers'  admission  that  a  mere  confer- 
ence would  have  prevented  the  strike,  the  operators'  refusal 
to  grant  such  a  conference  must  be  regarded  as  making  them 
responsible  for  all  the  disasters  that  followed.  For  it  was 
a  policy  opposed  to  the  spirit  and  the  practice  of  the  times, 
and  the  state  of  mind  which  dictated  it  can  only  be  explained 
on  the  theory  that  the  habit  of  arbitrary  power  had  fastened 
itself  on  the  men  who  ruled  the  coal  mining  counties  from 
their  offices  in  Denver. 

Governor  Ammons  continued  his  efforts  to  effect  a  settle- 
ment after  the  strike  began.  Violence  had  begun  early  in 
the  strike ;  armed  men  imported  by  the  companies  from  Texas, 
New  Mexico,  West  Virginia  and  Denver  swarmed  about  the 
mining  towns  and  clashed  frequently  with  armed  strikers 
from  the  tent  colonies ;  winter  was  coming  on  and  a  coal  short- 
age threatened  the  State;  miners  and  their  wives  and  chil- 
dren numbering  from  10,000  to  15,000  faced  the  winter  in 
hastily  established  tent  colonies  at  the  mouths  of  the  wind- 
swept canyons. 

On  October  26  Governor  Ammons  called  a  conference  of 
the  policy  committee  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  at  his  office, 
which  was  attended  by  President  White  of  the  United  Mine 
Workers  of  America.  The  union  officials  expressed  a  willing- 
ness to  settle  on  any  reasonable  basis.  The  Governor  told 
the  union  officials  that  the  operators  were  insisting  on  the  state 
troops  being  called  out,  and  he  said :  "  Before  I  call  them  out, 
I  am  going  to  make  another  great  effort  to  bring  about  a 
settlement,  an  amicable  settlement,  and  I  want  you  to  help 
me." 


87 

President  White  replied:  "If  the  operators  will  but  grant 
us  a  conference  we  know  that  this  strike  will  be  settled. " 

Governor  Ammons  communicated  with  the  operators,  in- 
forming them  that  he  believed  the  union  officials  would  be 
willing  to  waive  the  question  of  union  recognition  and  an  in- 
crease in  wages,  and  asked  if  the  operators  had  anything  to 
offer.  The  operators  replied  that  they  certainly  would  not 
make  any  concessions  to  the  men  who  at  that  moment  were 
attacking  their  properties  and  employees. 

On  October  27  Messrs.  Welborn,  Osgood  and  Brown,  con- 
stituting the  policy  committee  of  operators,  called  at  Gov- 
ernor Ammons '  office  at  his  request. 

On  the  previous  evening  Mr.  Welborn,  in  a  telephone  con- 
versation, had  suggested  to  the  Governor  that  the  operators 
would  sign  a  letter  promising  to  obey  all  state  laws  affecting 
the  conduct  of  their  mines  and  the  well-being  of  their  em- 
ployes. Governor  Ammons  had  prepared  such  a  letter  with 
the  aid  of  former  United  States  Senator  T.  M.  Patterson, 
and  the  draft  was  submitted  to  the  operators'  committee. 
They  refused  to  sign  it  without  alterations,  alleging  that  Sen- 
ator Patterson  had  not  quoted  correctly  the  law  prohibiting 
discrimination  against  members  of  labor  unions  and  that 
in  its  present  form  the  letter  inferred  an  admission  that  they 
had  not  previously  obeyed  the  state  laws.  They  prepared  a 
substitute  letter  in  which  the  laws  were  referred  to  in  only 
general  terms  and  which  contained  a  statement  that  the  oper- 
ators would  observe  all  laws,  as  they  had  in  the  past.  When 
this  letter  was  submitted  to  the  union  officials  as  a  basis  for 
settlement,  they  rejected  it  saying  the  letter  contained  noth- 
ing but  a  general  promise  to  obey  the  law  and  that  such  prom- 
ises had  been  made  before  and  broken. 

On  November  11  or  12  Governor  Ammons  made  a  verbal 
proposition  to  the  strike  leaders  whereby  operations  might 
be  resumed  in  the  mines  in  Eoutt  county.  These  mines  were 
not  owned  by  the  large  companies  and  were  at  a  distance  from 
the  center  of  trouble,  in  Las  Animas  and  Huerfano  counties. 
Any  settlement  there  would  not  have  affected  seriously  the 


strike  situation  as  a  whole,  and  would  have  been  comparatively 
unimportant.  The  Governor's  proposition  included  a  10  per 
cent  wage  increase;  no  discrimination  against  miners  on 
strike ;  recognition  of  the  right  of  miners  to  belong  to  a  union 
without  interference  by  the  companies;  the  miners  to  have 
the  right  to  a  check  weighman  and  to  board  and  trade  where 
they  pleased,  and  the  formation  of  a  committee  to  settle  future 
disputes  and  grievances.  This  arrangement,  it  was  proposed, 
should  remain  in  force  until  March  1,  1914. 

The  policy  committee  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  replied 
in  a  letter  dated  November  12  that  it  had  no  authority  to 
deviate  from  the  instructions  laid  down  in  the  Trinidad  con- 
vention in  September;  the  committee  could  not  enter  into  a 
verbal  agreement  or  make  any  change  in  demands  without  call- 
ing a  special  convention.  It  pointed  out  also  that  any  devia- 
tion from  the  demands  of  the  Trinidad  convention  would  be 
unfair  to  the  independent  operators  who  had  signed  the  union 
scale  and  who  at  that  time  were  employing  about  1,500  miners. 
Although  they  did  not  so  state  in  their  letter  to  the  Governor, 
the  union  officials  believed  that  the  small  operators  responsible 
for  this  proposition  wished  merely  to  arrange  a  truce  with  the 
union  throughout  the  winter  in  order  that  they  might  operate 
their  mines  without  difficulty  and  profit  from  the  high  prices 
brought  about  by  the  tying  up  of  the  large  companies. 

Governor  Ammons  then  asked  the  policy  committee  of  union 
officials  to  submit  a  proposition  for  a  settlement  of  the  strike. 
The  committee  proposed  that  the  operators  meet  and  confer 
with  five  representatives  of  the  union,  of  whom  three  were  to 
be  miners  on  strike  and  the  remaining  two  Mr.  Lawson  and 
Mr.  McLennan,  both  of  whom  were  residents  of  Colorado. 
Any  settlement  to  be  reached  as  a  result  of  such  a  conference 
was  to  be  submitted  to  the  miners  in  a  special  convention. 
The  operators  ignored  this  proposition. 

Governor  Ammons  next  asked  President  Wilson  to  ask  Sec- 
retary Wilson  of  the  Department  of  Labor  to  go  to  Colorado 
and  try  to  effect  a  settlement.  Secretary  Wilson  went  to 
Denver  and  remained  ten  days.  Messrs.  Welborn,  Osgood  and 


89 

Brown  agreed  to  meet  three  striking  miners  formerly  em- 
ployed by  the  companies  involved.  Conferences  were  held  in 
the  Governor's  office,  with  Secretary  Wilson  present.  The 
operators  had  insisted  on  a  distinct  understanding  that  the 
question  of  union  recognition  should  not  be  raised.  After 
each  point  was  discussed  Governor  Ammons  would  call  for 
a  vote  of  the  three  operators  and  the  three  miners,  Messrs. 
Evans,  Allison  and  Hammon.  All  points  were  tentatively 
agreed  upon  except  the  question  of  wages  and  a  plan  for  the 
adjustment  of  future  disputes,  according  to  Governor  Am- 
mons '  testimony  before  the  Commission.  The  conference  de- 
cided that  Governor  Ammons  should  write  a  letter  suggesting 
a  settlement  on  the  lines  discussed  in  the  conference.  The 
plan  of  settlement  proposed  in  Governor  Ammons'  letter  was* 
substantially  the  same  as  the  proposition  made  by  the  oper- 
ators in  October  during  the  conference  with  Governor  Am- 
mons and  Senator  Patterson.  It  made  no  provision  for  an 
increase  in  wages,  a  contract  of  any  kind,  or  for  machinery 
for  the  settlement  of  future  differences.  It  provided  that 
the  operators  would  obey  the  laws;  and  that  all  employees 
on  strike  should  be  given  work  except  where  their  places  had 
been  filled  by  others  or  where  they  had  been  guilty  of  acts  of 
violence. 

Secretary  Wilson,  while  approving  this  letter  as  far  as  it 
went,  objected  that  it  made  no  provision  for  the  adjustment 
of  future  disputes,  and  he  wrote  a  second  letter  covering  that 
point.  The  operators  rejected  Secretary  Wilson's  proposi- 
tion, and  accepted  the  plan  of  settlement  set  forth  m  Gov- 
ernor Ammons'  letter. 

Governor  Ammons'  proposition  was  unanimously  rejected 
by  the  strikers  at  mass  meeting  called  for  the  purpose  of  act- 
ing on  it.  The  operators  alleged  that  this  rejection  was 
"railroaded  through,"  and  that  the  strikers,  had  they  under- 
stood the  proposition,  would  have  accepted  it. 

It  is  this  plan  of  settlement  contained  in  Governor  Am- 
mons' letter  of  November  27,  to  which  Mr.  Rockefeller  and  the 
other  operators  referred  repeatedly  in  the  statements  and  bul- 


90 

letins  which  they  issued  later  in  the  strike  after  the  Ludlow 
massacre  had  impressed  on  them  the  wisdom  of  self  defense. 
The  effort  is  made  to  convince  the  public  that  in  accepting  the 
Governor's  proposition  the  operators  conceded  all  that  rea- 
sonable men  could  ask,  and  that  the  strikers  in  rejecting  it 
became  responsible  for  an  unjustifiable  continuance  of  the 
strike.  Therefore  it  is  important  to  arrive  at  a  correct  con- 
clusion regarding  the  validity  of  the  operators'  action  as  an 
effort  in  good  faith  to  meet  the  strikers  half  way  and  as  a 
modification  of  their  previous  arbitrary  refusal  to  yield  an 
inch. 

Following  is  Mr.  Bowers7  comment  on  the  conference  of 
November  26.  It  is  contained  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Rockefeller 
dated  November  28,  the  day  following  the  rejection  of  Secre- 
tary Wilson's  plan  of  arbitration  by  the  operators  and  of 
Governor  Ammons  *  plan  of  settlement  by  the  strikers : 

I  see  a  " nigger  in  the  woodpile"  in  Secretary  Wil- 
son's proposition  to  have  an  arbitration  board  consider 
two  points,  one  of  which  is  (a)  the  question  of  an  increase 
in  wages,  which,  if  the  board  granted,  however  slight  it 
might  be,  then  the  labor  leaders  would  declare  the  coun- 
try over  that  they  had  gained  a  victory  over  the  operators 
and  forced  tbem  to  make  a  concession,  which  we  do  not 
propose  to  permit  in  any  circumstances.  I  can  see  no  par- 
ticular objection  to  the  formation  of  an  arbitration  board, 
as  suggested  by  Secretary  Wilson,  providing  the  three 
miners  are  non-union  men  who  have  remained  in  the  em- 
ploy of  the  coal  operators  during  this  strike,  but  to  this 
I  am  sure  that  neither  Secretary  Wilson  nor  the  labor 
leaders  would  consent.  What  they  want  is  to  get  on  the 
board  three  striking  miners  who  are  union  men,  and  they 
would  keep  up  a  perpetual  controversy  on  a  hundred  and 
one  little  technicalities,  which  the  labor  leaders  are  no- 
torious for  doing  wherever  union  men  are  employed. 

And  Mr.  Welborn's  comment  is  contained  in  the  following: 


91 

The  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Company, 

Denver,  Colo. 
J.  F.  Welborn,  President. 

December  4,  1913. 
My  dear  Mr.  McClement : 

We  feel  that  we  have  made  substantial  progress  in  the 
conduct  of  the  strike  since  I  last  wrote  you,  although  the 
increase  in  output  during  the  three  weeks  has  not  been 
large. 

At  the  urgent  request  of  the  Governor  and  under  some 
newspaper  pressure,  we  met  three  of  our  striking  miners 
in  conference  with  the  Governor  November  26th.  There 
has  never  been  any  substantial  objection  to  meeting  our 
own  employees  or  our  former  employees  for  the  purpose 
of  discussing  proper  matters,  yet  we  have  felt  that  such 
a  meeting  might  be  construed  as  an  indirect  recognition 
of  the  officers  of  the  union. 

We  succeeded,  however,  in  yielding  to  the  requested 
meeting  in  such  manner  as  to  have  the  selection  of  the  men, 
nominally  at  least,  in  the  hands  of  the  Governor,  and  when 
the  meeting  was  called  to  order  by  the  Governor  who  acted 
as  chairman,  the  miners  in  answer  to  questions  stated  that 
they  represented  only  themselves  directly  and  would  be 
obliged  to  take  back  to  the  miners  for  their  approval  or 
disapproval  whatever  understandings,  if  any,  might  be 
reached.  We  reached  no  direct  understanding ;  in  fact  we 
wanted  none,  as  we  were  almost  sure  that  had  an  under- 
standing between  the  miners  and  ourselves  been  reached 
it  would  have  received  the  stamp  of  approval  of  the  of- 
ficers of  the  organization  and  in  that  way  been  twisted 
into  an  arrangement  between  us  and  the  organization. 

But  the  most  conclusive  evidence  regarding  the  bad  faith 
of  the  operators  in  this  alleged  consent  to  meet  their  men  is 
contained  in  the  following  extract  from  the  examination  of 
Mr.  Ivy  L.  Lee  at  Washington,  in  May,  1915.  Mr.  Lee  had  vis- 
ited Colorado  and  had  become,  since  the  strike,  a  director  rep- 
resenting Mr.  Rockefeller  in  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co. 


92 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  Are  you  aware  of  the  fact, 
Mr.  Lee,  that  it  was  brought  out  in  the  testimony  here, 
that  the  operators  did  meet  with  representatives  of  the 
strikers  in  the  office  of  the  Governor  some  two  months 
after  the  strike  took  place? 

Mr.  Lee:  Yes,  that  has  been  brought  out,  Mr.  Wein- 
stock; but  I  cannot  say  that  I  have  been  impressed  with 
the  fact  that  the  representatives  of  the  men  who  met  the 
operators  were  truly  representative. 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  Now,  will  you  explain  in 
what  way  they  did  and  did  not  represent  the  men? 

Mr.  Lee:  Well,  I  just  give  you  my  impression.  I  have 
not  been  impressed  with  the  representative  character  of 
that  committee. 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  Do  you  recall  who  the  mem- 
bers were? 

Mr.  Lee:  I  do  not.  I  simply  give  you  a  general  im- 
pression. My  feeling  is  that  that  was  one  serious  mistake. 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  Meeting  these  men  in  the 
office  of  the  Governor? 

Mr.  Lee:  It  was  the  failure  to  meet  the  real  repre- 
sentatives and  talk  it  over  with  them. 

Commissioner  Weinstock:  You  don't  know  how  these 
men  were  chosen  that  met  in  the  Governor's  office? 

Mr.  Lee:  No;  I  simply  give  you  my  impression  as  to 
their  general  standing. 

In  a  final  effort  to  bring  about  a  settlement,  Secretary  Wil- 
son held  a  conference  with  the  operators  on  December  4, 
at  which  he  proposed  to  create  a  conciliation  board  the  mem- 
bers of  which  would  be  selected  by  both  sides.  In  the  mean- 
time President  Wilson  had  written  to  members  of  the  oper- 
ators' committee  pointing  out  the  serious  consequences  of  a 
continued  conflict  and  urging  a  spirit  of  accommodation.  The 
operators  refused  to  consider  Secretary  Wilson's  suggestion, 


93 

saying  it  would  of  necessity  involve  recognition  of  the  union 
and  its  officers  and  on  the  further  ground  that  there  were 
no  differences  between  the  operators  and  their  employees. 
Secretary  Wilson  returned  to  Washington. 

Repeated  efforts  to  settle  the  strike  by  private  and  public 
agencies  were  made  during  the  winter  that  followed.  All 
were  resisted  by  the  operators,  who  pointed  to  the  strikers ' 
rejection  of  the  plan  suggested  by  Governor  Ammons  in  his 
letter  of  November  27.  The  most  important  of  these  efforts 
was  that  of  Representative  Foster,  chairman  of  the  Congres- 
sional sub-committee  that  held  extended  public  hearings  in 
Denver  and  Trinidad  during  February  and  March.  Dr.  Foster 
wrote  to  Mr.  Rockefeller  and  visited  him  in  New  York  in  a 
futile  endeavor  to  convince  him  that  the  differences  should  be 
arbitrated.  Mr.  Rockefeller  said  the  matter  was  being  handled 
entirely  in  Colorado  and  refused  to  act.  The  operators  re- 
plied to  Dr.  Foster's  request  for  arbitration  that  the  miners 
had  refused  the  terms  offered  them  in  November  and  that 
consequently  all  the  disorder  that  had  occurred  from  that  date 
was  due  and  chargeable  to  the  union. 

Mr.  Rockefeller  continued  his  policy  of  resistance  after  the 
Ludlow  massacre.  He  telegraphed  the  Denver  officials  strongly 
urging  them  to  issue  a  statement  that  would  recall  the  re- 
jection of  Governor  Ammons'  plan  by  the  miners  and  that 
would  thus  place  the  blame  for  all  that  had  happened  on  the 
strikers.  He  refused  to  see  Judge  Ben  Lindsey,  a  distin- 
guished citizen  of  Colorado  who  went  to  New  York  and  asked 
for  an  interview. 

With  the  nation  aroused  by  the  Ludlow  massacre,  Secretary 
Wilson  renewed  his  efforts  to  bring  about  peace.  He  appointed 
a  commission  composed  of  Mr.  Hywell  Davies,  a  Kentucky 
coal  operator,  and  W.  R.  Fairley  of  Alabama,  a  former  official 
of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  to  go  to  Colorado  and  attempt 
mediation.  This  commission  spent  several  weeks  in  Colo- 
rado. Although  Mr.  Davies  was  himself  a  coal  operator,  he 
encountered  considerable  difficulty  in  securing  the  consent 
of  some  of  the  large  operators  to  answer  a  list  of  printed 


94 

questions  which  he  submitted  to  all  the  operators  with  the 
object  of  obtaining  all  the  facts.  The  operators  insisted  that 
they  would  deal  with  him  only  on  the  understanding  that  he 
was  to  make  no  effort  to  bring  about  a  settlement  with  the 
union.  Mr.  Davis  found  the  operators  extremely  bitter  and 
obstinate.  Messrs.  Davies  and  Fairley  completed  their  in- 
vestigation late  in  the  summer,  and  submitted  a  report  which 
later  served  as  the  basis  for  a  plan  of  settlement  proposed  by 
President  Wilson  September  5th. 

Acting  after  all  other  agencies  had  failed,  and  when  the  war 
in  Europe  and  the  consequent  depression  in  this  country  had 
rendered  the  needless  continuance  of  civil  strife  particularly 
intolerable,  President  Wilson  himself  addressed  a  plan  of  set- 
tlement to  the  operators  and  the  strikers.  Under  date  of  Sep- 
tember 5,  1914,  he  addressed  each  operator  as  follows: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
Washington. 

September  5,  1914. 
My  dear  Sir : 

I  feel  justified  in  addressing  you  with  regard  to  the 
present  .strike  situation  in  Colorado  because  it  has  lasted 
so  long,  has  gone  through  so  many  serious  stages,  and  is 
fraught  with  so  many  possibilities  that  it  has  become  of 
national  importance. 

As  you  know,  federal  troops  have  been  in  the  State  for 
the  purpose  of  maintaining  order  now  for  a  long  time. 
I  have  been  hoping  every  day  during  that  time  that  some 
light  would  come  out  of  the  perplexities  of  the  situation, 
some  indication  that  the  mine  operators  and  the  miners 
who  are  now  on  strike  were  willing  to  consider  proposals 
of  accommodation  and  settlement,  but  no  such  indication 
has  reached  me,  and  I  am  now  obliged  to  determine 
whether  I  am  justified  in  using  the  Army  of  the  United 
States  indefinitely  for  police  purposes. 

Many  things  may  come  out  of  this  situation  if  it  is  not 
handled  with  public  spirit  and  with  a  sincere  desire  to 


95 

safeguard  the  public  as  well  as  all  others  concerned ;  per- 
haps the  most  serious  of  them  all  the  feeling  which  is 
being  generated  and  the  impression  of  the  public  that 
no  one  is  willing  to  act,  no  one  willing  to  yield  any- 
thing, no  one  willing  even  to  consider  terms  of  accommo- 
dation. 

As  you  know,  two  representatives  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  have  been  actively  engaged  in  in- 
vestigating the  whole  situation  and  in  trying  to  reach  a 
dispassionate  conclusion  as  to  what  it  is  possible  to  do 
in  justice  to  both  sides  not  only,  but  also,  in  the  interest 
of  the  public.  The  result  of  their  investigations  and  of 
their  very  thoughtful  consideration  in  the  matter  has  been 
the  drafting  of  the  enclosed  "  tentative  basis  for  the  ad- 
justment "  of  the  strike.  I  recommend  it  to  you  for  your 
most  serious  consideration.  I  hope  that  you  will  con- 
sider it  as  if  you  were  acting  for  the  whole  country,  and  I 
beg  that  you  will  regard  it  as  urged  upon  your  acceptance 
by  myself  with  very  deep  earnestness.  This  is  a  time,  I 
am  sure  you  will  feel,  when  everything  should  be  done 
that  it  is  possible  for  men  to  do  to  see  that  all  untoward 
and  threatening  circumstances  of  every  sort  are  taken  out 
of  the  life  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

Sincerely  yours, 
Enc.  (Signed)    WOODROW  WILSON. 


DRAFT  OF  A  TENTATIVE  BASIS  FOR  THE  ADJUSTMENT  OF  THE 
COLORADO  STRIKE. 

WHEREAS,  the  industrial  conflict  in  the  coal  mining  fields 
of  Colorado  has  disrupted  the  peace  of  those  sections  of 
the  State  to  the  extent  that  a  state  of  war  has  practically 
existed  for  some  time,  and 

WHEREAS,  a  temporary  peace  is  maintained  by  the 
presence  of  the  Federal  troops ; 

THEREFORE,  there  should  be  established  a  three-year- 
truce,  subject  to : 


96 

1.  The  enforcement  of  mining  and  labor  laws  of  the 
State. 

2.  That  all  striking  miners  who  have  not  been  found 
guilty  of  violation  of  the  law  shall  be  given  employment, 
by  the  employer  they  formerly  worked  for,  and  where 
the  place  of  the  employe  has  been  filled,  he  shall  be  given 
employment  as  a  miner  at  the  same  or  other  mines  of 
the  company. 

3.  Intimidation  of  union  or  non-union  men  strictly 
prohibited. 

4.  Current  scale  of  wages,  rules  and  regulations  for 
each  mine  to  be  printed  and  posted. 

5.  Each  mine  to  have  a  Grievance  Committee  to  be  se- 
lected by  majority  ballot  at  a  meeting  called  for  the  pur- 
pose, in  which  all  employes  (except  officials  of  the  com- 
pany) have  the  right  to  participate. 

Members  of  said  committee  must  be  employed  at  least 
six  months  at  the  individual  mine  before  being  eligible. 

Married  men  to  be  in  the  majority  on  each  committee. 

Grievances  to  be  first  taken  up  individually  with  the 
proper  officer  of  the  company.  Failing  adjustment,  they 
can  refer  to  their  local  grievance  committee  for  further 
consideration  with  the  mine  officials.  Still  failing  adjust- 
ment, the  matter  shall  be  submitted  to  a  Commission  com- 
posed of  three  men  to  be  appointed  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States  and  which  shall  be  representative  of 
each  side,  with  the  third  member  to  act  as  umpire,  when- 
ever necessary.  This  Commission  shall,  during  the  three 
years  of  truce,  serve  as  adjusters  or  referees  in  all  dis- 
putes (whether  individual  or  collective)  affecting  wages, 
working  and  social  conditions. 

Said  Commission  shall  devote  primarily  all  the  neces- 
sary time  to  the  consideration  and  adjustment  of  such 
disputes. 

6.  It  is  understood  as  a  condition  of  the  creation  of 
said  Commission,  that  during  the  life  of  the  truce — 


97 

(a)  The  claim  for  contractual  relations  is  to  be  waived, 
but  this  shall  not  prevent  the  voluntary  agreement  be- 
tween any  employer  and  their  employes  during  the  life 
of  this  truce. 

(b)  No  mine  guards  to  be  employed,  but  this  does  not 
preclude  the  employment  of  necessary  watchmen. 

(c)  In  the  establishment  of  the  truce  the  presence  of 
the  Federal  or  State  troops  should  become  unnecessary. 

(d)  There  shall  be  no  picketing,  parading,  colonizing, 
or  mass  campaigning  by  representatives  of  any  labor  or- 
ganization of  miners  that  are  parties  to  this  truce,  which 
will  interfere  with  the  working  operations  of  any  mine 
during  the  said  period  of  three  years. 

(e)  During  said  truce,  the  decisions  of  the  Commission 
in  cases  submitted  shall  be  final  and  binding  on  employers 
and  employes. 

(f )  There  shall  be  no  suspension  of  work  pending  the 
investigation  and  reaching  a  decision  on  any  dispute. 

(g)  The  suspension  of  a  mine  over  six  consecutive 
days  by  the  company  may  be  authorized  for  a  cause  sat- 
isfactory to  the  Commission,  but  not  pending  any  dispute. 

(h)  Wilful  violations  of  any  of  these  conditions  will  be 
subject  to  such  penalties  as  may  be  imposed  by  the  Com- 
mission. 

On  account  of  the  mutual  benefits  derived  from  the 
truce,  the  employers  and  employes  should  each  pay  one- 
half  of  the  expenses  of  the  Commission. 

Respectfuly  submitted, 


Commissioners  of  Conciliation. 

President  Wilson's  plan  was  promptly  accepted  by  the  pol- 
icy committee  of  the  Union,  subject  to  ratification  by  the  strik- 
ers. A  special  convention  of  the  miners  was  held  at  Trini- 
dad, September  15,  and  the  delegates  by  an  almost  unanimous 
vote  accepted  the  proposed  plan  of  settlement. 


I 

The  operators,  however,  addressed  a  letter  to  the  President 
flatly  rejecting  his  plan.  Their  particular  objection  was  to  the 
provision  for  the  appointment  of  a  permanent  commission  by 
the  President  to  act  as  conciliators  during  the  three-year  pe- 
riod. This  they  regarded  as  an  interference  with  their  busi- 
ness by  outsiders  that  could  not  be  tolerated.  They  also  de- 
clared that  it  would  be  impossible  to  re-employ  strikers  not 
guilty  of  acts  of  violence,  because  to  do  so  would  mean  the 
discharge  of  men  who  had  risked  death  or  injury  during  the 
strike. 

The  operators'  refusal  to  accede  to  the  President's  wishes 
came  after  they  had  been  fully  advised  that  public  opinion, 
as  expressed  through  the  press  of  the  nation,  strongly  sup- 
ported the  President  and  approved  his  plan.  Writing  under 
instructions  from  Mr.  Rockefeller,  Mr.  Murphy  addressed 
President  Welborn  on  September  8,  as  follows: 

The  fact  that  the  President  of  the  United  States  has 
suggested  a  plan  of  settlement  and  has  given  it  out  to  the 
public  produces  a  delicate  situation  which  we  have  no 
doubt  you  gentlemen  in  the  west  will  handle  in  the  same 
careful  and  diplomatic  way  in  which  you  have  handled  the 
whole  situation,  thus  far,  avoiding  on  the  one  hand  any 
entanglement  with  the  labor  union  and  on  the  other  an 
attitude  which  would  arouse  a  hostile  public  opinion.  We 
are,  of  course,  greatly  interested,  and  if  you  think  we  can 
be  of  any  service  in  helping  you  to  prepare  a  reply  we 
shall  be  most  happy  to  collaborate  on  any  draft  of  one 
which  you  may  send  us. 

Mr.  Rockefeller  here  sends  his  instruction  that  there  be  no 
entanglement  with  the  labor  union,  which,  it  apparently  was 
feared,  might  grow  out  of  an  acceptance  of  the  President's 
plan.  The  letter  of  Mr.  Murphy  apparently  conveys  Mr. 
Rockefeller's  wish  that  his  Colorado  officials  shall  not  be  un- 
duly impressed  or  swayed  from  their  course  merely  by  a  re- 
quest from  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

But  Mr.  Rockefeller's  staff  in  New  York  were  impressed 


99 

with  the  support  given  to  President  Wilson's  plan  of  settle- 
ment  after  it  had  been  made  public.  Mr.  Murphy  sends  Mr. 
Welborn  the  clippings,  and  writes  on  September  16 : 

I  am  impressed  with  the  frequency  with  which  they 
make  the  point  that  the  parties  should  either  accept  the 
President's  plan  or  suggest  some  other.  It  seems  to  me 
clear  that  public  opinion  will  demand  either  the  accept- 
ance of  the  President's  proposition  or  some  constructive 
suggestion  from  the  operators.  A  mere  refusal  to  do 
anything  would  be  disastrous. 

How  the  Company  sought  to  appease  public  opinion  by  in- 
serting in  the  letter  of  rejection  to  the  President,  a  statement 
that  a  plan  was  being  developed  for  dealing  with  the  men 
even  more  comprehensive  than  that  urged  by  the  President, 
has  already  been  set  forth,  together  with  the  evidence  showing 
that  at  the  time  Mr.  Welborn  wrote  this  letter  he  had  not  even 
formulated  such  a  plan,  nor,  apparently,  had  decided  to  take 
such  action. 

It  has  already  been  made  clear  that  Mr.  Welborn 's  rejec- 
tion of  the  President's  proposal  did  not  represent  merely 
his  personal  will.  Supplementing  Mr.  Murphy's  earlier  letter 
with  its  warning  against  an  "  entanglement, "  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller  sent  Mr.  Ivy  L.  Lee,  his  publicity  expert  and  personal 
adviser,  to  Denver  to  assist  Mr.  Welborn  in  the  preparation  of 
the  reply  to  the  President.  On  September  18,  1914,  Mr.  Wel- 
born wrote  to  Mr.  Murphy : 

Before  receiving  your  letter,  we  had  for  several  days, 
in  fact  since  Mr.  Lee's  arrival,  Monday  afternoon,  been 
engaged  in  the  task  of  framing  a  letter  which  would,  as 
tactfully  as  possible,  set  forth  to  the  public  our  point  of 
view.  Mr.  Lee  tells  me  he  sent  Mr.  Rockefeller  last  night 
a  copy  of  the  letter  we  drafted  before  your  own  arrived. 
We  have  today  very  carefully  gone  over  the  whole  sub- 
ject, and  have  been  glad  to  embody  in  our  letter  some  of 
your  suggestions. 

The  fact  that  two  members  of  Mr.  Rockefeller's  personal 


100 

staff  were  assisting  in  the  preparation  of  the  reply  to  the 
President  was  to  be  carefully  concealed  from  the  public.  In 
the  same  letter  Mr.  Welborn  writes: 

But  for  Mr.  Lee's  presence  here,  and  the  invaluable  as- 
sistance he  has  rendered  in  the  preparation  of  our  reply,  I 
should  have  gone  to  New  York  for  consultation  with  you, 
and  considering  the  probable  public  criticism  of  my  pres- 
ence at  your  office  at  the  time  when  it  would  have  been 
generally  known  that  the  answers  to  the  President's  pro- 
posal were  being  prepared,  I  think  it  is  very  fortunate 
that  we  have  been  able  to  make  reply  direct  from  Den- 
ver, with  the  public  fully  informed  as  to  my  presence 
here. 

Enough  has  been  told  to  prove  that  a  spirit  of  accommoda- 
tion or  conciliation  at  no  time  actuated  the  mine  owners 
either  in  Colorado  or  New  York.  The  evidence  is  conclusive 
that  such  a  spirit,  if  manifested,  would  have  prevented  the 
strike  and  all  the  disastrous  events  that  accompanied  it. 


101 

CHAPTER  III. 

VIOLENCE  AND  POLICING. 

The  first  act  of  violence  in  connection  with  the  strike  was 
the  killing  of  Gerald  Lippiatt,  an  organizer  for  the  United 
Mine  Workers  of  America,  by  George  Belcher,  a  Baldwin- 
Felts  detective  in  the  employ  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co. 
Lippiatt  was  shot  down  on  a  public  street  in  Trinidad  be- 
fore the  strike  began.  There  were  the  usual  charges  of  an 
altercation,  and  Belcher  asserts  that  he  fired  in  self  defense. 

But  the  question  as  to  who  committed  the  first  act  of  vio- 
lence is  of  minor  importance.  Conditions  in  the  coal  mining 
district  were  such  that  violence  was  inevitable.  The  testimony 
of  Sheriff  Jefferson  Farr  and  former  Under-sheriff  John  Mc- 
Quarrie  proves  that  men  accustomed  to  the  ready  use  of  a  re- 
volver or  rifle  had  been  imported  into  the  district  in  large 
numbers  from  Texas,  New  Mexico,  West  Virginia,  and  other 
sections  by  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  its  asso- 
ciates. These  mercenary  adventurers  had  been  employed  and 
armed  by  the  coal  companies  prior  to  the  strike,  and  had  been 
given  deputy  sheriff s'  commissions  by  the  sheriffs  of  Las 
Animas  and  Huerfano  counties,  who  were  political  partners 
and  agents  of  the  coal  companies. 

When  the  miners  left  their  homes  on  company  property 
and  established  tent  colonies  on  land  leased  by  the  United  Mine 
Workers,  they  knew  that  they  could  expect  no  protection  from 
officers  of  the  law.  A  sheriff  who  at  the  company's  behest 
would  deputize  hundreds  of  men  whom  he  had  never  seen,  and 
who,  for  all  he  knew,  "  might  be  red  handed  murderers  fresh 
from  the  scenes  of  their  crimes, "  could  not  be  counted  upon 
to  safeguard  the  rights  of  striking  employees  of  a  company 
that  was  his  partner  in  the  liquor  business  and  his  political 
master.  Mr.  Lawson,  the  most  prominent  Colorado  official  of 
the  United  Mine  Workers,  knew  from  bitter  experience  how 
low  the  sheriff  of  Huerfano  county  would  stoop  to  aid  the 
operators  and  to  crush  the  strike.  The  scene  was  set,  so  far  as 
the  operators  were  concerned,  for  a  repetition  of  1903  and 


102 

1904,  when  every  constitutional  right  of  the  strikers  had  been 
violated  and  they  had  been  deported,  imprisoned  and  as- 
saulted. 

At  the  inception  of  the  strike  it  seems  clear  that  the  union 
officials  and  the  strikers  determined  that  1903  was  not  to  be 
repeated;  that  at  the  first  attempt  of  the  operators'  private 
army  to  override  their  rights,  there  should  be  resistance.  But 
it  is  clearly  established  that  the  operators  had  employed  326 
armed  mine  guards  in  Huerf ano  county  alone  prior  to  Sept. 
1,  and  that  no  step  to  arm  the  strikers  was  taken  by  union 
officials  until  twelve  days  after  that  date.  Mr.  Welborn  gives 
Sept.  12  as  the  first  date  when,  it  is  alleged  by  the  operators, 
arms  were  purchased  of  a  Pueblo  hardware  dealer  by  agents 
of  the  union.  Union  officials  have  frankly  admitted  the  pur- 
chase of  arms  and  have  quoted  that  section  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  Colorado  which  reads:  "The  right  of  no  person  to 
keep  and  bear  arms  in  defense  of  his  home,  person,  and  prop- 
erty, or  in  aid  of  the  civil  power  when  thereto  legally  sum- 
moned, shall  be  called  in  question. " 

Active  in  the  management  of  the  companies'  armed  guards 
were  agents  and  officials  of  the  notorious  Baldwin-Felts  De- 
tective Agency  of  West  Virginia.  This  agency  already  had  a 
record  for  ruthless  and  brutal  treatment  of  strikers,  acquired 
during  the  coal  strike  in  West  Virginia.  It  was  employed 
by  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  to  aid  in  recruiting 
guards,  to  install  and  operate  machine  guns  at  the  principal 
mines,  and  generally  to  supervise  and  assist  the  work  of  pro- 
tecting the  properties  and  suppressing  the  strike.  Under  di- 
rection of  A.  C.  Felts  and  Detectives  Belk  and  Belcher  of  this 
agency,  an  armored  automobile  was  built  at  the  shops  of  the 
Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  at  Pueblo.  This  car,  chris- 
tened "The  Death  Special,"  was  mounted  with  a  machine 
gun  and  used  first  by  company  guards  and  later  by  militia 
officers. 

In  addition  to  the  presence  of  large  numbers  of  armed 
guards  and  the  absence  of  honest  and  impartial  public  offi- 
cials to  control  them,  there  existed  the  elements  of  violence 


103 

that  are  common  to  all  large  strikes.  The  strikers  had  es- 
tablished tent  colonies  at  strategic  positions  near  the  mouths 
of  the  canyons  in  which  the  mines  were  situated,  so  that  strike 
breakers  going  from  the  railroad  stations  to  the  mines  were 
forced  to  pass  near  them.  The  history  of  strikes  shows  that 
workmen  on  strike  feel  that  they  have  a  property  interest  in 
their  jobs,  and  that  other  workmen  who  take  their  places 
and  thus  aid  their  employers  to  defeat  the  strike  are  fit  sub- 
jects for  abuse,  ridicule,  and  violence.  It  is  only  by  ostracis- 
ing and  intimidating  strike  breakers  that  organized  workmen 
can  hope  to  discourage  the  practice  and  thereby  win  in  a 
struggle  for  higher  wages  or  for  industrial  democracy.  For 
after  negotiation  fails,  their  only  means  of  exerting  a  com- 
pelling influence  on  the  employer  is  to  stop  production  by  quit- 
ting work  and  to  prevent  a  resumption  of  operations  by  keep- 
ing out  strike  breakers.  And  society,  if  it  wishes  to  prevent 
violence  in  industrial  disputes,  has  only  two  courses  open: 
to  prohibit  strikes,  and  in  so  doing  to  establish  involuntary 
servitude;  or  to  prohibit  the  importation  of  strike  breakers 
at  least  until  the  employers  consent  to  meet  officials  of  the 
strikers '  union. 

The  second  act  of  violence  in  connection  with  the  strike, 
and  the  first  after  it  actually  began,  was  the  killing  of  Kobert 
Lee,  a  marshal  employed  by  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Com- 
pany. He  was  shot  at  Segundo  on  Sept.  24,  the  day  after  the 
strike  began.  Mr.  Welborn  testified  that  a  striker  in  ambush 
shot  Lee  while  he  was  attempting  to  arrest  four  strikers  who 
were  found  engaged  in  tearing  down  a  foot  bridge.  According 
to  former  Under-sheriff  John  McQuarrie,  Lee  was  a  bully 
who  had  insulted  the  wives  of  miners  and  had  incurred  their 
bitter  hatred. 

On  Oct.  7,  1913,  there  was  an  exchange  of  shots  between  a 
party  of  detectives  and  company  agents  and  a  party  of  strikers 
from  the  Ludlow  tent  colony.  An  attack  by  mine  guards  was 
made  on  the  Ludlow  tent  colony  Oct.  9,  and  one  miner  was 
killed.  Following  this  attack,  the  Policy  Committee  of  the 
Union  sent  a  letter  to  the  operators  deploring  the  killing  at 
Ludlow  and  asking  their  assistance  and  cooperation  to  pre- 


104 

vent  any  similar  occurrences  in  the  future.  No  reply  was 
received. 

On  Oct.  17  a  party  of  mine  guards  rode  to  the  Forbes  tent 
colony  in  an  armored  automobile  and  opened  fire  on  the  col- 
ony with  a  machine  gun.  One  man  was  killed  and  a  boy  was 
shot  nine  times  through  the  leg.  A  few  days  later  mine  guards 
fired  on  strikers  in  the  streets  of  Walsenburg  and  killed  three 
union  men. 

Enraged  by  these  occurrences,  and  alarmed  by  rumors  of 
attack,  the  tent  colonists  began  arming  themselves  rapidly. 
At  Ludlow  150  women  and  children  were  sheltered  in  the  tent 
colony,  and  reports  that  the  mine  guards  were  coming  in  an 
armored  train  to  attack  the  colony  as  they  had  attacked  Forbes 
colony  caused  great  excitement. 

The  wanton  attack  on  Forbes  colony,  the  record  of  the  oper- 
ators and  their  agents  for  intimidating  and  overriding  strik- 
ers and  union  organizers,  and  the  character  of  the  men  em- 
ployed as  guards  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  a  deliberate  at- 
tempt was  made  at  this  time  to  terrorize  the  strikers  in  order 
to  prevent  further  desertions  and  to  drive  the  men  already  on 
strike  back  to  work.  On  the  part  of  the  union  officials  and 
their  followers  there  was  a  determination  that  such  an  attempt 
should  not  succeed. 

At  this  time  Lieut.  K.  E.  Linderfelt  of  the  Colorado  Na- 
tional Guard  had  arrived  at  Ludlow  from  Denver.  He  testi- 
fied that  he  had  been  sent  by  Adjutant  General  John  Chase 
to  investigate  and  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  militia 
were  needed.  The  conduct  of  Linderfelt  after  his  arrival  and 
his  status  at  this  period  is  clouded  with  mystery.  Instead 
of  conducting  himself  as  an  impartial  investigator  he  ac- 
cepted a  deputy  sheriff's  commission  and  took  charge  of  a 
force  of  mine  guards  employed  by  the  companies  in  the  Ludlow 
district  to  escort  strike  breakers  from  the  station  to  the  mines 
in  adjoining  canyons.  Linderfelt  was  a  professional  soldier 
and  machine  gun  operator,  with  a  record  of  service  in  the 
Philippines  and  the  Mexican  revolution.  His  conduct  later 
in  the  strike  proved  him  to  be  belligerent,  hot  tempered, 
domineering  and  brutal. 


105 

On  the  day  following  the  killing  of  the  three  strikers  at 
Walsenburg,  in  the  adjoining  county,  a  fight  started  between 
Linderfelt's  detail  of  mine  guards  and  the  Ludlow  tent  col- 
onists. Linderfelt  and  his  men  retreated  to  Berwind  Canyon, 
after  being  reinforced  by  a  force  of  sixty  guards.  He  esti- 
mated by  the  volume  of  firing  that  the  strikers  had  a  force 
of  from  150  to  200  men,  " possibly  less."  One  deputy  was 
killed.  Early  the  next  morning,  according  to  Linderfelt,  an 
attacking  force  which  he  estimated  at  25  or  30  strikers,  fired 
down  into  Berwind  from  the  hills  above.  After  an  hour  of 
firing  the  strikers  retired.  Meanwhile  Sheriff  Gresham  and 
A.  C.  Felts  of  the  Baldwin-Felts  Detective  agency  recruited 
a  force  of  fifteen  local  militiamen  and  about  fifty  mine  guards 
in  Trinidad.  This  force  was  entrained  on  steel  box  cars, 
and  the  train  was  equipped  with  machine  guns.  After  some 
difficulty  they  induced  a  crew  to  man  the  train  and  it  started 
toward  Ludlow.  The  strikers  were  notified  of  its  coming,  and, 
thinking  this  was  the  ' '  armored  train, ' '  from  which  the  mine 
guards  were  to  shoot  up  the  Ludlow  colony,  those  colonists 
who  were  armed  hurried  along  the  tracks  toward  Trinidad 
and  took  up  positions  on  a  hill  about  a  mile  south  of  Ludlow 
to  await  its  arrival.  They  were  determined  to  stop  the  train 
if  possible.  When  the  train  arrived  the  shooting  began.  The 
engineer  was  killed,  and  the  train  was  forced  to  turn  back  to 
Forbes  Junction  where  the  mine  guards  detrained  and  made 
their  way  across  the  hills  to  the  canyon  where  Linderfelt 
and  his  man  had  taken  refuge. 

On  the  following  morning,  Oct.  27,  a  body  of  strikers  at- 
tacked the  power  house  and  mine  buildings  where  the  guards 
were  sheltered.  Two  children  were  shot  while  in  bed.  The 
firing  lasted  about  thirty  minutes.  The  only  known  casual- 
ties were  the  two  children,  but  Linderfelt  said  he  found  "a 
great  many  pools  of  blood  up  there,  and  I  think  thousands  of 
empty  shells. " 

Mr.  Lawson  had  been  visiting  the  Ludlow  tent  colony  for 
several  days  prior  to  Oct.  26,  when  he  went  to  Denver  to  at- 
tend a  conference  in  Governor  Ammons '  office.  He  was  pres- 


106 

ent  during  much  of  the  fighting  described  above.  This  fact 
and  the  extent  of  the  fighting  indicates  that  the  union  offi- 
cials and  the  strikers  had  decided  upon  a  vigorous  policy  to 
prevent  the  mine  guards  and 'detectives  from  shooting  into 
and  terrorizing  the  crowded  Ludlow  colony  as  they  had  that 
at  Forbes.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  either  the  sincerity 
or  the  reasonableness  of  their  belief  that  a  murderous  attack 
on  the  Ludlow  colony  was  imminent.  Enough  has  been  estab- 
lished as  to  the  desperate  methods,  to  which  peace  officers 
would  resort  in  behalf  of  the  companies  to  justify  a  very 
real  terror  and  excitement. 

In  all  discussion  and  thought  regarding  violence  in  con- 
nection with  the  strike,  the  seeker  after  truth  must  remem- 
ber that  government  existed  in  southern  Colorado  only  as 
an  instrument  of  tyranny  and  oppression  in  the  hands  of  the 
operators;  that,  once  having  dared  to  oppose  that  tyranny 
in  a  strike,  the  miners'  only  protection  for  themselves  and 
their  families  lay  in  the  physical  force  which  they  could 
muster. 

It  remains  to  be  seen  how  even  the  supreme  authority  of 
the  State  failed  to  protect  them  in  their  struggle  for  the  right 
to  work  and  live  as  free  men  and  to  bring  up  their  children 
in  an  atmosphere  wrhere  law  and  order  was  not  synonymous 
with  the  anarchistic  will  of  a  lawless  corporation. 


107 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  COLORADO  MILITIA  AND  THE  STRIKE. 

While  the  strikers  and  mine  guards  were  waging  guerrilla 
warfare  on  October  26  and  27,  Governor  Ammons  of  Denver 
was  making  a  last  effort  to  bring  about  a  settlement.  When 
his  efforts  failed  he  issued  orders  to  Adjutant  General  Chase, 
calling  out  the  militia  and  ordering  General  Chase  to  occupy 
the  strike  district.  The  fight  between  Linderfelt's  men  and 
the  strikers  in  Berwind  Canyon  occurred  on  October  27.  On 
the  following  day  the  State  troops  took  the  field.  The  units 
sent  into  the  field  included  cavalry,  infantry  and  artillery. 

Up  to  this  time  and  for  several  weeks  thereafter  Governor 
Ammons  had  devoted  all  his  efforts  to  bringing  about  a  set- 
tlement on  a  basis  that  would  be  fair  to  all  concerned,  and  no 
serious  question  had  been  raised  as  to  his  fairness  and  impar- 
tiality. In  his  orders  to  General  Chase  regarding  the  conduct 
of  the  troops  in  the  strike  zone,  he  specified  that  the  troops 
should  be  used,  first,  to  afford  protection  to  all  property ;  sec- 
ond, to  afford  protection  to  all  men  who  were  then  at  work; 
third,  to  protect  any  men  who  might  wish  to  return  to  work ; 
but  that  under  no  circumstances  should  the  troops  be  used 
to  aid  in  the  installation  of  imported  strikebreakers.  In 
giving  these  orders  Governor  Ammons  adopted  the  recom- 
mendation of  former  United  States  Senator  Thomas  M.  Pat- 
terson, a  resident  of  Colorado  for  forty-two  years  and  one  of 
the  leaders  in  Colorado  of  the  political  party  to  which  Gov- 
ernor Ammons  belonged.  Senator  Patterson's  views  were 
based  on  a  varied  experience  in  dealing  with  labor  disturb- 
ances, as  a  public  official,  a  politician,  a  mine  owner,  a  news- 
paper publisher  and  a  public  spirited  citizen.  Governor  Am- 
mons accepted  his  view  that  to  permit  the  use  of  the  troops 
in  escorting  strikebreakers  would  be  to  turn  them  over  to 
one  of  the  parties  to  the  conflict.  That  this  policy  of  Gov- 
ernor Ammons  was  not  out  of  line  with  the  correct  theory 
of  policing  strikes  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  when  the 


108 

Federal  troops  entered  the  field  seven  months  later  similar 
orders  were  issued  to  them  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

The  wisdom  of  prohibiting  the  importation  of  strikebreak- 
ers as  a  means  of  maintaining  order  has  been  amply  demon- 
strated, but  this  policy  rests  on  a  firmer  basis  than  its  mere 
expediency.  The  record  in  Colorado  shows  that  in  1903  and 
1904,  and  again  during  the  strike  under  discussion,  the  coal 
operators  had  no  scruples  in  taking  steps  to  displace  men  who 
for  years  had  been  attached  to  the  mining  communities  by 
ties  of  family,  friendships  and  love  of  State,  with  homeless 
and  penniless  immigrant  workmen  from  distant  states.  The 
record  shows  that  strikebreakers  were  imported  in  carload 
lots  under  the  guard  of  private  detectives  who  recruited  them 
in  distant  cities,  and  that  both  on  the  train  and  after  their 
arrival  in  Colorado  they  were  treated  more  as  chattels  than 
as  free  men.  Contracts  in  the  possession  of  the  Commission 
made  by  detective  agencies  engaged  in  such  work  show  that 
these  agencies  guarantee  against  the  escape  of  strikebreakers 
enroute  by  providing  guards  for  the  front  and  rear  entrances 
of  the  railway  coaches.  So  extensive  are  the  organizations 
of  such  agencies  that  strikebreakers  can  be  supplied  within  a 
short  time  in  any  numbers.  If  employers  and  strikebreaking 
agencies  are  to  be  permitted  to  operate  in  this  fashion  without 
let  or  hindrance,  it  means  that  entire  communities  of  home- 
making  and  home-loving  citizens  can  be  displaced  almost  over 
night  by  an  army  of  homeless  vagabonds,  drawn  from  the 
scum  of  the  labor  markets  of  widely  scattered  cities.  This 
practice  makes  wanderers  of  hard-working  and  home-loving 
men  whose  only  offense  is  that  they  have  taken  part  in  a 
strike.  It  fills  strikers  with  hatred  and  leads  inevitably  to  vio- 
lence, and  finally  it  has  a  disastrous  effect  on  the  community 
and  the  State  by  working  a  deterioration  in  the  quality  of  the 
citizenship. 

Two  days  before  the  State  troops  were  called  out,  Mr.  Law- 
son,  the  strikers'  leader,  had  been  called  to  Denver  to  be  pres- 
ent during  the  final  unsuccessful  attempt  to  procure  a  settle- 
ment. He  returned  to  the  strike  zone  October  29  and  ad- 
dressed the  strikers  in  the  Ludlow  Tent  Colony,  informing 


109 

them  that  the  State  troops  were  to  be  strictly  impartial,  that 
they  would  not  assist  in  the  importation  of  strikebreakers,  and 
that  they  meant  to  disarm  everyone,  mine  guards  and  strikers 
alike.  He  asked  the  strikers  to  welcome  the  militia  and  to 
surrender  their  arms  peaceably. 

Good  reason  existed  for  a  distrustful  and  suspicious  attitude 
toward  the  State  troops  on  the  part  of  the  strikers.  Lieutenant 
Linderfelt  had  come  to  the  strike  zone  as  a  representative  of 
General  Chase,  the  commanding  officer  of  the  State  troops, 
and  instead  of  acting  impartially  had  taken  command  of  a 
detail  of  mine  guards  and  deputies  engaged  in  escorting  strike- 
breakers from  the  Ludlow  station  to  the  mines.  General  Chase 
himself,  nine  years  before,  had  commanded  the  State  troops 
at  Cripple  Creek  during  the  strike  of  metalliferous  miners, 
and  had  been  active  in  arresting  strikers  in  large  numbers 
and  imprisoning  them  in  the  notorious  "bull  pens."  Senator 
Patterson  testified  before  this  Commission  that  he  was  con- 
vinced at  the  time,  and  still  believes,  that  the  Mine  Owners' 
Association,  through  its  committee,  really  directed  the  opera- 
tion of  the  troops.  During  this  strike  of  1904  at  Cripple 
Creek  the  District  Judge  ordered  the  release  of  arrested 
strikers  on  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  On  this  occasion  troops 
under  General  Chase's  command  guarded  the  interior  of  the 
court  room  and  presented  arms  when  the  Judge  entered.  Im- 
mediately after  the  order  of  release  General  Chase  arose  and 
announced  that  he  must  decline  to  comply  with  the  request 
of  the  court  and  ordered  the  military  guard  to  keep  the  men 
under  arrest  and  to  take  them  out  as  prisoners.  Not  only 
was  this  same  General  Chase  now  the  commanding  officer,  but 
his  principal  aid  was  Major  Edward  J.  Boughton,  attorney 
for  the  Cripple  Creek  Mine  Owners'  Association,  that  had, 
according  to  Senator  Patterson,  directed  the  operations  of 
the  troops  during  the  strike  nine  years  previous. 

In  spite  of  evidence  that  prominent  officers  of  the  guard 
might  be  expected  to  favor  the  operators,  the  strikers  at 
Ludlow  and  elsewhere  complied  with  Mr.  Lawson's  request, 
and,  on  the  arrival  of  the  troops,  greeted  them  with  band 
music,  parades  and  cheering.  General  Chase  ordered  the  dig- 


110 

armament  of  both  mine  guards  and  strikers.  He  testified  that 
about  two  thousand  guns  were  taken  up  in  the  strike  district 
and  that  of  this  number  about  three-fourths  were  taken  from 
mine  guards  and  operators.  Other  officers  of  the  guard  tes- 
tified that  strikers  gave  up  their  arms  reluctantly  and  undoubt- 
edly hid  a  large  number  of  rifles  and  revolvers. 

Soon  after  the  troops  entered  the  field  many  business  men 
and  salaried  employees  who  had  steady  positions  at  home 
asked  to  be  relieved  from  duty.  Their  places  were  taken  by 
men  recruited  in  the  strike  zone,  at  least  some  of  whom  had 
been  imported  to  serve  as  mine  guards.  At  the  Segundo  Camp 
a  man  named  Kennedy,  a  mine  guard,  appeared  in  the  uni- 
form of  a  National  Guardsman  within  a  week  or  two  of  the 
time  the  troops  were  sent  into  the  district.  Kennedy  had  been 
one  of  the  mine  guards  who  assisted  in  shooting  up  the  Forbes 
Tent  Colony  with  a  machine  gun  October  17,  and  was  known 
to  some  of  the  strikers.  The  practice  of  enlisting  mine  guards 
was  general  in  the  entire  strike  zone  and  had  the  sanction  of 
General  Chase.  Captains  Van  Cise  and  Garwood  both  testi- 
fied to  the  enlistment  of  the  guards. 

While  good  feeling  continued  at  points  where  the  militia 
companies  contained  few,  if  any,  mine  guards,  in  other  locali- 
ties arrival  of  the  troops  did  not  allay  the  fears  of  the  strikers 
that  their  colonies  were  about  to  be  attacked.  Disquieting 
rumors  were  prevalent.  There  is  testimony  that  a  camp  phy- 
sician at  Hastings  had  been  overheard  in  a  saloon,  a  few  days 
after  the  arrival  of  the  State  troops,  making  the  statement 
that  a  force  of  mine  guards  intended  coming  down  the  Canyon 
and  cleaning  up  the  tent  colonies.  There  was  no  basis  for  such 
a  report,  but  the  recent  fighting  had  left  much  bitterness  and 
agitation.  Violence  did  not  entirely  cease  with  the  arrival  of 
the  troops.  On  November  8,  ten  days  after  the  troops  were 
ordered  out,  an  employee  from  a  nearby  mine  got  into  an 
altercation  with  the  strikers  at  Walsenburg.  He  became 
alarmed  and  telephoned  to  the  mine  to  send  him  assistance. 
An  automobile  with  three  guards  in  addition  to  the  chauffeur 
was  sent  after  him.  On  the  return  trip  to  the  mine  the  auto- 
mobile was  ambushed  by  a  force  of  armed  strikers  and  the 


Ill 

driver  and  two  of  the  occupants  were  killed  instantly.  A 
fourth  was  so  severely  wounded  he  died  a  day  or  two  later. 
On  the  same  day  a  non-union  miner  was  shot  and  killed  by 
strikers  at  Aguilar. 

In  spite  of  occasional  acts  of  violence  the  strike  zone  re- 
mained comparatively  quiet  so  long  as  Governor  Ammons' 
orders  against  the  use  of  troops  to  escort  imported  strike- 
breakers remained  in  effect.  The  Governor's  policy  in  this 
respect  had  been  vigorously  opposed  by  the  operators,  and 
immediately  after  the  calling  out  of  the  troops  they  began 
a  campaign  to  coerce  the  Governor  into  withdrawing  his 
original  orders  and  directing  the  troops  to  act  as  escorts  for 
imported  strikebreakers.  Letters  already  quoted  from  Mr. 
Bowers,  the  highest  executive  official  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  & 
Iron  Co.,  to  Mr.  Eockef eller  's  office  in  New  York,  show  the 
methods  pursued  by  the  large  companies.  On  November  18, 
1913,  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Rockefeller : 

I  have  not  sent  you  much  published  matter  in  regard 
to  the  strike  during  the  last  few  days,  as  we  have  been 
having  a  season  of  comparative  quiet  in  southern  Colo- 
rado. 

You  will  be  interested  to  know  that  we  have  been  able 
to  secure  the  co-operation  of  all  the  bankers  of  the  city, 
who  have  had  three  or  four  interviews  with  our  little 
cowboy  Governor,  agreeing  to  back  the  state  and  lend  it 
all  the  funds  necessary  to  maintain  the  militia  and  afford 
ample  protection  so  that  our  miners  could  return  to  work, 
or  give  protection  to  men  who  are  anxious  to  come  up 
here  from  Texas,  New  Mexico  and  Kansas,  together  with 
some  from  states  farther  east.  Besides  the  bankers,  the 
Chamber  of  Commerce,  the  Real  Estate  Exchange,  to- 
gether with  a  great  many  of  the  best  business  men,  have 
been  urging  the  Governor  to  take  steps  to  drive  these 
vicious  agitators  out  of  the  state.  Another  mighty  power 
has  been  rounded  up  in  behalf  of  the  operators  by  the 
gathering  together  of  fourteen  of  the  editors  of  the  most 
important  newspapers  in  Denver,  Pueblo,  Trinidad,  Wai- 


112 

senburg,  Colorado  Springs  and  other  of  the  larger  places 
in  the  state.  They  passed  resolutions  demanding  that  the 
Governor  bring  this  strike  to  an  end,  as  they  found,  upon 
most  careful  examination,  that  the  real  issue  was  the 
demand  for  recognition  of  the  union,  which  they  told  the 
Governor  would  never  be  conceded  by  the  operators  as 
90  per  cent  of  the  miners  themselves  were  non-union  men, 
and  therefore  that  issue  should  be  dropped. 

Still  the  Governor  hobnobs  with  Hayes,  Laws  on,  Mc- 
Lennan and  the  rest  of  the  gang,  and  either  refuses  or 
begs  for  more  time  to  bring  the  strike  to  an  end  or  to 
amply  protect  the  operators  in  bringing  in  outsiders  to 
take  the  places  of  those  who  have  left  the  state  and  those 
engaged  in  these  murderous  assaults  whom  we  refuse  to 
take  back  under  any  circumstances.  Yet  we  are  making 
a  little  headway. 

There  probably  has  never  been  such  pressure  brought 
to  bear  upon  any  governor  of  this  state  by  the  strongest 
men  in  it  as  has  been  brought  to  bear  upon  Governor 
Ammons.  We  have  published  statements  of  the  earnings 
of  the  miners,  which  the  agitators  disputed  and  the  Gov- 
ernor expressed  great  doubt  as  to  its  accuracy.  In  order 
to  force  acknowledgment,  we  requested  the  bankers  to 
recommend  three  expert  accountants  to  examine  our  pay- 
rolls, books,  etc.,  which  they  did  yesterday.  The  Gov- 
ernor appointed  these  men  and  they  are  now  in  our  office 
checking  up  and  their  report  will  be  published. 

While  we  are  meeting  with  enormous  losses  we  are 
making  friends  by  the  thousands  in  the  state  by  giving 
to  the  public  all  of  the  data  proving  our  splendid  treat- 
ment of  our  men,  not  only  in  making  it  possible  for  them 
to  earn  more  money  than  in  any  other  bituminous  coal 
section  of  the  country,  but  showing  the  public  what  we 
have  been  doing  in  the  way  of  improving  the  condition 
of  our  miners  and  their  families.  We  have  won  the  cor- 
dial support  of  the  leading  papers  of  the  state  and  have 
won  over  several  men  who  formerly  supported  labor 
unions  and  the  agitators,  so  we  get  some  comfort  and  a 


113 

good  deal  of  satisfaction  in  having  our  efforts  recognized, 
covering  the  past  five  years,  in  the  upbuilding  of  our  com- 
pany morally,  commercially  and  financially,  through  the 
reports  of  the  strong  men  connected  with  the  business  or- 
ganizations, bankers  and  others,  who  have  been  given  all 
the  data  and  information  desired — which  has  been  an  eye- 
opener  to  most  of  them. 

Personally  the  strain  has  been  very  great  on  Mr.  Wei- 
born,  who  has  been  the  recognized  leader  among  the  oper- 
ators. He  has  not  spared  himself  day  or  night,  and  but 
for  his  vigorous  makeup,  would  have  been  unable  to  stand 
up  under  the  weight  loaded  upon  him.  I  mention  this  so 
that  you  may  know  how  valuable  a  man  he  is  when  placed 
in  the  most  trying  circumstances  that  any  official  has  ever 
been  called  upon  to  encounter  in  dealing  with  labor  unions 
whose  leaders,  in  this  state,  cannot  be  regarded  as  any- 
thing less  than  assassins. 

Personally  my  hope  is  to  be  blessed  with  enough  mental 
and  physical  strength  to  be  able  to  stand  four  square  un- 
til we  win  a  righteous  victory. 

On  December  22, 1913,  he  announces  the  success  of  the  cam- 
paign in  the  following: 

If  the  governor  had  acted  on  September  23  as  he  has 
been  forced  to  act  during  the  past  few  weeks,  the  strike 
would  have  never  existed  ten  days. 

We  used  every  possible  weapon  to  drive  him  into  action, 
but  he  was  glove-in-hand  with  the  labor  leaders  and  is  to- 
day, but  the  big  men  of  affairs  have  helped  the  operators 
in  whipping  the  agitators,  including  the  governor. 

Now  these  fellows  are  cursing  him  without  regard  for 
common  decency,  so  everybody  is  giving  him  more  or  less 
taffy  to  keep  him  from  backsliding.  The  enclosed  is  a 
sample  of  the  resolutions  being  sent  to  him,  besides  any 
number  of  personal  letters. 

By  the  number  of  miners  we  are  getting  in  from  the 
south  and  east,  we  will  have  all  we  can  work  in  a  week 


114 

or  so.  Of  course  the  coal  trade  is  good  for  nothing  after 
ahout  February  first,  except  the  railroads  and  little  money 
is  made  on  their  trade. 

I  received  a  nice  note  from  your  father  and  in  reply, 
stated  that  I  was  feeling  much  better,  though  I  am  having 
miserable  trouble  with  indigestion  yet,  which  upsets  me 
all  over,  especially  my  sleep. 

I  have  never  known  such  widespread  approval  by  all 
classes  of  business  men  as  we  are  getting  in  our  fight  for 
the  "open  shop." 

We  are  paying  the  4  per  cent  dividends  for  the  lasi 
half  of  the  current  year  on  the  preferred  stock. 

I  thank  you  for  your  suggestion,  to  take  a  rest,  but  I 
have  no  expectation  of  taking  even  a  day  off  before  spring 
unless  I  play  out  entirely. 

Wishing  you  and  yours  a  "  happy  holiday  season, "  I 
remain. 

In  addition  to  these  letters,  light  is  thrown  on  the  methods 
used  by  the  operators  to  whip  Governor  Ammons  into  line 
by  the  testimony  of  Attorney  General  Farrar.  General  Far- 
rar  went  to  Governor  Ammons  and  advised  him  that  his  order 
prohibiting  the  use  of  troops  to  escort  strikebreakers  could  not 
be  justified  under  the  laws  of  the  state,  and  that  furthermore 
this  order  was  having  the  effect  of  preventing  the  operation 
of  the  mines  and  was  contributing  to  a  coal  shortage.  In  view 
of  General  Farrar 's  subsequent  activities,  and  in  the  light  of 
Mr.  Bowers'  letters  just  quoted,  the  question  arises  as  to 
\\hether  or  not  he  was  one  of  the  " weapons "  used  by  the  op- 
erators to  drive  the  Governor  into  line. 

General  Farrar 's  initiative  in  going  to  the  Governor  with 
the  complaint  regarding  the  legality  of  the  militia's  acts  is 
hard  to  explain  on  any  other  basis.  For  he  took  no  such  in- 
terest in  the  later  acts  of  the  militia  and  its  officers,  when  mine 
guards  were  enlisted,  constitutional  guarantees  disregarded, 
and  actual  murder  committed  by  its  members.  He  testified 
before  the  Commission  that  the  legality  of  the  acts  of  the 
military  commission  was  not  investigated  by  him,  and  that 


115 

he  had  not  even  read  the  testimony  taken  at  the  official  in- 
vestigation of  the  Ludlow  massacre. 

In  their  efforts  to  coerce  the  Governor,  the  operators  were 
aided  by  a  peculiar  situation  produced  by  the  refusal  of  State 
Auditor  Kenehan  to  issue  certificates  of  indebtedness  to  pay 
the  salaries  and  expenses  of  the  State  troops.  Bankers  in 
Denver,  Ludlow  and  Colorado  Springs  had  acceded  to  a  re- 
quest of  the  Governor  that  they  advance  money  for  the  militia. 
There  were  constant  threats  that  the  money  would  not  be 
paid  and  some  bankers  were  afraid  to  honor  the  State  cer- 
tificates. Governor  Ammons  therefore  found  himself  under 
some  obligation  to  the  large  financial  interests  of  the  State. 
The  refusal  of  the  State  Auditor  to  issue  certificates  of  in- 
debtedness was  declared  by  the  operators  to  have  been  act- 
uated by  Mr.  Kenehan 's  sympathy  for  the  strikers.  He  was 
a  former  union  official.  Auditor  Kenehan  insisted  that  his 
refusal  was  due  to  the  fear  that  he  might  be  held  liable  under 
his  bond. 

Governor  Ammons  himself  testified  that  he  rescinded  his 
order  to  the  militia,  prohibiting  the  importation  of  strike- 
breakers, after  all  efforts  to  obtain  a  settlement  had  failed, 
following  the  conference  of  November  27,  and  that  he  knew 
he  had  strained  a  point  in  giving  the  original  order,  but  be- 
lieved it  was  justifiable  in  the  effort  to  bring  about  a  settle- 
ment. The  change  was  effected  by  the  issuance  of  general 
order  No.  17  by  General  Chase  from  military  headquarters  in 
Trinidad  on  November  28.  The  effect  of  this  order  is  de- 
scribed by  Senator  Patterson  in  his  testimony  at  Denver  as 
follows : 

From  that  time  things  went  from  bad  to  worse,  crim- 
ination and  recrimination,  the  operators  insisting  that  all 
violence  was  committed  by  the  miners  and  the  miners  in- 
sisting that  there  was  ample  provocation  for  whatever 
violence  they  resorted  to.  It  seemed  to  me  that  the  abso- 
lute management  of  the  strike  territory  had  been  turned 
over  to  Adjutant  General  Chase.  We  heard  daily  of 
large  numbers  of  men  being  arrested  and  put  in  jail;  we 


116 

heard  that  men  were  arrested  without  charge  on  mere 
suspicion  and  were  kept  incommunicado;  that  they  were 
refused  the  visits  of  friends,  the  right  to  consult  with  coun- 
sel or  to  do  anything  else  in  the  way  of  taking  charge  of 
and  looking  after  their  own  interest  and  welfare,  such  as 
is  usually  granted  to  the  commonest  of  criminals.  Mother 
Jones  was  arrested  and  put  in  jail  and  kept,  as  I  under- 
stand it,  absolutely  incommunicado  for  several  months. 
These  men  who  were  arrested  merely  on  suspicion  were 
kept,  many  of  them,  for  weeks  and  weeks.  All  of  that  was 
done  under  a  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State 
that  arose  out  of  the  Cripple  Creek  strike,  called  the 
Moyer  case,  the  substance  of  which  decision  was  that 
wherever  the  state  troops  were, — whether  martial  law  had 
been  proclaimed  or  not,  but  wherever  they  were  for  the 
purpose  of  restoring  peace  or  preserving  the  peace,  that 
there  all  civil  law  might  be  suspended  at  the  will  of  the 
commanding  officer  and  the  military  law  take  its  place. 
This  was  a  decision  that,  in  my  opinion,  up  to  that  time, 
had  no  precedent  except  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  I 
think  that  was  the  only  case  directly  in  point  that  the 
court  relied  on.  It  was  a  decision  against  which  every 
lawyer  naturally  rebelled  and  under  which  the  will  of  the 
military  officer  in  command  of  the  troops  in  such  localities 
was  the  law. 

Things  of  that  kind  are  no  justification  for  violence, 
or  for  the  destruction  of  property  or  the  taking  of  human 
life,  but  there  is  a  tremendous  amount  of  provocation  in 
things  of  that  kind.  Here  are  the  men  whose  experience 
leads  them  to  regard  themselves  as  a  class  distinguished 
from  the  other  class,  the  employers.  They  feel  that  they 
are  the  under-dogs  in  all  of  these  industrial  struggles; 
they  feel  that  simply  because  they  are  engaged  in  these 
struggles — the  part  of  the  mass  that  goes  out  on  a  strike 
— because  they  may  express  their  views  about  the  strike 
in  their  particular  locality,  they  are  deprived  of  all  their 
civil  rights,  that  they  may  be  arrested  and  are  arrested 
and  cast  into  jail  without  any  charge  being  filed  against 


117 

them  and  without  any  opportunity  for  a  hearing.  I  think 
that  decision  has  done  more  to  demoralize  both  the  social 
and  industrial  elements  in  these  great  industrial  disturb- 
ances— in  Colorado — wherever  these  industrial  disturb- 
ances have  arisen, — than  everything  else  combined,  for 
I  want  to  say  that  when  you  subject  the  citizens  of  a  great 
community  to  the  will  of  a  mere  soldier,  who  has  had  no 
training  in  civil  government — who  has  been  taught  and 
realizes  that  the  will  of  the  soldier  is  the  law  of  the  com- 
munity, that  the  rights  of  persons  and  the  rights  of  prop- 
erty are  all  at  his  will,  it  is  a  mighty  dangerous  thing, 
and  the  soldier  is  next  to  an  angel  that  does  not  abuse  it, 
and  grossly  abuse  it.  I  think  it  is  a  tremendously  grave 
mistake  in  any  Governor  to  turn  over  the  government 
of  any  section  of  any  of  the  states  of  this  nation  to  a  mil- 
itary officer,  exercising  his  duties  and  powers  as  com- 
mander-in-chief  not  only  to  keep  a  strong  hand  on  the 
military,  but  as  well  to  rule  the  citizenry,  and  keep  him- 
self within  the  limits  of  the  law. 

While  talking  with  Mr.  Hawkins,  attorney  for  the 
miners,  I  spoke  to  him  about  the  violence  that  was  going 
on  down  in  the  strike  field,  impressed  as  I  was  with  the 
feeling  that  the  violence  could  not  be  justified  and  was 
not  warranted,  although  there  might  be  provocation  from 
the  conduct  of  the  military.  He  came  back  with  this  sort 
of  argument,  and  I  can  understand  how  it  is  in  the  breast 
even  of  the  foreign  miners  in  this  country ;  he  said,  ' '  Pat- 
terson, you  don't  know  how  these  men  feel;  they  are  ar- 
rested without  charge,  simply  on  suspicion,  and  they  are 
cast  into  jail.  Their  fellows  know  how  they  are  treated 
and  they  are  conscious  that  they  are  guilty  of  no  viola- 
tion of  the  law,  but  simply  exercising  their  right  to  strike 
He  said,  "It  is  mighty  hard,  and  while  I  know  this  is  no 
justification,  I  want  to  tell  you  there  is  provocation  and 
the  law  recognizes  the  doctrine  of  provocation,  because 
provocation  mitigates  the  degree  of  crimes  against  per- 
sons/' and  I  could  not  gainsay  it. 

I  believe  one  of  the  first  things  that  should  be  done  in 


118 

the  state  is  for  the  Supreme  Court  to  recall  this  decision. 
I  have  said  that  a  hundred  times,  and  I  must  continue  to 
say  so. 

These  abuses  on  the  part  of  the  militia  resulted  in  the  Colo- 
rado State  Federation  of  Labor  demanding  an  investigation 
following  a  special  convention  which  opened  December  16  and 
remained  in  session  three  days.  The  labor  delegates  called 
upon  Governor  Ammons  to  remedy  the  conditions  complained 
of  and  he  suggested  that  the  convention  appoint  a  special  com- 
mittee to  make  a  complete  investigation  of  the  conduct  of  the 
militia  and  report  to  him. 

The  convention  appointed  a  committee  composed  of  John 
B.  Lawson,  James  Kirwan,  James  H.  Brewster,  Eli  M.  Gross 
and  Frank  Miner.  Four  of  the  five  members  of  the  committee 
were  union  men.  Mr.  Brewster  was  a  professor  of  law  at  the 
State  University. 

This  committee  began  an  investigation  on  December  23  after 
having  received  a  letter  from  Governor  Ammons  directing 
General  Chase  to  assist  in  every  way  to  bring  out  the  facts. 
This  inquiry  lasted  some  three  weeks  during  which  163  wit- 
nesses were  examined,  at  least  one-third  of  whom  were  not 
connected  with  the  union.  The  committee  found  that  the 
charges  made  in  the  special  labor  convention  were  more  than 
justified  by  the  facts.  The  committee  attributed  most  of  the 
abuses  complained  of  to  a  wrong  conception  of  duty  enter- 
tained by  General  Chase.  The  latter  said  that  a  "  state  of 
war"  existed  which  he  thought  justified  his  disregard  of  the 
constitution  in  the  matter  of  making  arrests  and  the  deten- 
tion of  prisoners  without  being  given  their  day  in  court.  In 
its  report  to  Governor  Ammons  the  committee  said  that  the 
assumption  of  General  Chase  and  some  of  his  immediate  ad- 
visers that  they  were  soldiers  engaged  in  war  "accounts  for 
most  of  the  errors  of  the  militia — errors  which  range  all  the 
way  from  pitiful,  puerile  blunders  to  the  grossest  atrocities." 
(Eeport  of  Committee,  p.  6.) 

Charges  that  the  organized  militia  was  assisting  the  mine 


119 

operators  were  sustained  by  the  findings  of  the  committee. 
It  said: 

Much,  however,  has  been  done  and  is  daily  being  done 
by  the  militia  to  incite  striking  miners  to  fight.  Some 
such  things  are  done  merely  from  a  lack  of  ordinary  com- 
mon sense,  but  other  things  are  being  done  seemingly  for 
no  other  purpose  than  to  cause  trouble. 

The  pretense  that  the  leaders  of  the  militia  have  been 
impartial  is  absurd.  A  villainous  mine  guard  may  walk 
the  streets  with  his  hand  ready  on  his  half-concealed  gun 
in  his  coat  pocket,  and  assault  a  union  boy  at  noonday — 
as  one  guard  did  Sunday,  January  4,  at  Walsenburg, 
while  this  committee  was  there — without  interference 
from  the  militia,  whereas  a  union  man  will  be  arrested 
and  compelled  by  militiamen  to  work  on  a  coal  company 
ditch  for  two  days  for  being  drunk,  when  as  a  fact,  drunk- 
enness among  the  militia  is  more  common  than  it  is  among 
strikers. 

The  military  authorities,  while  professing  intense  fair- 
ness, have  allowed  the  coal  operators  to  import  strike- 
breakers in  direct  violation  of  the  state  law  passed  in  1911 
forbidding  the  importation  of  laborers  into  this  state  by 
means  of  false  representation  or  false  advertisement. 

The  militia  have  tried  to  persuade  strikers  to  go  back 
to  work,  in  some  instances  threatening  and  abusing  them 
at  the  same  time;  a  major  offers  to  release  an  arrested 
union  man  if  he  will  work  in  the  mine ;  mine  guards  have 
given  orders  to  militiamen  as  to  the  arrest  and  release  of 
strikers. 

That  the  militia  arrested  strikers  and  held  them  for  long 
periods  without  placing  charges  against  them,  also  was  found 
by  the  investigating  committee.  Some  such  cases  mentioned 
in  the  report  of  the  committee  (pp.  11-12)  are  Gonzales,  53 
days;  King,  19  days;  Zeni,  44  days;  Thiros,  22  days;  Tits- 
worth,  12  days ;  Phillippi,  18  days ;  Zaginis,  14  days ;  Markas, 
25  days ;  Barrego,  5  days. 


120 

Numerous  instances  were  found  by  the  committee  where 
women  and  young  girls  were  insulted  by  the  militiamen : 

Unprotected  women  have  been  roused  from  sleep  by 
militiamen  attempting  to  enter  their  homes  at  night. 
Young  girls  have  been  grossly  insulted  by  militiamen  on 
the  public  street  and  their  protesting  fathers  laughed  at 
*  *  *  Restaurant  waitresses  are  so  insulted  by  militia- 
men that  they  will  not  wait  upon  them. 

Instances  where  militiamen  had  taken  part  in  robberies  and 
holdups  were  reported  by  the  committee,  which  in  its  report 
to  the  Governor  said  of  them: 

They  range  from  a  forced  loan  of  twenty-five  cents,  or 
whiskey  for  the  captain;  or  a  compulsory  gift  of  three 
dollars ;  or  whiskey,  gin,  cigars  and  champagne ;  or  a  ton 
of  coal,  to  the  downright  robbery  of  $300  and  other  con- 
siderable sums  of  money,  with  watches  and  other  small 
pieces  of  property. 

The  committee  recommended  to  Governor  Ammons  that 
General  Chase  be  asked  to  resign  or  failing  to  do  so  that  he  be 
removed  as  unfitted  by  temperament  and  training  for  the  po- 
sition he  occupied;  that  Major  Boughton,  Major  Townsend 
and  Lieutenant  E.  K.  Linderfelt  be  suspended  at  once  and  dis- 
charged from  the  National  Guard  as  soon  as  possible ;  that  all 
mine  guards  and  private  detectives  of  the  mining  companies 
be  discharged  from  the  organized  militia;  that  the  militia  be 
instructed  to  prevent  workmen  being  taken  to  the  mines  in 
violation  of  the  State  law  prohibiting  deception  and  that  the 
law  and  practice  of  electing  company  officers  by  members  of 
the  company  be  changed  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

As  already  pointed  out,  Professor  Brewster  was  the  only 
member  of  the  committee  not  connected  with  organized  labor, 
so  the  report  may  not  have  been  entirely  impartial,  but,  at 
least,  some  of  the  conclusions  reached  were  substantiated  by 
others. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  character  of  the  militiamen  d( 


121 

teriorated  as  the  strike  progressed.  In  his  testimony  Captain 
Van  Cise  said  that  originally  Company  K,  first  infantry,  was 
composed  almost  entirely  of  college  men — college  graduates. 
This  company  was  stationed  at  Ludlow.  On  December  12, 
about  six  weeks  after  the  troops  took  the  field,  Captain  Van 
Cise  testified  that  he  had  found  out  that  five  of  his  men  had 
broken  into  a  saloon  at  Raymondville  and  had  robbed  it  of 
about  $42  worth  of  liquor,  cigars  and  cigarettes.  The  men 
were  taken  before  a  court  martial,  tried  and  convicted.  Two 
were  sentenced  to  serve  terms  in  the  county  jail  and  the  others 
were  fined  and  returned  to  duty. 

Captain  Van  Cise  admitted  that  none  of  the  men  were  Colo- 
rado men.  Three  of  them  were  ex-regulars.  One  had  been 
dishonorably  discharged  from  the  army  and  had  served  time 
in  Leavenworth  prison.  Another  had  forged  his  discharge 
papers. 

This  statement  by  Captain  Van  Cise  is  significant  in  two 
respects.  It  proves  that  members  of  the  organized  militia 
committed  burglary  and  also  that  the  men  were  not  citizens 
of  the  State  of  Colorado.  Those  were  two  of  the  principal 
charges  brought  against  the  National  Guard  by  delegates  to 
the  special  convention  of  the  State  Federation  of  Labor  when 
the  investigating  committee  was  appointed. 

In  many  instances  where  charges  of  looting  had  been  made 
against  the  militia,  investigation  proved  that  they  were 
groundless,  or  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  show  the  robber- 
ies had  been  committed  by  militiamen.  But  a  number  of  in- 
stances in  which  members  of  the  organized  militia  took  part 
in  robberies  proved  the  low  character  of  some  of  the  men  who 
had  been  enlisted  after  the  troops  took  the  field. 

The  Eev.  James  McDonald  testified  that  the  company  at 
Aguilar  was  at  first  composed  largely  of  "good  Christian 
boys,  attending  church  regularly  and  behaving  themselves 
just  splendidly, ' '  but  before  the  troops  left  the  field  another 
element  was  introduced  which  did  many  things  not  credita- 
ble. 

Mr.  Brewster  in  his  testimony  told  of  a  naturalized  Italian 


122 

named  Grogatti,  who  told  the  labor  investigating  committee 
that  his  trunk  had  been  rifled  of  $300.  Mr.  Brewster  said  that 
Colonel  Lee  told  him  he  had  investigated  that  matter  and  that 
the  man  had  been  robbed,  but  that  he  could  not  find  who  had 
committed  the  robbery. 

Mother  Jones,  a  general  organizer  for  the  United  Mine 
Workers,  more  than  eighty  years  of  age,  arrived  in  Trinidad 
from  El  Paso  on  the  morning  of  January  4,  1914.  On  her 
arrival  she  was  met  by  militiamen  and  a  few  hours  later  de- 
ported to  Denver.  She  returned  on  January  12th,  was  again 
arrested  and  taken  to  San  Rafael  Hospital,  where  she  was 
held  incommunicado  for  nine  weeks.  She  was  then  sent  to 
Denver  and  there  released.  A  few  days  later,  in  March,  she 
boarded  a  sleeper  for  Trinidad.  She  was  awakened  at  Wal- 
senburg  before  daylight  and  taken  off  the  train  by  militiamen. 
They  took  her  to  an  insanitary  and  rat-infested  cell  in  the 
basement  of  the  jail.  She  was  kept  there  for  twenty-six  days 
and  was  then  released,  just  before  the  Supreme  Court  was 
expected  to  act  on  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  Mother  Jones 
and  attorneys  for  the  strikers  charged  that  she  was  released 
in  order  to  prevent  an  opportunity  by  the  Supreme  Court  to 
pass  on  the  Moyer  decision,  by  which  the  military  authorities 
justified  her  imprisonment.  Governor  Ammons  justified  the 
arrest  and  imprisonment  of  Mother  Jones  on  the  ground  that 
her  speeches  incited  violence.  She  had  been  given  to  under- 
stand at  all  times  during  her  imprisonment  that  she  would  be 
released  if  she  would  promise  to  leave  the  district  and  re- 
main away.  Mother  Jones  refused  to  make  such  a  promise, 
claiming  a  constitutional  right  to  stay  in  Trinidad. 

The  chief  legal  adviser  and  aid  of  General  Chase  in  the 
strike  zone  was  Major  Bought  on,  who  became  Judge  Advo- 
cate of  a  Military  Commission  appointed  by  Chase  to  super- 
vise all  cases  of  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  strikers.  Major 
Boughton,  in  his  testimony  before  this  Commission,  defended 
the  practice  of  arresting  without  a  warrant  and  asserted  that 
it  would  be  a  mere  idle  parade  to  send  the  militia  into  the 
field  without  the  power  of  arrest.  Mr.  Horace  N.  Hawkins, 


123 

attorney  for  the  United  Mine  Workers,  contended  on  the 
other  hand  that  "it  behooves  the  court  to  hold,  just  as  did 
the  courts  in  the  days  of  Lincoln,  that  military  power  cannot 
imprison  men  without  a  charge  where  the  courts  are  open 
and  unobstructed  in  the  transaction  of  business. " 

Strikers  and  union  officials  charge  that  many  of  the  172  pris- 
oners whose  cases  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Military  Commis- 
sion were  mistreated  and  even  tortured  by  officers  and  en- 
listed men.  A  reputable  officer  of  the  National  Guard  told  an 
agent  of  this  Commission  that  a  brother  officer  detailed  to 
service  on  the  Military  Commission  had  intimated  to  him  that 
third  degree  methods  were  used.  When  the  officer  in  ques- 
tion was  called  to  the  stand  by  this  Commission  in  Denver  he 
denied  any  knowledge  of  such  practices.  That  testimony  by 
National  Guard  officers  was  colored  by  a  feeling  of  loyalty 
toward  brother  officers  was  plainly  indicated  by  the  discrep- 
ancy between  their  public  testimony  and  their  statements  to 
an  agent  of  this  Commission. 

The  economic  dependence  of  the  Colorado  National  Guard 
on  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  and  other  operators  has  been 
fully  established.  President  Welborn  of  the  Colorado  Fuel 
&  Iron  Co.  testified  that  his  company  had  paid  militiamen 
from  $75,000  to  $80,000  on  certificates  of  indebtedness  bear- 
ing interest  and  collectable  fiom  the  State.  Troops  were 
quartered  in  Company  buildings  and  furnished  with  supplies 
by  Company  stores  in  return  for  these  certificates. 

During  February  and  March  a  Congressional  Committee 
held  hearings  at  Trinidad  and  Denver.  No  serious  disorder 
occurred  during  this  period,  but  there  were  frequent  petty 
clashes  between  strikers  and  militiamen  and  mutual  bitter- 
ness and  hatred  grew  ever  more  intense. 

When  the  Congressional  Committee  left  Colorado  the  strike 
zone  was  quiet  and  Governor  Ammons  decided  that  most  of 
the  troops  could  be  safely  withdrawn.  The  order  accord- 
ingly was  issued.  It  was  decided  to  leave  thirty-five  men  of 
Company  "B"  at  Ludlow  and  Berwind  Canyon,  just  above 
Ludlow  Station.  These  men  were  nominally  in  command  of 


124 

Major  Hamrock,  but  the  dominating  officer  was  Lieutenant 
Linderf elt.  Of  Company  "  B  "  a  committee  of  National  Guard 
officers  later  said: 

From  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  this  militia  or- 
ganization and  the  strikers  in  the  Colony  were  in  frequent 
petty  conflicts  with  one  another.  They  grew  to  dislike 
each  other,  to  worry,  harass  and  annoy  one  another.  Both 
sides  fed  the  flame  of  increasing  enmity.  They  provoked 
each  other  on  every  possible  occasion.  Dislike  grew  into 
hatred  and  provocation  into  threats.  From  threats  by 
each  against  the  others '  lives  the  strikers  have  come  to 
fear  and  hate  this  "  B  "  Company,  and  "  B  "  Company  has 
come  to  partake  of  the  fear  of  the  workmen  and  the 
hatred  of  the  mine  guards  toward  the  Colonists. 

Upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  the  field  it 
was  felt  necessary  to  leave  one  unit  at  Ludlow  between 
the  largest  colony  of  strikers  on  one  side  and  the  richest 
mines  and  the  most  populous  camps  on  the  other.  Com- 
pany "B"  was  selected  for  that  service,  because,  albeit 
hated  by  the  strikers,  it  was  feared  and  respected  by 
fhem. 

Company  "B",  originally  made  up  of  clerks  and  business 
and  professional  men  in  Denver,  had  changed  radically  in 
character  prior  to  the  Ludlow  tragedy.  On  April  20th  it  con- 
sisted of  mine  guards,  professional  soldiers  and  adventurers 
who  had  chosen  to  remain  on  strike  duty  when  the  rest  of  the 
State  force  had  been  withdrawn.  Many  were  transferred  to 
Company  "B"  as  volunteers  when  the  other  troops  left. 

Lieutenant  Linderfelt  who  was  the  actual,  although  not  the 
nominal,  commanding  officer  was  the  object  of  an  intenser 
hatred  from  the  strikers  than  any  other  man  in  the  field. 
They  had  complained  against  him  during  the  hearings  of  the 
Congressional  Committee  and  there  had  been  bad  blood  be- 
tween him  and  Louis  Tikas,  leader  of  the  Greek  strikers  in 
the  Tent  Colony.  It  will  be  remembered  that  he  had  entered 
the  field  prior  to  the  calling  out  of  the  militia,  and  as  deputy 


125 

sheriff  had  been  in  charge  of  a  machine  gun,  imported  by  the 
Baldwin-Felts  Detective  Agency  and  turned  over  by  the 
Agency  to  the  operators.  Witnesses  before  the  Congressional 
Committee  clearly  established  the  belief  of  the  strikers  that 
he  was  tactless,  domineering  and  brutal.  He  was  known 
among  the  inhabitants  of  the  Ludlow  Tent  Colony  as  "  Jesus 
Christ ",  because  he  is  alleged  to  have  told  a  striker's  wife 
that  he  was  Jesus  Christ  around  there  and  must  be  obeyed. 
Linderfelt  had  an  intense  hatred  for  the  strikers  and  espe- 
cially for  the  Greeks  and  southern  Europeans  who  predomi- 
nated in  the  Tent  Colony  at  Ludlow.  In  spite  of  all  this  he 
seems  to  have  been  considered  a  particularly  valuable  officer 
for  the  work  that  the  State  had  in  hand. 

At  about  the  same  time  that  Company  "B"  was  left  in 
charge  at  Ludlow,  officers  of  the  National  Guard  and  the 
mine  owners  cooperated  in  organizing  a  new  troop  of  cavalry 
called  Troop  "A". .  It  was  sworn  in  during  the  week  preced- 
ing April  20th  and  was  placed  in  command  of  Captain  Edwin 
Carson.  Carson  had  been  an  enlisted  man  in  the  British  Army, 
an  acrobat  performing  in  vaudeville,  and  an  athletic  instructor 
in  the  Denver  Club.  Although  the  legislative  committee,  quoted 
by  General  Chase  in  his  testimony  before  this  Commission, 
testified  that  only  eleven  mine  guards  were  members  of  this 
troop,  Captain  Carson  himself,  in  a  conversation  with  the 
Commission's  investigator,  estimated  the  number  of  mine 
guards  as  "not  more  than  thirty".  "The  others",  said  Car- 
son, "were  pit  bosses,  mine  superintendents,  mine  clerks  and 
the  like."  These  men  lived  and  worked  in  the  mines  near 
Trinidad  and  Ludlow,  ready  to  respond  to  a  call  at  any  time. 
They  were  to  be  paid  by  the  mine  operators  except  when  ac- 
tually serving  as  State  militia. 

That  Troop  "A"  was  organized  with  the  knowledge  of  the 
executive  officials  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  is  proved 
by  the  following  extract  from  a  letter  written  by  Mr.  Bowers 
to  Mr.  Rockefeller  on  April  18,  1914: 

Another  favorable  feature  is   the  organization  of  a 
military  company  of  one  hundred  volunteers  at  Trinidad 


126 

the  present  week.  They  are  to  be  armed  by  the  State  and 
drilled  by  military  officials.  Another  squad  is  being  or- 
ganized at  Walsenburg.  These  independent  militiamen 
will  be  subject  to  orders  of  the  sheriff  of  the  county.  As 
these  volunteers  will  draw  no  pay  from  the  State,  this 
movement  has  the  support  of  the  Governor  and  other 
men  in  authority. 

Thus,  by  April  20th  the  Colorado  National  Guard  no  longer 
offered  even  a  pretense  of  fairness  or  impartiality,  and  its 
units  in  the  field  had  degenerated  into  a  force  of  professional 
gunmen  and  adventurers  who  were  economically  dependent  on 
and  subservient  to  the  will  of  the  coal  operators.  This  force 
was  dominated  by  an  officer  whose  intense  hatred  for  the 
strikers  had  been  demonstrated,  and  who  did  not  lack  the 
courage  and  the  belligerent  spirit  required  to  provoke  hos- 
tilities. Although  twelve  hundred  men,  women  and  children 
remained  at  the  Ludlow  Tent  Colony  and  Linderfelt's  imme- 
diate force  consisted  of  not  more  than  thirty-five  men,  the 
militiamen  were  equipped  with  machine  guns  and  high  pow- 
ered repeating  rifles  and  could  count  on  speedy  reenforce- 
ment  by  the  members  of  Troop  "A",  which  numbered  about 
one  hundred.  The  Ludlow  Colony  had  been  repeatedly 
searched  during  the  preceding  weeks  for  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion, and  Major  Boughton's  testimony  before  this  Commis- 
sion indicates  that  Linderfelt  believed  the  strikers  to  be  un- 
armed. 

Mrs.  Helen  Ring  Kobinson,  a  member  of  the  Colorado  State 
Senate  and  a  distinguished  citizen  of  the  State,  testified  that 
while  visiting  the  strike  zone  just  before  the  Ludlow  affair  she 
heard  reports  and  threats  that  the  Ludlow  Colony  was  to  be 
wiped  out.  Similar  testimony  was  given  at  the  Coroner 's 
inquest  by  Miss  Susan  Hollearin,  postmistress  and  school 
teacher  at  Ludlow. 

On  April  20th  militiamen  destroyed  the  Ludlow  Tent  Col- 
ony, killing  five  men  and  one  boy  with  rifle  and  machine  gun 
fire  and  firing  the  tents  with  a  torch. 


127 

Eleven  children  and  two  women  of  the  colony  who  had 
taken  refuge  in  a  hole  under  one  of  the  tents  were  burned  to 
death  or  suffocated  after  the  tents  had  been  fired.  During  the 
firing  of  the  tents,  the  militiamen  became  an  uncontrolled  mob 
and  looted  the  tents  of  everything  that  appealed  to  their  fancy 
or  cupidity. 

Hundreds  of  women  and  children  were  driven  terror  strick- 
en into  the  hills  or  to  shelter  at  near-by  ranch  houses.  Others 
huddled  for  twelve  hours  in  pits  underneath  their  tents  or  in 
other  places  of  shelter,  while  bullets  from  rifles  and  machine 
guns  whistled  overhead  and  kept  them  in  constant  terror. 

The  militiamen  lost  one  man.  He  was  shot  through  the 
neck  early  in  the  attack. 

Three  of  the  strikers  killed  at  Ludlow  were  shot  while 
under  the  guard  of  armed  militiamen  who  had  taken  them  pris- 
oners. They  included  Louis  Tikas,  a  leader  of  the  Greek 
strikers,  a  man  of  high  intelligence  who  had  done  his  utmost 
that  morning  to  maintain  peace  and  prevent  the  attack  and 
who  had  remained  in  or  near  the  tent  colony  throughout  the 
day  to  look  after  the  women  and  children.  Tikas  was  first 
seriously  or  mortally  wounded  by  a  blow  on  the  head  from 
the  stock  of  a  Springfield  rifle  in  the  hands  of  Lieutenant  K. 
E.  Linderfelt  of  the  Colorado  National  Guard,  and  then  shot 
three  times  in  the  back  by  militiamen  and  mine  guards. 

Accounts  vary  as  to  who  fired  the  first  shot  on  the  morning 
of  the  tragedy,  but  it  is  established  that  the  first  offensive 
movement  was  the  occupation  of  a  hill  near  the  tent  colony  by 
militiamen  in  full  view  of  the  strikers,  the  planting  of  a  ma- 
chine gun  there,  and  the  exploding  of  two  dynamite  bombs  by 
the  militia.  These  bombs  had  been  made  by  Linderfelt  to 
be  used  as  signals  to  call  the  militia  and  mine  guards  from 
near-by  mines  and  camps,  but  the  strikers  did  not  know 
their  purpose.  They  streamed  out  of  the  colony,  and  about 
sixty  who  had  rifles  took  up  a  position  in  a  railroad  cut. 
Many  of  the  women  and  children  ran  from  the  colony  in  an- 
other direction  and  took  shelter  in  ranch  houses  or  the  open 
hill  country  before  the  destruction  began. 


128 

The  investigating  committee  of  national  guard  officers 
charged  the  strikers  with  deliberate  intent  to  attack  the  militia 
and  with  starting  the  fight.  Undoubtedly  the  excitable  Greeks 
hastened  the  attack  by  seizing  their  rifles  and  streaming  from 
the  colony  when  they  saw  the  militiamen  advancing  and  plant- 
ing a  machine  gun;  but  from  the  testimony  of  witnesses, 
the  known  attitude  of  the  militia  and  from  the  events  that 
followed,  it  is  reasonable  to  suspect  that  the  militia  was  not 
averse  to  seizing  upon  the  slightest  pretext  to  start  their  work 
of  destruction. 

Fifteen  or  twenty  of  the  women  and  children  who  were 
caught  in  the  tent  colony  when  the  firing  began  escaped  during 
the  morning  to  a  pump  house  near  the  tents.  There  they  hid 
in  a  deep  well,  while  bullets  whistled  overhead.  A  ladder 
extended  down  the  side  of  the  well  to  a  landing  where  the 
terror-stricken  refugees  remained  huddled.  At  7  o'clock  in 
the  evening,  a  freight  train  pulled  into  the  station  between  the 
pump  house  and  the  soldiers,  who  were  directing  a  heavy 
fire  into  the  tent  colony.  The  women  and  children  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  shelter  its  steel  coke  cars  afforded  to  climb 
from  the  well  and  make  a  dash  for  shelter  in  an  arroyo.  The 
conductor  and  brakeman  of  the  freight  train  testified  at  the 
inquest  that  they  saw  about  fifteen  women  and  children,  cry- 
ing and  whimpering,  scurrying  along  a  fence  near  the  rail- 
road track.  The  trainmen  testified  that  twelve  militiamen 
covered  the  engineer  with  revolvers  and  ordered  him  to  pull 
his  train  out  and  do  it  "damn  quick, "  or  they  would  shoot 
him.  The  engineer  obeyed,  although  he  had  orders  to  take  a 
side  track  at  Ludlow  in  order  to  let  a  passenger  train  pass. 

After  the  women  and  children  had  escaped  from  the  pump 
house,  militiamen  took  possession  of  it  and  there  captured 
Louis  Tikas,  leader  of  the  Greek  strikers.  According  to  the 
testimony  of  women  who  remained  in  the  tent  colony,  Tikas 
with  James  Fyler,  Secretary  Treasurer  of  the  Union,  re- 
mained in  the  colony  all  day  looking  after  the  many  women 
and  children  who  had  been  unable  to  escape.  Affidavits  from 
women  survivors  attached  hereto  agree  that  he  busied  himself 


129 

in  saving  women  and  children  from  the  flames  after  the  tents 
were  set  on  fire,  and  took  refuge  in  the  pump  house  only  when 
it  was  too  late  to  be  of  further  service.  Fyler  was  captured 
near  the  colony  a  few  minutes  after  the  capture  of  Tikas.  He 
was  shot  to  death  a  short  time  later. 

Tikas  was  taken  before  Lientenant  Linderfelt.  About  Lin- 
derfelt  at  the  time  stood  fifty  or  seventy-five  militiamen,  most 
of  them  members  of  Troop  "A"  and  acting  in  their  double 
capacity  as  militiamen  and  mine  guards.  Hot  words  ensuejd, 
and  although  Tikas  was  absolutely  defenseless,  Linderfelt 
grasped  his  Springfield  rifle  by  the  barrel  and  broke  the  stock 
over  Tikas '  head.  Linderfelt  then  strode  away,  and  a  few 
moments  later  there  was  a  fusillade  of  shots.  R.  J.  McDonald, 
stenographer  for  the  militia  officers,  testified  at  the  inquest 
that  Linderfelt  did  not  look  around  when  he  heard  the  shots. 
Tikas  was  shot  three  times  in  the  back.  The  doctors  who 
testified  at  the  inquest  said  that  he  had  been  literally  "shot 
to  pieces  inside. ' ' 

Dr.  Ben  Beshoar,  one  of  the  physicians  who  examined  Tikas ' 
body,  testified  at  the  inquest  as  follows : 

Q.  And  Louis  Tikas  came  to  his  death  by  a  gun  shot 
wound! 

A.  I  am  not  sure  whether  or  not  it  was  a  gun  shot 
wound  that  caused  his  death. 

Q.    Just  tell  why. 

A.  Well,  from  the  amount  of  blood  on  his  clothes  and 
on  his  head,  I  would  say  that  he  was  struck  a  blow  on 
the  head  before  the  gun  shot  wounds. 

Q.  Could  you  judge  from  the  blow,  whether  he  was 
standing  up  or  lying  down  when  it  was  dealt  ? 

A.  I  would  judge  that  he  was  lying  down  or  falling 
forward. 

Q.    Did  all  these  bullets  enter  from  the  rear? 

A.  Yes,  sir,  from  the  rear.  The  point  of  entrance  was 
lower  than  the  point  of  exit.  There  was  no  deflection  of 
the  bullets.  They  practically  all  went  straight. 


130 

When  questioned  as  to  Tikas'  death,  Linderfelt  dismissed 
the  subject  by  saying  that  there  had  been  bitter  feeling  be- 
tween them  for  a  long  time.  He  said  he  did  not  know  who  shot 
Tikas.  Linderfelt  then  volunteered  a  tribute  to  Tikas'  cool- 
ness and  judgment.  Accounts  agree  that  Tikas  was  highly  in- 
telligent, with  an  engaging  personality  and  an  unusual  power 
of  leadership  which  he  exercised  over  the  Greeks  in  the  col- 
ony. Major  P.  J.  Hamrock,  in  command  of  the  militia  at 
Ludlow,  has  testified  that  Tikas  that  morning  tried  in  good 
faith  to  prevent  trouble. 

Fyler  and  an  unknown  striker  were  shot  while  disarmed 
and  prisoners  at  the  mercy  of  the  militiamen.  The  unknown 
striker  thus  killed  may  have  been  John  Bartoloti,  whose  wife 
and  children  were  among  the  refugees  who  had  earlier  es- 
caped from  the  well  in  the  pump  house.  Mrs.  Bartoloti  in  an 
affidavit  says : 

I  had  six  children  in  the  well  with  me.  My  husband 
was  killed  there ;  he  was  coming  to  see  me  and  take  care 
of  me  and  the  children,  and  he  was  shot  in  the  back.  He 
was  crying  all  day  for  me  and  the  children. 

The  tents  were  set  afire  by  militiamen  on  orders  from  their 
officers,  according  to  apparently  unbiased  testimony.  This  is 
denied  by  the  officers,  who,  however,  admit  that  a  fire  which 
they  say  started  accidentally  was  deliberately  spread  by  their 
men.  Coal  oil  was  first  poured  on  the  canvas.  As  the  tents 
burned,  they  were  looted  by  a  mob  of  militiamen  who  had  lost 
all  semblance  of  discipline.  They  took  jewelry,  clothing,  bed- 
ding, tools,  bicycles,  and,  according  to  several  witnesses, 
money. 

Scores  of  women  and  children  who  had  been  unable  to  make 
their  escape  under  the  rain  of  rifle  and  machine  gun  fire  earlier 
in  the  day  ran  screaming  from  the  burning  tents  or  crawled 
from  the  cellars  or  holes  beneath  them.  Many  of  these  women 
were  soon  to  become  mothers.  Mrs.  Alcarita  Pedregon  took 
refuge  with  her  children  in  the  hole  where  eleven  children  and 
two  women  were  suffocated  by  smoke.  She  testified  that  she 


131 

saw  a  militiaman  set  fire  to  the  tent.  Mrs.  Pedregon  was 
compelled  to  remain  in  the  hole  while  she  saw  two  of  her  chil- 
dren and  eleven  others  slowly  die. 

Many  of  the  women  and  children  were  assisted  out  of  the 
holes  and  saved  from  death  in  the  flames  by  the  officers  who  di- 
rected the  firing  of  the  tents.  Captain  Carson  and  Lieutenant 
Linderfelt  are  entitled  to  whatever  credit  is  due  for  participa- 
tion in  the  rescuing  of  all  the  women  and  children  save  thir- 
teen, who  perished  of  suffocation  and  burns  in  the  hole  where 
they  had  taken  refuge  from  the  rain  of  lead. 

Among  the  families  remaining  in  the  colony  was  that  of 
William  Snyder.  Snyder  himself  had  stayed  with  his  family. 
During  the  afternoon  his  son,  Frank,  aged  11,  had  been  shot 
in  the  head  and  almost  instantly  killed  as  he  sat  in  his  father's 
tent. . 

Having  burned  and  looted  the  tent  colony  and  killed  or 
driven  off  its  inhabitants,  the  militiamen  on  the  following  day 
maintained  a  close  watch  in  all  directions  and  fired  at  all 
persons  who  showed  themselves  on  the  roads  or  nearby  fields 
and  hillsides.  Many  of  the  women  and  children  had  taken 
refuge  at  the  ranch  house  of  Frank  Bayes  and  his  family, 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  northeast  of  the  colony.  Bayes  was 
agent  for  an  oil  company  and  a  kindly,  respected  citizen  of 
the  community.  He  sheltered  the  terror-stricken  women  and 
children  as  best  he  could,  but  insisted  that  none  of  the  men 
should  remain  in  or  about  the  ranch  house,  fearing  their  pres- 
ence would  attract  the  fire  of  the  militia.  On  Tuesday  morn- 
ing, the  militiamen  started  firing  at  the  Bayes  house  and  at 
least  six  bullets  struck  it.  A  mule  near  the  house  was  shot 
through  the  hip,  and  a  bullet  passed  just  above  the  bed  of  two 
of  Mr.  Bayes '  children.  On  Tuesday  Mr.  Bayes  took  his  fam- 
ily and  the  refugees  to  safer  quarters  at  a  ranch  house  in 
the  valley.  He  returned  on  Wednesday.  Testifying  at  the 
coroner's  inquest,  he  said: 

I  found  everything  in  the  house  topsy  turvy.  There  was 
seventy-five  barrels  of  water  standing  in  the  tank  and  they 
drained  it.  Took  the  plug  out  underneath,  in  order  to  do 


132 

away  with  the  water.  They  went  in  the  house  and  de- 
stroyed the  furniture.  They  even  stole  a  violin,  and  there 
was  a  bucket  of  125  eggs  on  the  table,  and  they  were  taken, 
and  preserves  scattered  all  over.  There  was  some  can- 
celed Continental  Oil  Company  checks,  and  $19.50  cash 
sales,  and  that  was  gone.  These  canceled  checks  were 
scattered  all  over  the  room.  They  left  me  a  note  on  the 
back  of  one  of  the  checks  saying:  "This  is  to  be  your 
pay  for  harboring  the  Union.  Cut  it  out,  or  we  will  call 
again. "  (Signed)  B.  F.  and  C.  N.  G. 

District  Attorney.    Colorado  National  Guard  and  Bald- 
win-Felts? 

Mr.  Bayes.    That's  the  way  I  took  it.    I  also  found  this 
soldier 's  button  and  this  belt,  and  this  cartridge. 

Many  pages  could  be  filled  with  the  stories  of  horror,  hard- 
ship and  bereavement  told  by  survivors  of  the  tent  colony. 
Women  crazed  by  fear  and  the  loss  of  their  children  wandered 
about  the  hills  all  night,  not  knowing  where  to  turn,  and  frantic 
with  anxiety  over  the  fate  of  their  husbands  and  children. 
Others  huddled  in  ditches,  gulches  and  similar  shelters,  listen- 
ing to  the  scream  of  bullets  overhead.  The  colony  had  housed 
about  1,200  souls,  of  whom  a  great  majority  were  women  and 
children. 

The  assassination  of  Tikas  and  the  death  of  thirteen  women 
and  children  at  Ludlow  precipitated  an  armed  and  open  re- 
bellion against  the  authority  of  the  State  as  represented  by  the 
militia.  This  rebellion  constituted  perhaps  one  of  the  nearest 
approaches  to  civil  war  and  revolution  ever  known  in  this  coun- 
try in  connection  with  an  industrial  conflict. 

Strikers  in  the  Trinidad  and  Walsenburg  Districts  of  South- 
ern Colorado,  and  in  the  Canyon  City  and  Louisville  Districts, 
armed  themselves  and  swarmed  over  the  hills,  bent  on  aveng- 
ing the  death  of  their  Ludlow  comrades. 

Two  days  after  the  Ludlow  tragedy,  on  Wednesday,  April 
22,  the  responsible  leaders  of  organized  labor  in  Colorado  tele- 
graphed to  President  Wilson,  notifying  him  that  they  had  sent 


133 

an  appeal  to  every  labor  organization  in  Colorado  urging 
them  to  gather  arms  and  ammunition  and  organize  themselves 
into  companies. 

The  call  to  arms  and  the  telegram  to  the  President  were 
signed  by  John  E.  Lawson,  ranking  official  of  the  United  Mine 
Workers  of  America  in  the  district  and  a  member  of  its  execu- 
tive board;  and  John  McLennan,  President. of  the  State  Fed- 
eration of  Labor. 

In  Denver  the  union  headquarters  and  attorneys  were  be- 
sieged by  union  men  having  no  connection  with  the  Mine 
Workers  who  offered  to  arm  themselves  and  form  companies. 

At  Trinidad  the  Mayor  left  the  city,  and  arms  and  am- 
munition were  distributed  to  the  strikers  without  concealment 
at  the  union  headquarters.  A  military  camp  of  strikers  was 
established  on  a  mesa  near  the  town,  and  the  union  officials  as- 
sumed responsibility  for  maintaining  order  in  the  town. 

At  Ludlow  the  militiamen  who  had  participated  in  the  de- 
struction of  the  tent  colony  were  surrounded  by  armed  strik- 
ers, and  remained  there  helpless  to  participate  in  the  fighting 
that  followed. 

By  Wednesday,  April  22,  two  days  after  the  Ludlow  killings, 
armed  and  enraged  strikers  were  in  possession  of  the  field 
from  Rouse,  twelve  miles  south  of  Walsenburg,  to  Hastings 
and  Delagua,  southwest  of  Ludlow.  Within  this  territory  of 
eighteen  miles  north  and  south  by  four  or  five  miles  east 
and  west  were  situated  many  mines  manned  by  superin- 
tendents, foremen,  mine  guards  and  strikebreakers.  Inflamed 
by  what  they  considered  the  wanton  slaughter  of  their  women, 
children  and  comrades,  the  miners  attacked  mine  after  mine,, 
driving  off  or  killing  the  guards  and  setting  fire  to  the  build- 
ings. At  the  Empire  mine  of  the  Southwestern  Fuel  Com- 
pany near  Aguilar  the  President  of  the  company,  J.  W.  Siple, 
with  twenty  men  and  eight  women  and  children,  took  refuge 
in  the  mine  stope  after  the  shaft  house  and  buildings  had  been 
burned  and  dynamited.  The  strikers  besieged  them  for  two 
days,  Siple  having  declined  to  surrender  on  promise  of  safe 
conduct.  The  party  was  rescued  on  the  arrival  of  fresh 


134 

militiamen  from  Denver  under  Adjutant  General  Chase  on 
Friday  afternoon. 

Mine  buildings  were  burned  by  the  strikers  at  the  South- 
western, Hastings,  Delagua,  Empire,  Green  Canyon,  Boyal 
and  Broadhead  mines. 

On  Thursday,  362  national  guardsmen  answered  General 
Chase's  call  and  left  Denver  for  the  strike  zone.  Up  to  this 
time  the  only  state  troops  in  the  field  consisted  of  Troop  "A" 
of  Trinidad  and  Segundo  and  Company  "B"  of  Denver, 
mounted,  which  had  been  left  at  Ludlow  when  the  other  com- 
panies were  withdrawn.  Both  Troop  ' '  A  "  and  Company  "  B  " 
had  remained  at  Ludlow,  surrounded  by  strikers,  since  the 
destruction  of  the  tent  colony. 

By  Friday  General  Chase  had  650  State  troops  in  the  field. 
They  made  no  attempt  to  go  further  south  toward  Trinidad 
than  Ludlow,  but  occupied  the  district  between  Walsenburg 
and  Ludlow  along  the  railroad. 

On  Saturday  strikers  attacked  the  Chandler  mine  near  Can- 
yon City,  on  the  other  side  of  a  range  of  foot  hills  and  many 
miles  from  any  point  where  disorder  had  previously  oc- 
curred. The  mine  was  captured  Sunday  afternoon  and  some 
of  the  buildings  were  burned. 

On  Monday  night  strikers  attacked  the  Hecla  mine  at  Louis- 
ville, northwest  of  Denver,  and  about  250  miles  north  of  Trini- 
dad. They  also  surrounded  the  Vulcan  mine  at  Lafayette,  a 
camp  near  Louisville  in  the  northern  field. 

Fighting  in  the  southern  field  had  been  stopped  on  Friday 
as  the  result  of  a  truce  arranged  by  Horace  N.  Hawkins  of 
Denver,  attorney  for  the  Mine  Workers,  and  the  State  authori- 
ties. After  the  attacks  at  Canon  City  and  Louisville,  General 
Chase  was  quoted  as  declaring  that  the  truce  had  been  violated 
and  no  longer  existed.  This  was  the  signal  for  fresh  out- 
breaks in  the  southern  field.  On  Monday,  April  27,  strikers  at- 
tacked the  McNally  mine  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Com- 
pany near  Walsenburg.  Miss  Maggie  Gregory,  a  cousin  of 
the  Superintendent,  was  hit  in  the  arm  by  a  bullet  a  she  was 
escaping  in  a  buggy  toward  Walsenburg.  Militiamen  who  had 


135 

arrived  from  Denver  on  the  previous  Friday  engaged  the 
strikers,  and  fighting  continued  for  forty-eight  hours  over  a 
wide  area.  On  Wednesday  Major  P.  P.  Lester,  of  Walsen- 
burg,  company  surgeon  at  the  mines  and  surgeon  for  the  Na- 
tional Guard,  was  killed  by  a  bullet  from  the  strikers'  lines. 
His  fellow  guardsmen  declared  that  Major  Lester  wore  a  red 
cross  badge  and  was  bandaging  the  wound  of  a  militiaman 
when  he  was  shot.  District  Attorney  Hendricks  of  Las  Ani- 
mas  and  Huerfano  Counties  told  the  Commission's  investi- 
gator that  he  had  gone  to  Walsenburg  and  had  investigated 
Major  Lester's  death,  and  that  it  was  his  belief  that  the  sur- 
geon was  participating  in  the  battle  as  a  combatant.  The 
fighting  at  Walsenburg  ended  in  the  calling  of  a  second  truce 
which  was  arranged  at  Denver  between  union  officials  and  at- 
torneys and  State  officials. 

On  Wednesday  morning,  or  late  in  the  preceding  night,  a 
party  of  about  200  armed  strikers  left  the  strikers'  military 
colony  near  Trinidad  and  marched  over  the  hills  to  Forbes, 
a  mining  camp  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of  a  canyon  sur- 
rounded by  steep  hills.  Most  of  the  party  were  Greeks. 
Earlier  in  the  strike,  before  the  visit  of  the  Congressional 
Committee,  the  strikers'  tent  colony  at  Forbes,  situated  on 
ground  leased  by  them,  had  been  twice  destroyed  by  militia- 
men and  mine  guards,  and  on  one  occasion  it  had  been  swept 
by  machine  gun  fire  and  a  striker  killed  and  a  boy  had  been 
shot  nine  times  through  the  legs.  Bent  on  revenge  for  this 
earlier  attack  and  for  the  killings  at  Ludlow,  the  strikers 
took  up  positions  on  the  hills  surrounding  the  mine  buildings, 
and  at  daybreak  poured  a  deadly  fire  into  the  camp.  Nine 
mine  guards  and  strikebreakers  were  shot  to  death  and  one 
striker  was  killed.  The  strikers  fired  the  mine  buildings,  in- 
cluding a  barn  in  which  were  thirty  mules,  and  then  withdrew 
to  their  camp  near  Trinidad. 

Twenty-four  hours  later  the  federal  troops  arrived  and  all 
fighting  ceased. 

During  the  ten  days  of  fighting  at  least  fifty  persons  had 
lost  their  lives,  including  the  twenty-one  killed  at  Ludlow. 


136 

From  700  to  1,000  armed  strikers  had  been  in  absolute  con- 
trol of  large  areas  of  territory,  and  had  waged  open  warfare 
against  mine  guards,  militia  and  mine  employees.  Respon- 
sible union  officials  planned  the  movements  of  their  men,  set 
about  collecting  and  distributing  arms  and  ammunition,  and 
openly  justified  their  acts.  Each  side  reported  its  casualties 
after  each  skirmish  and  made  claims  as  to  the  number  of  men 
killed  and  wounded  on  the  opposing  side.  Newspapers, 
friendly  to  one  side  or  the  other,  charged  with  apparent  satis- 
faction that  the  losses  of  the  other  side  had  been  greater  than 
were  admitted. 

In  Denver  every  newspaper  in  the  city  denounced  the  militia 
for  what  was  termed  "the  Ludlow  massacre ",  and  the  re- 
ports of  every  newspaper  showed  varying  degrees  of  sym- 
pathy with  the  strikers.  Former  United  States  Senator  Pat- 
terson had  declared  at  a  meeting  of  the  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce in  Denver  on  Friday,  April  24,  that  he  believed  nine  out 
of  ten  women  in  the  city  believed  the  Ludlow  affair  to  have 
been  a  deliberate  slaughter  of  women  and  children  by  the 
national  guards.  Senator  Patterson  also  said : 

It  has  been  brought  home  to  me  in  many  ways  that 
the  State  and  Denver  stand  on  the  brink  of  a  volcano. 
The  chasm  is  not  only  wide,  but  it  is  widening.  Denver 
is  divided  into  two  hostile  camps,  arising  out  of  the  trage- 
dies in  the  State  the  past  week,  and  no  one  can  tell,  unless 
wisdom  and  moderation  control  both  sides,  what  the  out- 
come may  be. 

Horace  N.  Hawkins,  of  Denver,  Attorney  for  the  United 
Mine  Workers,  told  the  Commission's  investigator  that 
trade  union  members  and  officials  had  called  him  on  the  tele- 
phone offering  to  raise  an  army  of  10,000  volunteers.  Mr. 
Hawkins  used  his  utmost  endeavor  to  arrange  a  truce  as  soon 
as  the  strikers  began  their  reprisals,  and  was  severely  criti- 
cised by  some  of  the  union  men  because  he  succeeded  in  bring- 
ing about  a  temporary  cessation  of  hostilities. 

It  seems  of  vast  importance  that  it  should  be  understood 


137 

how  nearly  the  situation  in  Colorado  approached  a  condition 
of  absolute  prostration  of  government  and  of  actual  revolu- 
tion. This  is  apparent  not  so  much  in  the  record  of  battles 
and  skirmishes  fought  and  lives  lost,  as  in  the  evidences  given 
above  of  the  state  of  public  feeling.  It  was  apparent  in  the 
frankness  with  which  strike  leaders  admitted  that  they  were 
gathering  and  distributing  arms,  in  the  open  admissions  made 
by  many  strikers  that  they  or  others  whom  they  named  had 
taken  part  in  one  or  other  of  the  various  attacks,  and  in  the 
refusal  of  the  District  Attorney  of  Las  Animas  County  to  take 
official  notice  of  the  killings  which  followed  Ludlow,  that  the 
rules  of  *  '  civilized  warfare ' '  formed  the  only  criterion  for  pub- 
lic criticism  of  acts  on  either  side  during  this  period. 

Enlightened  public  sentiment  existing  in  Denver  and  other 
Colorado  communities  found  itself  helpless  of  effective  ex- 
pression. That  expression,  of  course,  should  have  come 
through  the  State.  This  leads  to  the  direct  causes  of  the 
failure  of  government  and  of  all  the  horrors  that  resulted 
from  it.  Their  consideration  is  vitally  important  because 
there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  same  cause  may  not  operate 
again  in  Colorado  or  other  States,  and  that  some  day  they  may 
produce  a  situation  far  more  serious  even  than  that  under 
discussion. 

The  State  of  Colorado  through  its  military  arm  was  ren- 
dered helpless  to  maintain  law  and  order  because  that  mili- 
tary arm  had  acted,  not  as  an  agent  of  the  commonwealth, 
but  as  an  agent  of  one  of  the  parties  in  interest,  as  an  agent, 
that  is,  of  the  coal  operators,  as  against  the  strikers. 

Lieutenant  Linderfelt  and  others  who  participated  in  the 
Ludlow  massacre  were  tried  by  a  courtmartial  of  their  brother 
officers  of  the  Colorado  National  Guard.  Linderfelt  was 
found  guilty  of  striking  the  late  Louis  Tikas  with  the  stock 
of  his  Springfield  rifle,  this  being  the  blow  that  one  of  the 
doctors  who  testified  at  the  inquest  said  might  have  caused 
death,  even  if  Tikas '  body  had  not  been  riddled  with  bullets  by 
men  in  Linderfelt 's  command.  The  courtmartial  assessed  as 
punishment  a  trifling  demotion  in  rank. 


138 

The  Declaration  of  Independence  named  among  the  acts  of 
King  George  justifying  rebellion  the  following: 

"For  quartering  large  bodies  of  armed  troops  among 
us. 

"For  protecting  them,  by  a  mock  trial,  from  punish- 
ment for  any  murders  which  they  should  do  on  the  in- 
habitants of  these  states. " 

Only  those  who  hope  and  pray  for  bloody  revolution  can 
contemplate  the  record  of  the  Colorado  National  Guard  and 
fail  to  see  the  need  of  measures  that  will  make  this  branch 
of  the  government  as  representative  of  the  people  and  as  sub- 
servient to  the  people's  will  as  other  governmental  agencies. 
Today  there  is  ample  evidence  in  Colorado  in  support  of  the 
claims  of  radical  agitators  that  the  national  guard  is  an  in- 
strument of  suppression  maintained  for  the  purpose  of  intimi- 
dating and  crushing  workmen  who  go  on  strike  in  an  effort  to 
improve  the  conditions  of  life  for  themselves,  their  women  and 
their  children,  and  to  secure  for  themselves  a  larger  measure 
of  freedom  from  arbitrary  power. 


139 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  ULTIMATE  RESPONSIBILITY. 

At  certain  times  during  the  strike,  the  operators  in  their 
public  utterances  took  great  pains  to  point  out  that  a  large 
number  of  mining  companies  joined  in  every  step  taken  by  the 
operators '  committee,  and  that  the  policies  of  the  owners  were 
not  those  of  the  Rockefeller  Company,  or  even  of  the  three 
largest  companies,  but  of  a  large  number  of  mine  owners  all 
of  whom  had  arrived  independently  at  the  same  conclusion  re- 
garding the  proper  course  to  pursue. 

It  is  important  to  examine  this  claim  with  a  view  to  decid- 
ing whether  the  policies  of  the  operators  grew  out  of  condi- 
tions peculiar  to  Colorado  or  were  influenced  and  controlled 
by  the  dominant  will  and  interest  of  a  group  whose  activities 
are  nation-wide  and  typical  of  corporation  controlled  indus- 
tries. 

The  evidence  shows  that  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company 
played  a  master  hand  in  determining  the  policy  of  the  oper- 
ators, and  in  maintaining  that  policy  after  it  was  announced. 
This  Company  mined  from  thirty-five  to  forty  per  cent  of  the 
coal  produced  in  Colorado  and  employed  nearly  three  times 
as  many  miners  as  the  second  largest  company.  For  more 
than  ten  years  its  largest  stockholder  had  been  John  D.  Rocke- 
feller, and  since  1907  a  personal  representative  of  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller had  been  in  active  charge  of  its  management  as  chairman 
of  the  board  of  directors,  vice-president  and  treasurer.  This 
official  was  Mr.  L.  M.  Bowers,  a  man  sixty-nine  years  of  age, 
who  had  been  employed  by  Mr.  Rockefeller  to  manage  various 
industries  for  twenty  years,  and  whose  deep  seated  opposition 
and  animosity  to  labor  unions  and  the  practice  of  collective 
bargaining  must  have  been  well  known  to  his  employer  when 
he  was  sent  to  Colorado  to  represent  the  Rockefeller  interest. 

From  first  to  last  Mr.  Bowers,  as  shown  by  his  letters  to 
Mr.  Rockefeller's  office,  saw  nothing  in  the  struggle  of  the 
miners  for  the  right  to  organize  for  collective  bargaining  ex- 


140 

cept  a  plot  by  "socialists,"  "anarchists,"  and  " political 
demagogues"  to  wrest  the  control  of  the  mines  from  their 
owners.  His  letters  to  Mr.  Rockefeller,  Jr.,  early  in  the  strike 
show  him  to  have  been  bitter  and  prejudiced  in  the  extreme, 
with  an  adherence  to  the  individualistic  economic  doctrines  of 
a  century  ago  that  was  almost  grotesque  in  its  intensity. 

Back  of  Mr.  Bowers  and  President  Welborn  in  determining 
and  maintaining  the  operators'  policies  stood  John  D.  Rocke- 
feller, Jr.,  whose  enthusiastic  approval  and  indorsement  of 
these  policies  gave  incalculable  moral  and  material  support 
both  to  his  own  subordinates  and  to  the  executive  officials  of 
other  companies.  Mr.  Rockefeller's  indorsement  and  approval 
was  accorded  promptly  at  the  beginning  of  the  strike  in  the 
form  of  personal  letters  to  Mr.  Bowers,  which  were  shown  not 
only  to  the  executive  officers  of  the  Company  but  to  the  heads 
of  other  companies  as  well.  It  is  greatly  to  be  doubted  if 
the  Colorado  operators  could  have  maintained  their  unyield- 
ing and  defiant  attitude  of  opposition  to  the  enlightened  public 
opinion  of  the  entire  nation  had  they  not  been  bulwarked  by 
the  material  and  moral  power  wielded  by  the  possessor  of  the 
hugest  private  fortune  in  the  world. 

Mr.  Rockefeller's  power  to  direct  the  policies  of  his  own 
company  is  admitted  and  needs  no  discussion.  But  it  is  al- 
leged that  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  was  but  one 
of  many,  and  by  itself  unable  to  control  the  situation. 

Examination  of  the  evidence  shows  that  Mr.  Rockefeller  and 
his  agents  admitted  the  company's  leadership  in  the  counsels 
of  the  operators  during  the  first  seven  months  of  the  strike. 

It  was  not  until  the  horror  of  the  Ludlow  massacre  had 
shocked  and  outraged  the  nation  and  brought  upon  its  per- 
petrators the  wrath  and  loathing  of  every  decent  citizen  that 
Mr.  Rockefeller,  for  the  first  time,  makes  the  point  that  his 
company  was  but  one  of  many,  and  that  Mr.  Bowers  in  Denver, 
his  supreme  self-complacency  staggered  for  the  minute,  writes 
his  employer: 

"We  have  been  given  altogether  too  prominent  a  place  in 
this  trouble." 


141 

Mr.  Bowers  used  this  phrase  five  days  after  the  Ludlow 
massacre.  The  same  sudden  desire  to  minimize  his  part  in  the 
affair,  apparently  animated  Mr.  Kockefeller  in  New  York  at 
about  the  same  time.  Telegraphing  to  Mr.  Bowers  on  April 
26,  while  the  tide  of  the  nation's  anger  still  rose  about  him, 
Mr.  Kockefeller  asked: 

How  many  coal  companies  are  involved  in  the  strike? 
what  proportion  of  their  normal  total  output  does  your 
company  represent?  Answer  ten  West  Fifty-fourth 
street. 

Contrast  Mr.  Bowers'  modesty  after  Ludlow  with  his  early 
boastfulness.  On  November  18  he  wrote  Mr.  Rockefeller: 

Personally  the  strain  has  been  very  great  on  Mr.  Wei- 
born,  who  has  been  the  recognized  leader  among  the  oper- 
ators. 

And  on  April  7, 1914,  only  thirteen  days  before  Ludlow,  the 
conspicuous  part  played  by  Mr.  Rockefeller  as  the  dominant 
figure  in  the  strike  situation  had  filled  Mr.  Bowers  with 
" boundless  delight."  He  expressed  it  in  the  following  letter: 

Binghamton,  N.  Y.,  April  7,  1914. 
DEAR  MB.  ROCKEFELLER  : 

You  have  rendered  a  service  for  the  entire  country  in 
your  testimony  before  the  Congressional  Committee,  that 
cannot  be  over  estimated  for  its  value  just  at  this  period 
in  our  industrial  history :  As  the  writer  anticipated,  these 
biased  political  wire  pullers  utterly  failed  in  their  attempt 
to  trip  you  and  every  word  you  said  simply  brought  out 
clearer  and  clearer  your  genuine  American  loyalty  to 
stand  against  all  comers,  to  protect  every  man  who 
seeks  employment  in  the  enterprise  in  which  you  have  a 
commanding  interest  in  the  enjoyment  under  the  stars 
and  stripes,  of  life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 

I  believe  the  hours  you  gave  to  the  committee  and  the 
position  you  so  ruggedly  maintained  against  the  assaults 
of  Dr.  Foster,  will  do  more  for  the  cause  of  the  millions 


142 

of  laboring  men,  than  all  the  efforts  of  social  reformers 
in  as  many  years. 

It  will  set  thousands  of  faltering  employers  to  thinking 
and  inspire  confidence  and  spur  them  to  activity  in  oppos- 
ing the  schemes  of  political,  social  and  religious  dema- 
gogues, who  are  in  the  clutches  of  the  labor  union  leaders, 
whose  aim  is  to  shut  the  open  shops. 

I  cannot  put  into  words  my  satisfaction,  I  will  say 
boundless  delight  with  your  magnificent  and  unshaken 
stand  for  principle,  whatever  the  cost  may  be.  Now  for 
an  aggressive  warfare  to  1916  and  beyond  for  the  open 
shop. 

Sincerely  yours, 

L.  M.  BOWEES. 

One  week  before  the  strike  began  Mr.  Rockefeller's  per- 
sonal attorney  in  New  York,  Mr.  Starr  J.  Murphy,  was  told 
by  Mr.  Ethelbert  Stewart,  a  mediator  from  the  United  States 
Department  of  Labor,  that  "he  was  also  informed  that  the 
other  operators  in  Colorado  had  decided  to  follow  the  lead  of 
the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co."  Reporting  this  conversation 
to  Mr.  Bowers,  Mr.  Murphy  enters  no  denial  or  comment,  and 
in  a  long  reply,  in  which  he  comments  on  Mr.  Stewart's  visit, 
Mr.  Bowers  does  not  refute  Mr.  Stewart's  statement,  al- 
though he  discusses  the  situation  in  Colorado  at  length. 

Reference  must  be  made  to  the  copies  of  letters  between  Mr. 
Rockefeller  and  executive  officials  of  the  company,  which  ac- 
company this  report,  for  a  full  understanding  of  the  extent 
of  Mr.  Rockefeller's  information  and  responsibility  as  to  the 
progress  of  the  strike  and  the  methods  used  to  break  it. 
While  Mr.  Rockefeller  may  have  fully  believed  that  conditions 
in  the  Colorado  mines  had  been  greatly  improved  since  Mr. 
Bowers  was  sent  there,  and  were  as  good  or  better  than  condi- 
tions prevailing  in  other  fields,  even  a  cursory  reading  of  Mr. 
Bowers'  letter  should  have  revealed  to  his  employer  that  here 
was  a  man  temperamentally  and  intellectually  incapable  of 
dealing  wisely  and  fairly  with  a  strike  involving  the  vital 
rights  and  interests  of  thousands  of  employees  and  their  fam- 


143 

ilies,  and  seriously  menacing  the  peace  and  well  being  of  a 
state.  Mr.  Bowers'  letters  alone  should  have  been  sufficient 
to  convince  Mr.  Rockefeller  that  the  writer  was  irritable,  arbi- 
trary and  obstinate  to  an  exceptional  degree;  that  he  was  a 
survival  of  the  dark  age  of  theory  and  practice  regarding  in- 
dustrial relations ;  that  he  was  ignorant  of  the  character  and 
records  of  the  men  whom  he  opposed,  and  that  finally  his  at- 
titude toward  the  government  of  the  state  and  nation  was  con- 
temptuous and  defiant. 

Nor  could  Mr.  Rockefeller  be  acquitted  even  had  Mr.  Bow- 
ers concealed  these  qualities  in  his  correspondence  with  26 
Broadway.  From  the  day,  seven  days  before  the  strike  began, 
when  he  avoided  an  interview  sought  by  a  mediator  of  the 
federal  government,  Mr.  Rockefeller  refused  to  enter  upon 
any  independent  investigation  in  order  to  determine  for  him- 
self the  true  situation  in  Colorado,  before  he  threw  all  the 
enormous  power  of  his  personal  support  behind  the  men  who 
had  set  themselves  to  the  task  of  crushing  the  revolt  of  8,000 
miners.  Yet  the  men  whose  unsupported  word  he  accepted 
were  almost  strangers  to  him.  They  were  men  who  could 
not  have  admitted  the  grievances  complained  of  without  ad- 
mitting themselves  guilty  of  crimes  against  society.  But  their 
denial  was  all  that  Mr.  Rockefeller  required  before  projecting 
himself  into  the  situation  as  a  decisive  factor. 

During  all  the  seven  tragic  and  bitter  months  that  preceded 
Ludlow,  Mr.  Rockefeller  wrote  letter  after  letter  In  enthusi- 
astic praise  of  men  whose  acts  during  this  period  had  pre- 
cipitated a  reign  of  terror  and  bloodshed.  It  was  only  when 
the  Ludlow  massacre  filled  the  press  of  the  nation  with  edi- 
torial denunciation,  when  mourners  in  black  silently  paraded 
in  front  of  his  New  York  office,  when  cartoons  in  the  conserva- 
tive press  pilloried  him  and  his  father  before  an  angry  public, 
that  at  last  complacency  gives  way  to  concern  in  his  letters 
and  telegrams  to  Denver.  Stung  to  self-defense,  he  issued  a 
statement  in  New  York  pointing  out  that  his  company  had 
voluntarily  granted  improvements  and  concessions  demanded 
by  the  strikers.  Witness  the  surprise  of  26  Broadway  when 
a  writer  in  the  New  York  Evening  Post  pointed  out  that  all 


144 

of  these  concessions  except  one  had  been  required  by  laws  of 
Colorado  for  years : 

May  7,  1914. 
DEAR  MR.  BOWERS  : 

In  the  statement  which  Mr.  John  D.  Rockefeller,  Jr., 
gave  out  to  the  press,  he  said  that  the  eight-hour  day, 
semi-monthly  pay,  right  to  use  check-weighmen,  freedom 
to  deal  at  the  company  stores  or  not,  and  the  increase  of 
wages,  were  all  made  by  the  company  voluntarily.  The 
statement  is  now  made  by  some  of  his  critics  that  all  these 
points,  except  the  increase  in  wages,  were  covered  by  law, 
and  that  the  company  did  not  make  the  concessions  until 
statutes  were  passed  requiring  them.  He  asks  me,  on  his 
behalf,  to  find  out  what  are  the  facts  in  this  connection, 
and  would  be  obliged  if  you  could  inform  us  when  the 
statutes  went  into  effect,  and  when  the  various  matters 
above  mentioned  were  granted  to  our  workmen,  and  what, 
il^any,  are  the  relations  between  the  granting  of  them  and 
the  statutes. 

Sincerely  yours, 

STARR  J.  MURPHY. 

From  the  inception  of  the  strike,  the  most  conspicuous  and 
most  frequently  reiterated  allegation  of  the  strikers  was  that 
their  demands  were  already  requirements  of  the  Colorado 
statutes.  Yet  to  Mr.  Rockefeller,  seven  months  later,  this 
comes  as  a  surprise,  when  pointed  out  by  a  writer  to  The  Post. 
Nothing  could  better  show  the  depth  of  his  indifference  as  to 
the  merits  of  the  controversy,  in  contrast  with  his  keen  inter- 
est in  and  support  of  efforts  to  defeat  the  strike. 

That  Mr.  Rockefeller's  support  of  his  Colorado  officials  be- 
came a  factor  of  tremendous  importance,  if  not  a  decisive 
factor,  in  preventing  a  peaceful  settlement  is  made  clear  by 
a  study  of  the  testimony  and  correspondence. 

On  May  13,  1913,  Mr.  Bowers  wrote  to  Mr.  Rockefeller's 
secretary:  "It  is  well  known  that  the  Rockefeller  interests 
are  managing  the  affairs  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co." 
Business  men,  ministers,  college  professors,  editors,  and  the 


145 

general  public  knew  that  Mr.  Bowers  and  Mr.  Welborn  repre- 
sented the  greatest  financial  interest  in  the  world.  They  re- 
presented this  interest  in  a  comparatively  new  state,  where  de- 
pendence on  'eastern  capital'  and  the  habit  of  sedulously 
cultivating  the  friendship  of  eastern  investors  still  held.  They 
represented  the  world's  greatest  investor  in  a  community  of 
small  business  men  newly-arrived  in  the  charmed  circle  of 
wealth  and  power  and  acutely  sensitive  to  the  glamor  that 
surrounds  the  world's  financially  powerful.  In  the  business 
community  of  Denver  Mr.  Rockefeller's  agents  had  a  prestige 
comparable  to  that  of  those  strong  men  of  Rome  sent  out 
from  the  world's  capital  to  carry  its  grandeur  into  distant 
provinces.  Three  newspaper  publishers,  preachers  of  the 
gospel,  obscure  officers  of  the  militia,  looked  to  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller, a  stranger  in  distant  New  York,  for  succor  in  their 
financial  distress.  When  the  United  States  government, 
warned  of  the  discontent  and  the  impending  revolt  in  the 
coal  fields,  moved  to  prevent  a  disastrous  strike,  it  was  to 
Mr.  Rockefeller's  office  in  New  York  that  this  government  sent 
its  mediator.  It  was  to  Mr.  Rockefeller  that  a  Cabinet  Officer 
appealed  early  in  the  strike,  and  Mr.  Rockefeller's  answer 
then,  in  contrast  with  his  attitude  after  Ludlow,  carried  no 
denial  or  repudiation  of  his  supreme  authority  and  power. 

There  are  herewith  submitted  extracts  from  the  correspond- 
ence between  Messrs.  Bowers  and  Welborn  in  Denver  and  Mr. 
Rockefeller,  or  members  of  his  personal  staff,  at  26  Broad- 
way, all  bearing  on  the  question  of  Mr.  Rockefeller's  responsi- 
bility. Mr.  Rockefeller's  first  indorsement  came  after  he  had 
been  fully  informed  regarding  the  imminence  of  the  strike  and 
of  the  intention  of  his  subordinates  in  Denver  to  resist  the 
men's  demands  to  the  utmost. 

Bowers  to  Rockefeller,  Sept.  29, 1913:  *  *  *  He  was 
told  that  we  would  work  such  mines  as  we  could  protect 
and  close  the  others,  and  that  the  writer  with  every  official 
of  this  company  would  stand  by  this  declaration  until  our 
bones  were  bleached  as  white  as  chalk  in  these  Rocky 
Mountains. 


146 

Eockefeller  to  Bowers,  Oct.  6, 1913:  I  have  your  letter 
of  Sept.  29.  *  *  *  We  feel  that  what  you  have  done  is 
right  and  fair  and  that  the  position  which  you  have  taken 
in  regard  to  the  unionizing  of  the  mines  is  in  the  interest 
of  the  employes  of  the  Company.  Whatever  the  outcome 
may  be,  We  will  stand  by  you  to  the  end. 

Kockefeller  to  Bowers,  Oct.  10 :  I  have  your  letter  of 
Oct.  3  and  note  with  interest  the  progress  of  the  strike.  I 
realize  that  these  are  trying  days  for  the  management  of 
the  Fuel  Company.  Its  actions  are  watched  with  great 
interest  by  this  office,  and  its  strong  and  just  position 
will  not  lack  backing  at  this  end. 

Bowers  to  Eockefeller,  Oct.  11,  1913 :  I  am  in  receipt 
of  your  favor  of  the  6th,  and  I  want  to  express  the  ap- 
preciation of  Mr.  Welborn  and  myself,  together  with  that 
of  several  coal  operators  who  have  seen  your  letter,  for 
the  stand  you  have  taken  in  supporting  us  in  fighting  this 
unjust,  uncalled  for  and  iniquitous  strike,  called  by  the 
officials  of  what  is  supposed  to  be  a  very  important  union. 
When  this  Government  places  in  the  Cabinet  men 
like  Commissioner  of  Labor  Wilson,  who  was  for  many 
years  secretary  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America, 
which  has  been  one  of  the  unions  that  permitted  more 
disorder  and  bloodshed  than  any  class  of  labor  organiza- 
tions in  this  country,  we  are  not  skating  upon  thin  ice, 
but  we  are  on  top  of  a  volcano.  When  such  men  as  these, 
together  with  the  cheap  college  professors  and  still 
cheaper  writers  in  muck-raking  magazines,  supple- 
mented by  a  lot  of  milk-and-water  preachers  with  little  or 
no  religion  and  less  common  sense,  are  permitted  to  as- 
sault the  business  men  who  have  built  up  the  great  in- 
dustries and  have  done  more  to  make  this  country  what  it 
is  than  all  other  agencies  combined,  it  is  time  that  vigor- 
ous measures  are  taken  to  put  a  stop  to  these  vicious 
teachings  which  are  being  sown  broadcast  throughout  the 
country. 

Rockefeller  to  Bowers,  Nov.  13,  1913 :    I  am  interested 


147 

to  keep  in  touch  with  the  situation  and  hope  the  worst  is 
over. 

Bowers  to  Rockefeller,  Nov.  18,  1913 :  You  will  be  in- 
terested to  know  that  we  have  been  able  to  secure  the  co- 
operation of  all  the  bankers  of  the  city,  who  have  had 
three  or  four  conferences  with  our  little  cowboy  Gover- 
nor, agreeing  to  back  the  state  and  lend  it  all  the  funds 
necessary  to  maintain  the  militia  and  afford  ample  protec- 
tion. There  probably  has  never  been  such  pres- 
sure brought  to  bear  upon  any  governor  of  this  state  by 
the  strongest  men  in  it.  *  *  *  Personally  the  strain 
has  been  very  great  on  Mr.  Welborn,  who  has  been  the 
recognized  leader  among  the  operators. 

Rockefeller  in  telegram  to  Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson, 
Nov.  21,  1913:  The  action  of  our  officers  in  refusing  to 
meet  the  strike  leaders  is  quite  as  much  in  the  interest  of 
our  employes  as  of  any  other  element  in  the  company. 
Their  position  meets  with  our  cordial  approval  and  we 
shall  support  them  to  the  end. 

Bowers  to  Rockefeller,  Nov.  22, 1913 :  We  are  in  receipt 
of  your  telegram  of  last  night,  giving  telegraphic  corres- 
pondence between  Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson  and  your- 
self. Your  telegram  has  been  shown  to  all  the  members 
of  the  executive  board,  in  whose  behalf  I  want  to  express 
appreciation  for  your  splendid  support,  and  for  the  reply 
you  made  to  Secretary  Wilson.  Numerous  conferences 
are  being  held  day  and  night,  and  it  is  the  opinion  of  the 
coal  operators  generally,  that  the  officials  representing 
the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  are  still  hunting  for 
a  hole,  however  insignificant,  through  which  they  can 
crawl  without  disgracing  themselves  before  the  member- 
ship in  their  failure  to  make  the  coal  miners'  strike  gen- 
eral and  cause  a  complete  tie  up. 

Rockefeller  to  Bowers,  Nov.  24,  1913:  You  and  Mr. 
Welborn  are  frequently  in  our  minds,  and  we  have  none 
but  words  of  the  highest  commendation  for  the  energetic, 
fair  and  firm  way  in  which  you  have  handled  this  very 
trying  matter.  *  *  *  We  are  with  you  to  the  end. 


148 

Bowers  to  Kockef eller,  Nov.  28,  1913 :  I  am  in  receipt 
of  your  favor  of  November  24th,  which  has  been  read  to 
all  of  our  executive  officers,  and  I  can  scarcely  express 
our  appreciation  of  the  support  you  are  giving  us. 
We  are  satisfied,  all  of  us,  that  since  the  receipt  of  our 
letters  by  President  Wilson,  and  your  reply  to  Secretary 
Wilson 's  telegram,  the  latter  has  been  prompted  to  labor 
for  any  sort  of  a  compromise,  to  which  we  shall  never 
consent. 

Murphy  to  Bowers,  Dec.  1,  1913 :  Mr.  Rockefeller 
asked  me  *  *  *  to  say  that  he  fully  approves  of  the 
position  you  have  taken  in  the  correspondence  with  the 
President  and  the  handling  of  the  matter  in  general.  We 
think  you  and  Mr.  Welborn  are  treating  the  matter  in  a 
very  wise  and  firm  way.  *  *  *  I  think  your  position  in 
refusing  to  submit  to  arbitration  under  the  conditions  is 
unassailable. 

Bowers  to  Murphy,  Dec.  6,  1913 :  On  the  surface  the 
President's  suggestion  looks  plausible,  but  we  are  too 
well  advised  to  believe  that  it  would  be  possible  to  secure 
an  impartial  committee  named  by  him.  He  knows  per- 
fectly well  that  there  was  not  an  atom  of  difference  be- 
tween the  company  and  the  miners,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
entire  satisfaction.  *  *  *  Mr.  Welborn,  who  with  the 
other  two  representatives  of  the  operators,  now  believe 
that  behind  the  soft  voice  of  Secretary  Wilson  is  the 
hand  of  Esau;  that  he  is  a  cunning  schemer  and  has  tried, 
during  his  stay  here,  to  trap  the  operators  into  some 
corner,  that  the  labor  leaders  can  claim  that  they  have 
won  recognition  of  the  union  through  him. 

Rockefeller  to  Bowers,  Dec,  8,  1913 :  You  are  fighting 
a  good  fight,  which  is  not  only  in  the  interests  of  your 
own  company,  but  of  the  other  companies  of  Colorado 
and  of  the  business  interests  of  the  entire  country  and 
of  the  laboring  classes  quite  as  much. 

Bowers  to  Rockefeller,  Dec.  22, 1913 :  I  received  a  nice 
note  from  vour  father.  *  *  *  I  have  never  known  such 


149 

widespread  approval  by  all  classes  of  business  men  as 
we  are  getting  in  our  fight  for  the  "open  shop."  We 
are  paying  the  4%  dividends  for  the  last  half  of  the 
current  year  on  the  preferred  stock. 

Rockefeller  to  Bowers,  Dec.  26,  1915:  I  know  that 
Father  has  followed  the  events  of  the  past  few  months 
in  connection  with  the  Fuel  Company  with  unusual  in- 
terest and  satisfaction. 

Bowers  to  Rockefeller,  Dec.  30,  1913:  I  am  enclosing 
herein  letter  No.  3  from  President  Wilson,  and  my  reply. 
His  Excellency  had  an  excellent  opportunity  to  end  this 
correspondence  upon  receipt  of  my  second  letter,  but  un- 
wisely, we  all  think,  he  allowed  himself  to  write  another 
one,  which  if  from  a  less  dignified  statesman  would  be  re- 
garded as  a  bluff.  *  *  *  We  are  confidentially  advised 
that  President  Wilson's  recommendation  for  a  Congres- 
sional investigation  will  be  no  more  effective.  Anyhow, 
he  can  meditate  over  his  decidedly  weak  reply  to  my  second 
letter  and  take  such  action  as  he  sees  fit.  *  *  *  I  am 
more  than  pleased  to  receive  this  third  letter,  which  no 
shrewd  business  man  would  have  allowed  himself  to  have 
written,  in  my  opinion. 

Bowers  to  Rockefeller,  Jan.  8,  1914:  The  Federal 
Court,  after  two  days'  trial  on  the  part  of  the  Govern- 
ment, dismissed  the  case  against  us  on  the  grounds  of  no 
cause  of  action,  before  we  had  opened  our  defense.  This 
case  was  *  *  to  recover  160  acres  of  coal  lands, 
valued,  as  they  stated,  at  $1,000  an  acre.  This  is  the  last 
case  of  the  Government  against  the  company,  unless  the 
herd  of  government  politicians  run  out  of  a  job  and 
browse  around  to  find  something  else  over  which  to  annoy 
us. 

Rockefeller  to  Bowers,  Jan.  8,  1914:  It  is  most  re- 
grettable that  these  armed  trouble-makers  are  still  re- 
maining in  the  labor  camps,  and  we  can  only  hope  that  the 
state  government  will  take  such  action  as  will  compel  them 
to  leave  the  country  at  an  early  date. 


150 

Bowers  to  Rockefeller,  April  25,  1914:  The  Colorado 
Fuel  &  Iron  Company  usually  leads  in  fixing  prices  and 
conditions,  which  the  larger  companies  usually  agree  to, 
and  the  smaller  concerns  also,  if  it  is  for  their  interest, 
but  no  dependence  can  be  placed  upon  their  adherence  to 
any  working  plan  for  any  length  of  time. 

Bowers  to  Rockefeller,  April  7,  1914:  You  have  ren- 
dered a  service  for  the  entire  country  in  your  testimony 
before  the  Congressional  Committee,  that  cannot  be  over 
estimated  for  its  value  just  at  this  period  in  our  indus- 
trial history:  As  the  writer  anticipated,  these  biased 
political  wire  pullers  utterly  failed  in  their  attempt  to 
trip  you  and  every  word  you  said  simply  brought  out 
clearer  and  clearer  your  genuine  American  loyalty  to 
stand  against  all  comers,  to  protect  every  man  who  seeks 
employment  in  the  enterprise  in  which  you  have  a  com- 
manding interest  in  the  enjoyment  under  the  stars  and 
stripes,  of  life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 

I  believe  the  hours  you  gave  to  the  committee  and  the 
position  you  so  ruggedly  maintained  against  the  assaults 
of  Dr.  Foster,  will  do  more  for  the  cause  of  the  millions 
of  laboring  men,  than  all  the  efforts  of  social  reformers 
in  as  many  years. 

It  will  set  thousands  of  faltering  employers  to  thinking 
and  inspire  confidence  and  spur  them  to  activity  in  oppos- 
ing the  schemes  of  political,  social  and  religious  dema- 
gogues, who  are  in  the  clutches  of  the  labor  union  leaders, 
whose  aim  is  to  shut  the  open  shops. 

I  cannot  put  into  words  my  satisfaction,  I  will  say 
boundless  delight  with  your  magnificent  and  unshaken 
stand  for  principle,  whatever  the  cost  may  be.  Now  for 
an  aggressive  warfare  to  1916  and  beyond  for  the  open 
shop. 

Bowers  to  Rockefeller,  April  25, 1914 :  I  have  received 
a  large  number  of  letters,  telephone  calls  and  personal 
visits  from  prominent  men  in  all  lines  of  business  and 
professions  complimenting  you  on  your  testimony  before 
the  Congressional  Committee. 


151 

Eockefcller  to  Welborn,  July  21,  1914:  You  are  fre- 
quently in  our  thoughts  and  always  with  warm  and  high 
regards. 

Welborn  to  Rockefeller,  July  27,  1914:  I  appreciate 
very  much  your  expressions  concerning  my  personal  wel- 
fare. My  health  has  never  been  better  than  during  the 
past  year,  and  I  am  hardly  conscious  of  any  strain.  The 
knowledge  that  we  have  your  confidence  and  support 
makes  everything  else  easy. 

But  Mr.  Eockef eller  's  part  in  the  Colorado  conflict  was  not 
confined  to  these  letters  of  praise  and  indorsement  which  so 
heartened  and  sustained  the  Colorado  operators.  Prior  to 
the  massacre  at  Ludlow  on  April  20,  the  letters  proved  quite 
sufficient  for  Mr.  Rockefeller's  purpose.  But  the  storm  of 
popular  wrath  that  rose  after  Ludlow  demanded  more  active 
participation.  It  was  then  that  Mr.  Rockefeller  initiated  the 
nation-wide  publicity  campaign  by  which  he  hoped  to  con- 
vince the  country  that  the  strikers,  and  not  his  company's 
mine-guard-militiamen,  were  responsible  for  the  deaths  of 
thirteen  women  and  children  who  perished  at  Ludlow,  and  that 
the  strike  itself,  instead  of  a  struggle  for  freedom,  was  a 
revolt  by  bloodthirsty  and  anarchistic  foreigners,  led  by  men 
who  obtained  huge  incomes  from  organized  agitation  and  law- 
lessness. Still  hiding  behind  his  executive  officials  in  Denver, 
Mr.  Rockefeller  employed  a  publicity  expert  and  advanced  him 
money  from  his  personal  funds  to  begin  the  campaign.  He 
chose  for  the  purpose  Mr.  Ivy  L.  Lee,  publicity  agent  for  the 
Pennsylvania  railroad.  The  President  of  that  railroad  con- 
sented that  Mr.  Lee  should  devote  a  part  of  his  time  to  Mr. 
Rockefeller's  service,  and  the  pamphlets  and  bulletins  were  to 
be  dispatched  in  bulk  from  Mr.  Lee's  Philadelphia  office  to 
Denver,  for  distribution  from  the  office  of  the  Colorado  Fuel 
&  Iron  Company.  They  were  to  go  forth  under  the  name  of 
the  operators '  committee,  as  correct  information  gathered  and 
written  on  the  scene  by  men  familiar  at  first  hand  with  the 
facts. 

Early  in  the  summer  of  1914  there  began  that  remarkable 
publicity  campaign  by  which  Mr.  Rockefeller  flooded  the  nation 


152 

with  bulletin  after  bulletin,  defending  the  coal  operators  and 
denouncing  the  strikers  and  their  leaders.  These  bulletins 
contained  false  and  deceptive  statements.  Salaries  paid  to 
officials  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  in  Colorado  for  the  year 
ending  November,  1913,  were  conspicuously  displayed  as  sal- 
aries for  the  nine  weeks  ending  in  that  month.  This  gross 
and  palpable  slander  was  mailed  to  thousands  of  congressmen, 
editors,  ministers  of  the  gospel,  school  teachers,  public  of- 
ficials, business  and  professional  men  whose  names  appear  on 
Mr.  Lee 's  carefully  prepared  mailing  lists.  No  correction  was 
made  until  it  had  been  exposed  by  the  Commission  during  the 
hearing  in  Denver  in  December,  1914. 

The  preparation  and  distribution  of  these  bulletins  was  car- 
ried on  with  the  greatest  secrecy  as  to  the  authorship  of  Mr. 
Lee  and  as  to  his  employment  by  Mr.  Rockefeller.  When  the 
Commission  demanded  the  name  of  the  writer  of  the  bulletins 
of  Mr.  Welborn,  during  the  hearing  in  December,  Mr.  Welborn 
refused  to  answer  until  he  had  consulted  his  attorney.  Even 
then  he  carefully  refrained  from  revealing  the  fact  that  the 
publicity  campaign  had  been  initiated  and  paid  for  by  Mr. 
Rockefeller. 

Mr.  Rockefeller  not  only  directed  Mr.  Lee's  publicity  cam- 
paign, but  he  sent  Mr.  Lee  to  Denver  to  aid  President  Welborn 
in  preparing  his  letter  rejecting  the  President's  peace  plan. 

Mr.  Rockefeller's  responsibility  has  a  significance  beyond 
even  the  sinister  results  of  his  policy  in  Colorado.  The  per- 
version of  and  contempt  for  government,  the  disregard  of 
public  welfare,  and  the  defiance  of  public  opinion  during  the 
Colorado  strike  must  be  considered  as  only  one  manifestation 
of  the  autocratic  and  anti-social  spirit  of  a  man  whose  enorm- 
ous wealth  gives  him  infinite  opportunity  to  act  in  similar 
fashion  in  broader  fields.  Mr.  Rockefeller  writes  to  Mr.  Bow- 
ers: 'You  are  fighting  a  goo*l  fight,  which  is  not  only  in  the 
interests  of  your  own  company,  but  of  the  other  companies  of 
Colorado  and  of  the  business  interests  of  the  entire  country." 
And  Mr.  Bowers,  with  whom  Mr.  Rockefeller  obviously  is  in 
full  sympathy  and  agreement,  writes  letter  after  letter  pictur- 
ing the  growth  of  trade  unionism  as  a  national  menace  against 


153 

which  the  business  men  of  the  nation  must  combine.  "Now 
for  the  campaign  of  1916 "  and  beyond,  is  the  slogan  with 
which  one  of  these  letters  closes,  and  Mr.  Bowers  is  unsparing 
in  criticism  of  a  President  who  would  tolerate  a  former  of- 
ficial of  a  labor  union  in  his  Cabinet.  The  nation-wide  sig- 
nificance and  importance  of  the  Colorado  conflict  and  the  com- 
pany's ruthless  policy  of  suppression  are  emphasized  again 
and  again.  By  June,  1914,  Mr.  Rockefeller  had  formulated 
something  like  a  definite  plan  for  a  nation-wide  campaign. 
The  most  highly  paid  publicity  expert  in  the  country  had  been 
borrowed  from  a  great  eastern  railway,  to  be  taken  over  later 
as  a  permanent  member  of  Mr.  Rockefeller's  staff.  A  "union 
educational  campaign"  is  to  be  conducted,  and  the  country  is 
to  be  flooded  with  articles  by  college  professors  and  others 
bitterly  denouncing  trade  unions.  And  at  the  very  time  when 
he  prepares  to  circulate  Prof.  Stevenson's  intemperate  and 
amazing  defense  of  industrial  absolutism  and  tirade  against 
trades  unions,  Mr.  Rockefeller  enlists  the  aid  of  Mr.  W.  L. 
Mackenzie  King,  expert  on  industrial  relations,  to  devise  spec- 
ious substitutes  for  trade  unions  that  will  deceive,  mollify  and 
sooth  public  opinion  while  bulwarking  the  employers'  arbi- 
trary control. 

Yet  it  is  important  to  remember  that  Mr.  Rockefeller's  char- 
acter and  policies  are  important  only  as  showing  the  possibili- 
ties inherent  in  an  economic  and  industrial  situation  that  per-, 
mits  one  man  or  group  of  men  to  wield  arbitrarily  such  enor- 
mous economic  power,  and  through  that  power  not  only  to 
control  the  destinies  and  dictate  the  circumstances  of  life  for 
millions  of  wage  earners  and  for  entire  communities,  but  to 
subsidize  and  control  to  a  large  "degree  those  agencies  that 
mold  the  public  opinion  of  a  nation.  Even  should  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller change  over  night,  those  possibilities  of  evil  would  re- 
main inherent  in  our  economic  and  industrial  situation,  as  a 
menace  to  freedom  and  democracy. 

Has  the  Colorado  strike  opened  the  eyes  of  Mr.  Rockefeller 
and  his  associates  to  necessity,  wisdom  or  moral  obligation 
pointing  toward  radical  concessions  and  changes  in  Colorado  ? 


154 

The  evidence  justifying  an  affirmative  answer  is  lacking.  The 
Rev.  Eugene  S.  Gaddis,  head  of  the  sociological  or  welfare 
work  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  left  in  Febru- 
ary, 1915,  nearly  three  months  after  the  close  of  the  strike 
and  two  months  after  the  inauguration  of  the  latest  plan  thus 
far  announced  by  the  company  for  the  protection  of  employ- 
ees' interests.  He  left  because  no  longer  was  there  an  execu- 
tive official  in  Denver  who  had  time  to  give  serious  atten- 
tion to  his  suggestions  for  betterment.  He  was  instructed 
by  Mr.  Welborn  to  take  up  these  suggestions  with  Mr.  Weit- 
zel,  manager  of  the  fuel  department  with  headquarters  in 
Pueblo,  and  Mr.  Weitzel,  testified  the  Eev.  Mr.  Gaddis,  was 
not  "at  all  qualified  to  speak  the  first  and  last  word  on  mat- 
ters of  sociological  import,  and  we  do  not  get  along.  We 
did  the  first  year,  but  he  certainly  turned  on  me,  and  noth- 
ing that  I  did  could  please  him.  The  fact  of  it  was,  my  report 
made  statements  that  I  knew  would  offend  him.  I  did  not 
care.  They  were  outrageous  conditions  and  ought  to  have 
been  reported,  and  for  that  reason  he  was  determined  to 
get  me  out  of  the  way."  The  outrageous  conditions  com- 
plained of,  said  Mr.  Gaddis,  were  in  regard  to  sanitation. 
He  reported  that  inhabitants  of  the  coal  camps  were  dying  of 
typhus.  Mr.  Gaddis  addressed  Mr.  Rockefeller  protesting 
against  Mr.  Weitzel's  efforts  to  discharge  him,  but  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller did  not  answer  the  letter  and  his  attorney  wrote  that 
he  could  not  interfere.  Mr.  Gaddis'  place  was  taken  by  an 
assistant  mine  clerk  whose  only  qualification,  according  to  the 
same  witness,  was  that  he  would  assume  an  obsequious  atti- 
tude toward  Mr.  Weitzel.  It  was  two  months  after  his  dis- 
charge that  Mr.  Gaddis  was  described  by  President  Welborn 
in  a  letter  to  the  Commission  as  "an  earnest,  faithful  worker, 
and  undoubtedly  a  Christian  gentleman. ' ' 

The  Rev.  Mr.  Gaddis  visited  all  the  camps  of  the  Colorado 
Fuel  &  Iron  Company  and  had  exceptional  opportunity  to 
meet  the  miners  and  superintendents  and  to  ascertain  the  ac- 
tual conditions.  Testifying  in  May,  1915,  he  summed  up  his 
judgment  of  the  situation  existing  in  these  camps  in  the  fol- 
lowing language : 


155 

"I  have  never  seen  a  situation  to  my  mind  more  despic- 
able and  damnable.  *  *  It  is  an  oligarchy  that  is  con- 
trolling everything." 

One,  and  just  one,  concession  to  the  demand  for  better  con- 
ditions in  Colorado  has  been  heralded  by  Mr.  Rockefeller  and 
his  subordinates  since  the  strike.  This  is  a  plan  by  which 
the  miners  at  each  camp  select  representatives  or  a  repre- 
sentative to  go  to  Denver,  at  the  expense  of  the  Company,  and 
attend  a  conference  with  the  executive  officials  there.  The  plan 
first  took  form  in  Mr.  Rockefeller's  mind  when,  after  the 
Ludlow  massacre,  aroused  public  opinion  frightened  him  into 
a  realization  that  something  must  be  done.  It  will  be  dis- 
cussed in  the  concluding  chapter. 


156 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  SITUATION  IN  COLORADO  AFTER  THE   STRIKE. 

The  defeat  of  the  strike  by  the  methods  that  have  been 
described  left  the  Colorado  operators  free  to  operate  their 
properties  exactly  as  they  saw  fit.  The  United  Mine  Workers 
have  abandoned,  at  least  temporarily,  their  effort  to  organize 
the  miners,  and  the  large  operators  other  than  the  Colorado 
Fuel  &  Iron  Company  are  as  determined  as  ever  that  there 
shall  be  no  democratic  organization  of  the  industry  which 
they  control. 

At  the  mines  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  a  plan 
purporting  to  provide  the  miners  with  easy  access  to  Com- 
pany officials,  and  with  other  advantages  of  collective  bar- 
gaining, has  been  announced  by  Mr.  Rockefeller  and  his  sub- 
ordinates, and  has  been  widely  heralded  by  them  as  evidence 
that,  the  strike  having  been  defeated,  they  are  now  willing 
to  grant  of  their  own  free  will  and  accord  what  they  stub- 
bornly refused  to  give  under  the  duress  of  the  strike.  Be- 
fore considering  the  merits  of  this  plan  it  must  be  pointed  out 
that  the  spirit  actuating  those  who  conceived  and  executed 
it  was  the  spirit  of  men  who  give  as  a  charity  or  a  favor  that 
which  they  had  denied  when  demanded  as  a  right.  Even  if 
we  grant  that  the  concession  has  substantial  value,  it  must 
still  be  characterized  not  as  a  concession  to  democratic  prin- 
ciples, but  as  an  instance  of  that  handing  down  of  favors 
in  which  autocrats  always  have  delighted. 

But  after  a  study  of  the  plan  as  disclosed  in  the  testimony 
of  Mr.  Rockefeller  and  Reverend  Mr.  Gaddis,  and  in  the 
public  announcements  of  President  Welborn,  the  writer  finds 
that  it  embodies  none  of  the  principles  of  effectual  collective 
bargaining  and  instead  is  a  hypocritical  pretense  of  granting 
what  is  in  reality  withheld.  The  testimony  and  correspond- 
ence not  only  prove  this,  but  they  contain  indisputable  evi- 
dence that  the  plan  was  conceived  and  carried  out,  not  for  the 
purpose  of  aiding  the  Company's  employees  in  Colorado,  but 
for  the  purpose  of  ameliorating  or  removing  the  unfavorable 


157 

criticism  of  Mr.  Rockefeller  which  had  arisen  throughout 
the  country  following  his  rejection  of  President  Wilson's  plan 
of  settlement,  and  which  had  found  utterance  even  in  those 
conservative  circles  and  newspapers  in  Eastern  cities  where 
Mr.  Rockefeller's  self  esteem  could  not  escape  injury  by  such 
criticism. 

In  considering  the  correspondence  and  testimony  that  will 
here  be  quoted,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Mr.  Welborn 
is  still  the  President  of  the  Company  and  the  dominating 
executive  official  on  the  ground  in  Colorado.  If  it  appears  that 
Mr.  Welborn 's  spirit  and  attitude  toward  the  new  plan,  as 
disclosed  in  his  correspondence  while  this  plan  was  being 
formulated,  were  such  as  to  convince  the  recipient  of  his  letters 
that  he  was  temperamentally  and  by  conviction  unfitted  for  the 
carrying  out  of  any  plan  for  real  collective  bargaining,  then 
Mr.  Rockefeller's  retention  and  continued  support  of  Mr. 
Welborn  must  be  taken  as  a  measure  of  his  own  sincerity 
regarding  the  plan.  Statements  by  Mr.  Rockefeller  and  mem- 
bers of  his  staff  that  mistakes  undoubtedly  were  made  dur- 
ing the  strike,  and  intimations  that  the  policy  of  the  Company 
would  be  different  if  the  same  circumstances  again  arose, 
must  all  be  judged  by  the  acts  of  Mr.  Rockefeller  and  his 
subordinates  since  the  strike. 

In  June,  1914,  Mr.  Rockefeller  was  planning  what  he  called 
a  "union  educational  campaign".  It  was  to  be  conducted  by 
Mr.  Lee,  his  publicity  expert,  and  in  connection  with  it  Mr. 
Rockefeller  proposed  to  Mr.  Lee  that  he  circulate  copies  of  an 
article  by  Professor  Stevenson  of  New  York  University,  bit- 
terly attacking  trade  unionism.  It  was  at  about  this  time 
that  he  also  conceived  the  plan  of  conducting  through  the 
Rockefeller  Foundation  an  extensive  investigation  into  the 
field  of  industrial  relations.  He  met  Mr.  W.  L.  Mackenzie 
King  of  Ottawa,  Canada,  formerly  Minister  of  Labor  for  Can- 
ada, and  proposed  to  Mr.  King  that  he,  Mr.  King,  take  charge 
of  this  inquiry.  On  August  1,  1914,  he  wrote  to  Mr.  King, 
who  had  not  yet  joined  the  staff  of  the  Foundation,  the  fol- 
lowing letter: 


158 

As  you  have  doubtless  learned  from  the  papers,  the 
situation  in  the  coal  mines  of  Colorado  is  quiet.  Prac-- 
tically  all  of  the  mines  are  in  operation,  the  output  being 
seventy  or  eighty  per  cent  of  normal,  but  quite  all  that 
present  business  conditions  will  absorb.  Practically  all 
of  the  men  who  are  needed  are  obtainable.  On  the  other 
hand,  tent  colonies  are  maintained,  in  which  some  fifteen 
hundred  or  two  thousand  strikers  still  reside.  These  tent 
colonies  are  a  constant  menace  to  peace  and  are  only  held 
in  subjection  by  the  presence  of  the  federal  troops.  If 
the  latter  were  withdrawn,  doubtless  these  unoccupied 
men,  many  of  them,  we  believe,  paid  by  the  union  to  con- 
tinue the  disturbances,  would  renew  active  hostilities. 
I  wrote  Mr.  Welborn,  the  President  of  the  Fuel  Com- 
pany, a  few  days  ago,  inquiring  what  the  present  status 
was  of  the  various  committees  or  individuals  appointed 
to  undertake  to  terminate  the  industrial  warfare.  A 
copy  of  his  interesting  reply  I  enclose  herewith. 

There  would  seem  to  be  but  two  ways  in  which  a  per- 
manent condition  of  peace  can  be  restored.  First,  by 
the  calling  off  of  the  strike  by  the  United  Mine  Work- 
ers of  America.  That  this  is  likely  to  happen  in  the  near 
future  we  have  no  definite  reason  to  believe,  unless  the 
financial  resources  of  the  union  are  so  depleted  as  a  re- 
sult of  their  industrial  conflicts  in  several  states,  that 
they  cannot  much  longer  continue  to  support  the  strik- 
ing miners.  Secondly,  by  developing  some  organization 
in  the  mining  camps  which  will  assure  to  the  employees 
the  opportunity  for  collective  bargaining,  for  easy  and 
constant  conferences  with  reference  to  any  matters  of 
difference  or  grievance  which  may  come  up,  and  any  other 
advantages  which  may  be  derived  from  membership  in 
the  union.  When  we  had  our  first  conference  at  my  house, 
you  remember  we  discussed  this  matter  and  developed 
certain  points  which  such  an  organization  would  include. 
I  am  wondering  whether  you  can  take  the  time  to  dictate, 
at  your  convenience,  an  outline  of  such  an  organization 
and  send  it  to  me  for  consideration.  I  think  we  all  reo- 


159 

ognized  in  the  conference  above  referred  to  the  many 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  devising  such  a  plan ;  at  the  same 
time,  there  were  certain  points  which  we  agreed  upon 
as  essential.  An  outline  covering  these  essentials  and 
as  fully  developed  as  your  experience  and  present  thought 
might  make  possible  is  what  I  have  in  mind.  The  pur- 
pose of  this  outline  would  be  to  provide  a  basis  for  our 
further  consideration  of  the  subject  and  for  our  discus- 
sion of  it  with  the  officers  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron 
Company.  While  I  recognize  that  after  your  studies  have 
progressed  you  will  feel  yourself  much  better  fitted  to 
outline  such  an  organization,  on  the  other  hand  it  seems 
to  me  that  a  step  of  this  kind  is  going  to  be  the  next 
move.  This  is  only  my  personal  opinion.  I  have  not 
talked  with  my  colleagues  or  with  any  of  the  officers 
of  the  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Company  about  it. 

I  understand  that  you  are  ajbout  to  start  on  your  West- 
ern trip  and  that  your  time  is  fully  occupied.  I  shall  not 
expect  a  carefully  studied  or  carefully  rounded  plan — 
simply  a  rough  outline  of  those  points  which  may  occur 
to  you,  without  extended  thought  but  more  as  a  result 
of  your  past  experience  with  questions  of  this  kind.  I 
shall  be  in  New  York  for  the  next  ten  days  or  two  weeks 
and  shall  be  glad  to  hear  from  you  at  my  office  address. 
The  accompanying  editorial  from  the  New  York  Times 
of  July  30th  is  along  the  line  of  my  suggestion. 

On  August  6  Mr.  King  replied  as  follows: 

As  stated  in  my  wire  to  you,  I  did  not  receive  your 
letter  of  August  1st  until  the  late  mail  on  Thursday  the 
4th.  The  announcement  of  the  declaration  of  war  be- 
tween Britain  and  Germany  came  a  few  hours  later. 
Pressing  duties  arising  out  of  this  exceptional  circum- 
stance made  it  impossible  for  me  to  get  off  a  letter  to 
you  yesterday  as  I  had  hoped,  and  may  necessitate  this 
letter  being  less  in  detail  than  I  should  like.  However, 
please  do  not  hesitate  to  suggest  my  coming  to  New 
York  to  see  you  if  you  should  desire  this.  I  shall  be  quite 


160 

frank  in  stating  if  it  is  impossible  to  get  away  for  forty- 
eight  hours.  Just  now  I  am  with  Sir  Wilfrid  most  of  the 
time,  as  this  seems  to  afford  an  opportunity  of  service 
greater  than  any  other  which  it  is  possible  for  me  to  hope 
to  render  in  the  present  crisis. 

The  western  trip  has  been  called  off  owing  to  the  war, 
and  as  you  may  have  noticed,  the  Canadian  Parliament 
has  been  called  for  a  special  session  to  open  a  week  from 
Tuesday.  It  is  hardly  probable  that  this  session  will 
last  any  length  of  time,  but  while  it  is  on,  and  until  there 
is  something  decisive  in  the  European  situation,  I  almost 
feel  that  I  owe  it  to  my  country  to  stay  here  and  be 
available  in  contingencies  that  may  arise.  Under  these 
circumstances,  I  am  inclined  at  this  time  of  writing  to 
feel  that  notwithstanding  the  cancellation  of  the  Western 
trip,  you  will  think  I  am  taking  the  right  course  if  I  hold 
to  the  original  intention  of  not  giving  my  time  wholly 
to  the  work  of  the  Foundation  until  about  October  1st, 
as  originally  planned.  On  the  other  hand,  the  cancella- 
tion of  the  Western  trip  makes  possible  an  earlier  an- 
nouncement of  my  association  with  the  Foundation,  if 
any  useful  purpose  might  be  served  by  this.  If  in  the  in- 
terests of  the  Foundation  it  would  seem  desirable  to  make 
the  announcement  in  the  near  future,  I  should  be  glad 
to  confer  with  Mr.  Greene,  Mr.  Murphy  or  yourself  as 
to  the  time  and  form  in  which  it  could  best  be  made,  hav- 
ing regard  to  the  work  itself. 

Coming  to  the  Colorado  situation:  I  agree  with  you 
in  believing  it  to  be  extremely  unlikelv  that  the  United 
Mine  Workers  of  America  will  call  off  the  strike.  They 
might  be  willing  to  drop  open  active  support  by  de- 
grees, but  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  where  recognition 
has  been  the  principle  for  which  they  have  been  fight- 
ing, they  will  not  openly  abandon  the  struggle  with  any- 
thing short  of  what  they  may  be  able  to  construe  as  such. 

It  may  be,  however,  that  organized  labour  in  the 
United  States  will  realize  the  opportunities  and  handicaps 


161 

likely  to  come  to  certain  industries  through  the  changed 
conditions  of  Europe,  and  will  be  prepared  to  cease  hos- 
tilities where  industrial  strife  at  present  exists,  in  order 
that  on  the  one  hand  labour  may  reap  with  capital  a 
fuller  measure  of  the  harvest,  or,  in  industries  that  may 
be  differently  affected,  protect  itself  against  consequences 
that  are  certain  to  arise.  I  fear  that  the  view  likely  to 
be  taken  by  some  of  the  leaders  may,  at  the  outset,  be 
the  short-sighted  one  of  endeavouring  to  persuade  their 
followers  that  the  opportunities  which  may  come  to  Amer- 
ican capital  through  the  crippled  condition  of  industries 
elsewhere,  will  induce  a  recognition  which  under  less  fa- 
vorable circumstances  might  not  be  granted.  This  is 
almost  certain  to  be  the  immediate  effect,  and  I  think  you 
are  wise,  therefore,  in  dismissing  altogether  from  your 
mind  the  possibility  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  calling 
off  the  present  strike,  even  if,  under  any  circumstances 
short  of  recognition,  they  would  be  likely  so  to  do.  It 
will  not  be  very  long,  however,  before  the  inevitable 
effects  of  the  European  war  on  American  labour  condi- 
tions are  certain  to  make  themselves  felt,  both  because 
of  the  scarcity  of  capital  available  for  investment,  and 
the  crippled  condition  of  industry  on  the  other  side,  and 
once  this  becomes  apparent,  the  unions  will  have  to  revise 
considerably  some  of  their  present  policies. 

Having  regard  to  the  more  cordial  relations  between 
labour  and  capital  which,  it  is  hoped,  the  Foundation 
may  be  able  to  effect,  it  would  be  fortunate,  indeed, 
if  you  could,  out  of  the  changed  conditions  which  this 
European  war  is  certain  to  produce,  find  a  means  of  re- 
storing industrial  peace  in  the  United  States  in  indus- 
tries such  as  coal  and  fuel  where  there  is  a  certainty  of  a 
direct  bearing.  It  may  be  that  among  those  who  are  em- 
barrassing the  situation  in  Colorado,  there  are  many 
foreigners  who  may  feel  compelled  to  return  to  Europe, 
and  that  may  prove  an  immediate  factor  of  importance. 
Looking  at  the  ultimate,  rather  than  the  immediate  ef- 
fect, there  is,  speaking  generally,  going  to  be  a  large 


162 

amount  of  unemployment  as  a  consequence  of  this  war, 
and  once  the  war  is  over,  thousands  of  men  and  their 
families  in  the  Old  World  are  going  to  seek  future  em- 
ployment here  in  the  New.  In  certain  industries  it  is 
going  to  be  easy  for  employers  to  find  all  the  labour 
they  desire,  and  unions  will  be  confronted  with  a  new 
problem.  Recognition,  simply  for  the  sake  of  recogni- 
tion, is  going  to  be  seen  to  be  less  pressing  as  an  imme- 
diate end,  than  that  of  maintaining  standards  already 
existing,  and  may  rightly  come  to  regard  as  their  friends 
and  allies  companies  and  corporations  large  enough  and 
fair  enough  to  desire  to  maintain  these  standards  of  their 
own  accord.  For  the  unions  to  take  a  different  view  will 
certainly  mean  to  lose  the  substance  of  fair  conditions 
while  wasting  resources  in  fighting  for  the  shadow  of 
recognition.  Here,  it  seems  to  me,  lies  a  possible  avenue 
of  approach  towards  restoring  normal  conditions  in 
Colorado. 

The  possibilities  here  set  forth  might  be  pointed  out 
by  employers  in  a  perfectly  frank  and  open  manner.  It 
might  be  said  with  equal  frankness  that  were  it  desired 
to  profit  by  such  a  situation,  employers  may  seek  later  to 
enforce  individual  agreements  with  all  men  desiring  to 
enter  their  employ;  may  even  consider,  as  some  doubt- 
less will,  altering  conditions  of  employment  to  their  sup- 
posed immediate  advantage.  Between  the  extreme  of 
individual  agreements  on  the  one  side,  and  an  agree- 
ment involving  recognition  of  unions  of  national  and  in- 
ternational character  on  the  other,  lies  the  straight  accept- 
ance of  the  principle  of  Collective  Bargaining  between 
capital  and  labour  immediately  concerned  in  any  cer- 
tain industry  or  group  of  industries,  and  the  construc- 
tion of  machinery  which  will  afford  opportunity  of  easy 
and  constant  conference  between  employers  and  employed 
with  reference  to  matters  of  concern  to  both,  such  machin- 
ery to  be  avowedly  constructed  as  a  means  on  the  one 
hand  of  preventing  labour  from  being  exploited,  and  on 


163 

the  other,  of  ensuring  that  cordial  cooperation  which  is 
likely  to  further  industrial  efficiency. 

Granting  the  acceptance  of  the  principle  outlined,  the 
machinery  to  be  devised  should  aim  primarily  at  securing 
a  maximum  of  publicity  with  a  minimum  of  interference 
in  all  that  pertains  to  conditions  of  employment.  By 
this,  I  mean,  that  the  hope  of  establishing  confidence  be- 
tween employers  and  employed  will  lie  more  in  a  known 
willingness  on  the  part  of  each  to  confer  frankly  with 
the  other  than  in  anything  else.  Similarly,  the  avoid- 
ance of  friction,  likely  to  lead  to  subsequent  strife,  is 
likely  to  be  minimized  by  agencies  which  will  disclose 
the  existence  of  irritation  and  its  cause,  at  or  near  in- 
ception ;  trouble  most  frequently  follows  where  ill-feeling 
is  allowed  to  develop,  unknown  or  unheeded. 

A  Board  on  which  both  employers  and  employed  are 
represented,  and  before  which  at  stated  intervals  ques- 
tions affecting  conditions  of  employment  can  be  dis- 
cussed and  grievances  examined,  would  appear  to  con- 
stitute the  necessary  basis  of  such  machinery.  The  size 
of  this  Board,  and  whether  there  should  be  one  or  many 
such  Boards,  would  depend  upon  the  numbers  employed, 
and  the  nature  of  the  industry,  and  whether  or  not  the 
work  is  carried  on  in  one  or  several  localities.  Where, 
for  example,  there  are  different  mines,  or  refining  plants 
as  well  as  mines,  it  might  be  that  boards  pertaining  to 
each  individual  concern  might  be  combined  with  a  pro- 
vision for  reference  to  a  joint  Board  covering  the  whole 
industry,  or  group  of  industries,  to  which  matters  not  set- 
tled by  smaller  Boards  might  be  taken  for  further  dis- 
cussion and  adjustment. 

In  determining  the  character  of  representation  on  such 
Boards,  broadly  speaking,  a  line  might  be  drawn  be- 
tween those  who  are  "paid  salaries "  on  the  one  hand,  and 
those  who  "earn  wages"  on  the  other.  This  is  very 
rough  and  very  general,  for  there  are  in  some  industries 
a  class  of  petty  bosses  whose  interests  may  appear  to 


164 

identify  them  more  closely  with  wage-earners  than  with 
salaried  officials,  but  broadly  speaking,  men  who  have  au- 
thority to  give  orders  and  to  direct  operations,  fall  into 
the  salaried  class,  while  men  who  have  no  authority  to 
direct  others,  and  whose  own  work  is  subject  wholly  to 
direction,  fall  into  the  category  of  wage-earners.  The 
selection  of  representatives  on  such  Boards  should  be 
made  at  a  meeting  or  meetings  of  employees  called  ex- 
pressly for  the  purpose.  It  might  be  left  optional  for  the 
employees  to  say  whether  they  desired  a  permanent  form 
of  organization  of  which  their  representatives  on  a  Board 
would  be  the  officers,  or  whether  they  would  prefer  the 
selection  of  individuals  at  stated  periods,  without  ref- 
erence to  any  permanent  form  of  organization.  It  could 
also  be  left  optional  with  the  workers  themselves  to  say 
whether  they  wished  to  allow  representatives  so  chosen, 
a  salary  in  payment  of  their  services,  or  whether  such 
services  would  have  to  be  voluntary.  A  company  might, 
with  propriety,  offer  to  provide  a  place  of  meeting  for  the 
Boards,  and  possibly  go  the  length  of  supplying  the  em- 
ployees with  permanent  office  accommodation  for  their 
representatives,  leaving  it,  however,  to  the  employees 
themselves  to  provide  whatever  might  be  necessary  in  the 
way  of  salaries  and  expenses  in  the  keeping  up  of  such 
offices. 

It  would  not  appear  desirable  at  the  outset  that  these 
Boards  should  have  anything  to  do  with  benefit  features. 
They  should  not  be  framed  with  a  view  of  restricting 
through  possible  benefits,  the  liberty  of  any  man  as  re- 
spects the  continuance  of  his  employment,  but  should  aim 
primarily  at  affording  a  guarantee  of  fair  play  in  de- 
termining, in  the  first  instance,  the  conditions  under  which 
men  would  be  obliged  to  work  and  the  remuneration  to  be 
paid,  and  secondly,  the  carrying  out  of  these  conditions 
in  a  spirit  of  fair  play. 

One  thing  to  be  especially  aimed  at  in  the  construction 
of  such  Boards  would  be  the  making  virtually  certain 
of  the  possibility  of  grievances  or  conditions  complained 


165 

of  being  made  known  to,  and  subject  to  the  review  of 
persons  in  authority  over  and  above  the  parties  imme- 
diately concerned,  where  the  parties  fail  to  adjust  these 
differences  between  themselves ;  this  to  be  carried  even  to 
the  point  that  directors,  if  need  be,  should  have,  where  the 
numbers  to  be  affected  are  likely  to  justify  it,  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  situation,  and  power  to  pass  upon  it.  This 
feature  will  probably  not  appeal  to  pit  bosses  and  man- 
agers who  may  desire  absolute  authority.  On  the  other 
hand,  I  am  convinced  it  should  be  possible  to  so  frame 
a  constitution  for  these  Boards  that  the  possibility  of 
this  review  would  in  no  way  interfere  with  discipline, 
but  would  be  a  material  assistance  rather  than  a  handi- 
cap to  those  who  are  charged  with  responsibility. 

What  might  be  expected  of  Boards  of  this  kind  would 
be  that  employees,  before  taking  up  any  question  with 
the  officers  of  the  company  would  try  to  adjust  or  settle 
it  among  themselves.  Failing  adjustment  in  this  manner, 
differences  and  difficulties  would  be  presented  to  the  offi- 
cers of  the  company,  not  by  the  individuals  immediately 
affected,  but  by  the  duly  constituted  representatives 
chosen  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  all.  Having  had  a 
preliminary  sifting  in  this  manner,  cases  could  be  brought 
before  a  committee  of  the  Board  or  before  the  whole 
Board  in  any  one  industry  for  adjustment.  If  it  should 
be  found  that  an  individual  Board  could  not  definitely 
determine  a  matter  of  importance,  there  might  be  brought 
a  further  appeal  on  stated  conditions  to  a  Board  chosen 
to  represent  the  industry  as  a 'whole,  or  a  group  of  allied 
industries;  the  purpose  here  being  to  get  away,  to  a  de- 
gree, for  purposes  of  adjustment,  from  the  parties  im- 
mediately concerned,  but  not  wholly  away  from  parties 
likely  to  be  ultimately  affected.  This  would  make  it  an 
essential  that  all  members  of  such  boards,  excepting  pos- 
sibly, persons  chosen  as  chairmen,  referees  or  umpires, 
should  be  persons  actually  employed  in  the  industry  or 
connected  with  it  in  some  way,  not  persons  chosen  from 
outside.  It  should  be  possible,  however,  for  workmen 


166 

to  select  one  or  more  of  their  number,  who  could  give 
their  entire  time  to  acting  in  a  representative  capacity, 
and  pay  them  a  salary  pending  their  acting  in  such  ca- 
pacity. 

I  think,  in  a  very  rough  way,  this  covers  the  points 
mentioned  in  our  conversation.  I  really  hesitate  to  send 
this  letter  in  such  rough  outline  and  without  care  in 
preparation.  I  believe  so  strongly  in  never  advising 
in  regard  to  any  situation  until  one  has  made  oneself 
familiar  with  all  its  phases,  that  I  feel  I  am  running  a 
great  risk  in  even  setting  forth  what  this  letter  contains, 
as  there  may  be  conditions  or  reasons  which  will  render 
its  suggestions  wholly  inapplicable  to  some  of  the  in- 
dustries with  reference  to  which  consideration  is  invited. 
I  should  mention,  too,  that  in  the  course  of  the  present 
dictation,  I  have  been  subject  to  constant  interruptions, 
and  in  fact,  have  had  to  pick  up  this  letter  and  drop  it 
half  a  dozen  times  before  reaching  this  point,  all  of  which 
is  most  unsatisfactory  in  a  matter  so  important.  I  un- 
derstand, however,  from  your  letter  that  for  the  moment, 
you  are  agreeable  to  accepting  a  very  rough  outline,  the 
purpose  being  mainly  that  of  enabling  persons  imme- 
diately concerned  with  the  industries  to  consider  possi- 
bilities and  limitations  of  the  suggestions  made,  in  order 
that  these  may  be  taken  account  of  in  the  working  out 
of  some  definite  plan  when  the  same  may  come  up  for 
consideration. 

With  this  understanding  I  am  agreeable  to  letting  this 
letter  go  forward.  Without  it,  I  should  hesitate,  without 
opportunity  of  mature  consideration,  to  attempt  to  give 
concrete  expression  to  views  which  are  clear  in  my  own 
mind,  but  which,  without  knowledge  of  the  conditions  to 
which  they  are  to  apply,  I  find  the  greatest  difficulty  in 
seeking  to  convey. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  here  on  the  circumstance  that  Mr. 
King  speaks  of  "the  shadow  of  recognition, "  indicating  that 
he  sees  the  labor  problem  as  merely  one  of  securing  for 


\ 


167 

the  workers  a  decent  degree  of  physical  welfare,  and  in  no 
sense  as  a  problem  of  democratizing  industry  and  freeing  the 
wage  earners  from  arbitrary  economic  control.  Nor  does  Mr. 
King  hesitate  to  advise  Mr.  Rockefeller  as  an  employer  how 
he  may  take  advantage  of  a  situation  produced  by  the  war 
to  defeat  the  aspirations  of  the  workers,  and  force  them  to 
take  about  what  he  desires  to  give.  Mr.  King's  personal 
bent  is  not  of  great  importance  in  connection  with  the  Colo- 
rado situation,  although  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  in 
determining  what  may  be  expected  of  the  Rockefeller  Foun- 
dation's proposed  investigation  in  the  field  of  industrial  rela- 
tions. But  in  Colorado  Mr.  King's  recommendations  were  so 
modified  by  the  wills  of  Mr.  Rockefeller  and  Mr.  Welborn 
that  he  was  not  a  controlling  factor. 

Mr.  Rockefeller  sent  a  copy  of  Mr.  King's  tentative  proposal 
to  Mr.  Bowers,  who  was  still  chairman  of  the  board  at  Den- 
ver, and  to  President  Welborn.  In  his  letter  under  date  of 
August  11  to  Mr.  Welborn,  Mr.  Rockefeller  said: 

For  some  months,  we  have  been  talking  with  different 
ones  who  are  familiar  with  the  subject,  about  some  simple 
machinery  which  would  insure  quick  and  easy  access  on 
the  part  of  the  employees  of  the  Fuel  Company  to  the 
officers  of  the  company,  with  reference  to  wages  or  con- 
ditions of  employment,  feeling  that  the  officers  of  the 
company  might  think  that  the  introduction  of  some  simple 
mechanism  of  this  kind  would  tend  to  promote  kindly 
feeling  between  the  employes  and  the  officers,  as  well  as 
be  a  further  evidence  to  the  public  of  the  entirely  fair 
and  just  attitude  of  the  officers  toward  their  men.  Among 
the  men  with  whom  we  have  talked  on  this  subject,  we 
have  found  no  one  more  intelligent,  more  practical  or 
more  experienced  than  Mr.  W.  L.  Mackenzie  King,  who 
was  a  short  time  ago  the  Secretary  of  Labor  of  Canada. 
As  Deputy  Secretary,  Mr.  King  himself  settled  forty-five 
strikes.  It  is  he  who  prepared  and  put  on  the  Canadian 
statute  books  laws  with  reference  to  the  handling  of  in- 
dustrial disputes  which  have  so  materially  reduced  the 


168 

number  of  strikes  in  Canada  during  the  past  few  years. 
Mr.  King  is  a  man  who  has  approached  this  subject  from 
both  the  theoretical  and  the  practical  side.  I  fancy  that 
his  success  in  settling  the  strikes  above  referred  to  was 
due  partly  to  his  extensive  knowledge  of  and  wide  ex- 
perience in  dealing  with  industrial  difficulties  and  partly 
to  the  fact  that  he  has  the  faculty  of  making  men  of  high 
and  low  degree  believe  in  his  sincerity  and  genuineness. 

Having  had  several  conferences  with  Mr.  King  during 
the  past  few  months  along  these  lines,  it  occurred  to  me 
the  other  day  to  ask  him  to  outline  briefly  some  simple 
machinery  which  would  accomplish  the  result  suggested 
at  the  beginning  of  this  letter.  I  am  enclosing  a  copy 
of  that  portion  of  his  reply  which  deals  with  the  sub- 
ject. You  will  understand  that  as  a  Canadian  subject 
closely  related  to  the  government,  Mr.  King  is  over- 
whelmed with  public  duties  at  this  time,  in  connection 
with  the  European  war.  He  has  been  unable  to  give  the 
subject  of  my  letter  any  careful  or  continued  thought 
but  has  dictated  hurriedly  some  of  the  points  which  he 
made  in  his  discussions  of  this  subject  with  us. 

I  am  sending  this  memorandum  to  you  in  the  most 
informal  way,  without  any  conference  with  my  colleagues, 
simply  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  you  gen- 
tlemen in  Denver  believe  that  anything  along  these  lines 
is  worth  considering  for  the  Fuel  Company.  If  you  think 
it  is,  as  we  are  inclined  to  believe,  it  occurs  to  me  that  it 
might  be  possible  for  us  to  arrange  with  Mr.  King,  should 
you  so  desire,  to  go  to  Denver,  at  your  invitation,  for  con- 
ference privately  with  you  gentlemen.  The  purpose  of 
this  conference  would  be  for  you  to  give  him  the  many 
facts  as  to  the  Fuel  Company's  organization,  a  knowl- 
edge of  which  would  be  essential  to  enable  him  to  outline 
a  plan  adapted  to  the  specific  requirements  of  that  com- 
pany. If  there  is  any  man  available  who  could  be  help- 
ful in  working  out  such  a  plan  as  this,  I  believe  Mr.  King 
is  the  man.  My  thought  would  be  for  him  to  go  to 


169 

Denver  in  an  entirely  private  and  unofficial  capacity  as 
your  guest,  without  its  being  generally  known  that  he 
was  there.  I  should  not  expect  him  to  undertake  to  visit 
the  coal  properties  of  the  company,  but  rather  simply  to 
confer  with  you  gentlemen  in  your  own  office. 

I  shall  appreciate  a  frank  expression  of  your  feeling 
on  this  general  subject,  and  if  I  can  be  of  any  help  in 
developing  a  plan,  should  the  idea  meet  with  your  ap- 
proval, or  in  securing  such  a  visit  from  Mr.  King,  as  I 
have  suggested,  I  shall  be  only  too  glad  to  do  so.  I  may 
say  in  passing  that  I  had  a  few  words  with  Mr.  Lee  on  this 
general  subject  before  he  went  west. 

Mr.  Bowers  wrote  his  chief  on  August  16,  1914 : 

For  us  to  take  steps  at  the  moment,  to  form  such  a 
board,  would  be  regarded  by  the  public  as  an  admission 
on  our  part,  that  some  such  committee  or  board  was  lack- 
ing prior  to  the  strike  and  might  perhaps  have  prevented 
it. 

To  form  such  a  board  now,  would  discount  every  utter- 
ance we  have  made  and  insisted  upon,  that  there  were  no 
differences  whatever  and  the  strike  was  not  forced  be- 
cause of  any  grievances  or  differences. 

The  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  could  and  would 
justly  charge  us  with  inconsistency  and  that  we  were 
forced  to  side  step  and  at  last  compelled  to  admit  their 
repeated  charges,  that  the  miners  had  no  way  to  reach  the 
managers  with  their  grievances. 

We  have  known  for  some  time,  that  if  we  would  agree 
to  a  joint  committee  of  miners  and  operators  being  formed 
the  strike  would  be  called  off  and  without  recognition  of 
the  union  being  mentioned.  Such  a  scheme  was  no  longer 
ago  than  yesterday,  passed  by  the  strike  leaders  here  and 
submitted  to  the  International  Committee  at  Indianapolis, 
who  meet  there  Monday  next,  who  in  turn  are  expected  to 
submit  it  through  Mr.  Davies,  one  of  the  investigating 
committee,  to  the  operators. 


170 

This  trick  they  know  would  be  a  recognition  of  the 
union  and  they  would  shout  it  over  the  world,  that  they 
had  won  the  strike  and  our  men  set  upon  by  a  horde  of 
organizers  and  run  into  the  union  and  followed  in  a  year 
or  two  with  a  strike  and  the  open  shop  would  be  shut. 

Later  on  and  after  the  strike  is  off,  or  worn  out,  the 
writer  would  favor  and  take  an  active  part  in  joint  con- 
ferences, directly  with  our  miners  and  undertake  to  form 
a  scheme  or  plan  that  would  give  the  miners  a  representa- 
tive to  whom  they  could  go  with  any  matter  that  they 
thought  should  be  adjusted.  I  mean  a  board  that  would 
have  a  much  wider  field  than  investigating  grievances  and 
adjusting  quarrels,  but  who  would  undertake  to  prevent 
quarrels.  To  suggest  ways  and  means  for  the  betterment 
of  the  miners  in  many  ways,  and  help  solve  the  perplexing 
social  conditions  and  a  general  uplift  board,  so  to  speak. 

There  has  been  some  cause  for  complaint,  I  think,  in 
some  coal  companies,  because  of  the  inability  for  miners 
to  reach  the  officers — higher  up — with  their  real  or  fan- 
cied complaints,  but  this  has  not  been  shown  to  be  the 
case  in  the  C.  F.  &  I.  Co.  To  remedy  this  would  be  one 
of  the  good  features  that  a  board  would  be  expected  to 
develop;  they  would  be  the  " missing  link"  between  the 
miner  and  the  managers. 

At  the  proper  time,  the  writer  will  give  his  cordial  sup- 
port and  will  take  an  active  part  in  formulating  such  a 
scheme  and  help  to  make  it  valuable  to  both  the  miners 
and  the  company  alike,  not  only  to  forestall  trouble,  but 
to  bring  about  better  feelings  and  conditions  for  the  mu- 
tual benefit  for  all  concerned. 

To  take  this  up  at  the  moment,  would  be  most  unwise 
in  my  opinion  from  every  viewpoint ;  I  feel  certain  other 
operators  would  balk,  the  socialistic  papers  would  charge 
us  with  dodging  and  hiding  behind  this  eleventh  hour 
scheme  to  save  our  faces.  The  Union  leaders  would  use 
it  as  a  club  to  drive  us  into  some  other  corner. 

Our  rugged  stand,  has  won  us  every  foot  we  have  gained 


171 

and  we  know  that  the  organization  is  bankrupt  in  this  field, 
while  the  big  men  in  the  union  are  at  swords  points  be- 
cause of  their  failure  here ;  so  to  move  an  inch  from  our 
stand  at  the  time  that  defeat  seems  certain  for  the  enemy, 
would  be  decidedly  unwise  in  my  opinion. 

The  political  gang  at  Washington  are  at  their  wits  '  end 
to  find  some  way  to  get  out  of  the  pit  they  helped  these 
leaders  to  dig,  so  we  are  encouraged  to  stick  to  the  job 
till  we  win. 

President  Welborn  wrote  as  follows  to  Mr.  Rockefeller  on 
August  20: 

I  was  very  much  impressed  with  Mr.  King's  thorough 
presentation  of  the  merits  of  what  might  be  termed  a  con- 
ciliation board,  and  have  carefully  reread  his  propositions 
a  number  of  times.  A  plan  somewhat  similar  in  form 
was  suggested  by  Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson  when  he 
was  in  Colorado  the  latter  part  of  November,  and  fol- 
lowing the  meeting  between  the  three  striking  miners  and 
representatives  of  the  operators,  a  part  of  which  he  (Wil- 
son) attended.  I  have  no  doubt  Mr.  King's  plan  would 
be  effective  in  cases  of  frequent  disputes  between  the  em- 
ployed and  employer,  or  where  there  was  a  general  rec- 
ognition of  union  labor  without  the  "  check-off "  and  ex- 
clusive rights  of  the  members  of  the  union  that  are  a  part 
of  the  policy  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America. 

It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  the  adoption  at  this  time 
by  the  Colorado  operators  of  such  a  plan  as  Mr.  King 
suggests,  would  weaken  us  with  our  men;  would  tend  to 
strengthen  the  organization  with  our  employes  not  now 
members  of  it ;  and  would,  in  the  minds  of  the  public,  be 
an  admission  on  our  part  that  a  weakness,  the  existence 
of  which  we  had  previously  denied,  was  being  corrected. 

The  strike  of  our  coal  miners  was  literally  forced  upon 
them  against  their  wishes  by  people  from  the  outside. 
I  imagine  that  some  people  more  or  less  intimately  con- 
nected with  labor  conditions  in  other  parts  of  the  United 
States,  but  uninformed  as  to  our  affairs,  would  accept 


172 

this  statement  with  a  good  deal  of  allowance,  but  I  con- 
tend that  it  is  absolutely  correct  as  made,  and  that  being 
true,  no  arbitration  or  conciliation  board  operating  be- 
tween workmen  and  employers  could  have  prevented  the 
calling  of  this  strike. 

I  am  interested  in  what  you  say  about  the  results  of 
Mr.  King's  labors  in  Canada  in  connection  with  strikes, 
and  hope  to  some  time  have  the  opportunity  of  discuss- 
ing work  of  this  character  with  him.  It  seems  to  be  un- 
necessary, however,  for  him  to  come  to  Colorado  at  this 
time,  for  my  opinion,  as  indicated  above,  is  that  it  would 
be  inadvisable  to  undertake  a  plan  such  as  Mr.  King  sug- 
gests while  the  coal  strike  is  in  an  unsettled  state.  We 
know  there  is  no  demand  on  the  part  of  our  men — at 
any  rate,  none  of  moment — for  a  board  to  arbitrate  or 
handle  possible  differences  between  them  and  the  mine 
officers.  Whatever  demand  there  may  be  of  that  char- 
acter comes  from  the  uninformed  public  and  is  an  opin- 
ion, rather  than  a  demand,  based  on  misinformation  as 
to  conditions  surrounding  the  Colorado  strikes. 

I  think  that  the  views  expressed  by  those  from  whom 
I  have  received  letters  inspired  by  the  bulletins  are  some- 
what significant,  and  practically  all  of  these  have,  while 
commending  the  coal  mine  committee  for  setting  the  facts 
before  the  public,  approved  the  general  policy  that  the 
operators  have  pursued. 

Mr.  Bowers,  Mr.  Weitzel,  manager  of  our  fuel  depart- 
ment, and  I  have  considered  the  advisability  of  at  some 
time  inaugurating  a  plan  to  be  represented  by  the  proper 
committee,  by  which  our  men  could,  when  they  considered 
it  necessary,  reach  the  higher  officers  of  the  company  on 
matters  in  which  they  were  concerned.  We  were  prompt- 
ed to  the  consideration  of  this  because  of  the  charge  fre- 
quently made  during  the  past  few  months — which  as  to 
the  C.  F.  &  I.  Co.  is  false — that  the  workmen  could  not 
reach  the  officers  of  the  company  on  any  matter  without 
fear  of  discharge  by  the  superintendent,  and  by  the  fact 
that  this  charge  seemed  to  make  an  impression  on  some 


173 

of  those  who  were  naturally  favorably  disposed  toward 
our  side  of  the  controversy  and  toward  our  general  policy. 
We  have  thought  that  whatever  we  do  in  this  direction 
should  be  done  after  the  strike  is  over,  and  as  a  natural 
forward  step  from  or  development  of  our  past  liberal 
policy  toward  our  men.  Above  all,  it  seems  to  me  that 
we  should  avoid  a  course  that  would,  in  the  minds  of 
the  public,  justify  the  charge  that  we  had  been  forced  by 
the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  into  giving  our  em- 
ployes something  radically  different  and  better  than  they 
had  previously  enjoyed.  Mr.  Lee  is  now  working  on  some 
bulletins  of  an  introductory  nature,  to  be  posted  at  our 
mine,  from  which  we  can  work  into  a  broader  scheme  of 
co-operation,  as  seems  advisable. 

In  normal  times  we  have  considered  that  our  interests 
were  best  served,  generally  speaking,  by^pursuinga  course 
independent  of  the  other  operators.  During  the  strike, 
however,  there  has  been  very  satisfactory  co-operation 
among  all  of  the  operators,  except  the  few  who  signed  up 
with  the  miners '  organization ;  yet  I  do  not  feel  that  that 
co-operation  should  be  extended  to  cover  our  plans,  as 
herein  outlined,  to  which  many  of  them  might  object,  and 
in  the  operation  of  which  I  fear  good  faith  would  not  al- 
ways be  shown. 

I  have  delayed  answering  your  letter  for  the  reason  that 
I  wanted  to  take  time  to  consider  the  question  presented 
in  all  of  its  phases.  In  expressing  my  views  I  have  attempt- 
ed to  be  as  unprejudiced  as  circumstances  would  permit, 
and  have  tried  to  be  governed  by  feelings  that  could  not 
be  considered  arbitrary. 

In  reply  Mr.  Eockef eller,  under  date  of  August  28,  wrote : 

I  fully  understand  your  point  of  view,  and  quite  agree 
with  your  conclusion  that,  however  desirable  some  such 
plan  as  suggested  by  Mr.  King  may  be  "for  future  con- 
sideration, in  order  to  give  additional  assurance  that  any 
just  cause  of  complaint  by  an  employe  can  be  brought 


174 

to  the  attention  of  the  officers,  it  is  not  desirable  to  take 
the  subject  up  at  this  time. 

There  the  matter  rested  until  President  Wilson  on  Septem- 
ber 7  made  public  his  plan  of  settlement  and  his  letter  to  the 
operators,  urging  them  to  accept  it. 

On  September  8  Mr.  Starr  J.  Murphy,  attorney  on  Mr. 
Rockefeller's  personal  staff,  wrote  to  Mr.  Welborn,  on  Mr. 
Rockefeller's  behalf,  the  letter  that  has  already  been  quoted 
in  a  previous  section  of  this  report,  in  which  he  warns  Mr. 
Welborn  against  action  on  the  President's  proposal  that  might 
involve  "any  entanglement  with  the  labor  union, "  or  "an 
attitude  which  would  arouse  a  hostile  public  opinion. " 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Mr.  Rockefeller  participated  in 
the  rejection  of  the  President's  plan,  not  only  by  instructing 
Mr.  Murphy  to  write  the  letter  just  quoted,  but  by  having  the 
company's  letter  of  rejection  drafted  by  President  Welborn 
in  collaboration  with  two  of  his  personal  employees,  Messrs. 
Murphy  and  Lee.  The  letter  of  rejection  was  dispatched  on 
September  18.  On  September  16  Mr.  Murphy  wrote  again  to 
President  Welborn,  sending  him  editorial  clippings  and  say- 
ing: 

I  am  impressed  with  the  frequency  with  which  they 
make  the  point  that  the  parties  should  either  accept  the 
President's  plan  or  should  suggest  some  other.  It  seems 
to  me  clear  that  public  opinion  will  demand  either  the 
acceptance  of  the  President's  proposition,  or  some  con- 
structive suggestion  from  the  operators.  A  mere  re- 
fusal to  do  anything  would  be  disastrous. 

This  letter  did  not  reach  Mr.  Welborn  until  after  the  letter 
of  rejection  had  been  sent  to  the  President,  but  Mr.  Rocke- 
f eller  had  sent  Mr.  Lee  to  Denver  to  assist  in  the  preparation 
of  the  letter  of  rejection,  and  it  was  probably  Mr.  Lee's  in- 
fluence that  brought  about  the  insertion  of  the  following  sen- 
tences in  Mr.  Welborn 's  letter  to  the  President: 

A  plan  to  secure  harmonious  relations  in  some  indus- 
tries or  sections  of  the  country  would  not  necessarily  ap- 


175 

ply  to  our  peculiar  conditions.  We  are  now  developing 
an  even  more  comprehensive  plan,  embodying  the  results 
of  our  practical  experience,  which  will,  we  feel  confident, 
result  in  a  closer  understanding  between  ourselves  and 
our  men.  This  plan  contemplates  not  only  provision  for 
the  redress  of  grievances,  but  for  a  continuous  effort  to 
promote  the  welfare  and  the  good  will  of  our  employes. 

With  these  sentences  in  Mr.  Welborn's  letter  to  the  Presi- 
dent in  mind,  what  is  to  be  thought  of  Mr.  Welborn's  honesty, 
when  on  the  following  day,  September  19,  he  writes  to  Mr. 
Murphy : 

I  appreciate  your  very  thoughtful  letter  of  the  16th 
inst,  with  suggestions  for  consideration  in  the  event  of  its 
being  necessary  to  propose  some  plan  to  take  the  place 
of  that  presented  to  us  by  the  President. 

But  Mr.  Murphy  in  New  York  is  still  impressed  with  the 
volume  of  criticism  aroused  by  the  company's  refusal  to  ac- 
cept the  President's  plan.  On  October  5  he  writes: 

What  would  you  think  of  the  idea  of  having  in  each 
mine  a  mine  committee  consisting  of  representatives  of 
the  operators  and  representatives  of  the  miners  employed 
in  that  mine,  chosen  by  the  miners  from  their  own  num- 
ber, which  should  be  charged  with  the  duty  of  enforcing 
the  statutes  of  the  State  and  also  the  regulations  of  the 
Company  looking  to  the  safety  and  comfort  of  the  miners 
and  the  protection  of  the  company's  property? 

Some  years  ago  I  visited  the  George  Junior  Republic, 
and  was  greatly  impressed  with  the  way  that  their  plan  of 
local  self-government  worked.  The  boys  and  girls  who 
were  there  were  mostly  of  the  unruly  class,  and  a  good 
many  were  sent  there  after  conviction  in  the  criminal 
courts.  They,  however,  made  their  own  laws  and  en- 
forced them,  with  the  result  that  there  was  almost  no 
infraction  of  the  rules.  Even  the  most  unruly  felt  that 
if  they  themselves  passed  the  laws  and  were  charged 


176 

with  their  enforcement,  it  would  be  undignified  and  fool- 
ish not  to  do  so.  The  entire  force  of  public  opinion  was 
in  favor  of  law  enforcement  rather  than  against  it.  Would 
it  not  work  the  same  way  in  our  mines  if  a  committee 
of  the  men  themselves  was  charged  with  the  responsibility 
of  enforcing  the  rules  ? 

Such  a  mine  committee  could  also  be  a  medium  of  com- 
munication between  the  employes  and  the  operators  on 
any  matters  of  common  interest,  and  would  take  the  place 
of  the  objectionable  Grievance  Committee  referred  to  in 
the  plan  which  has  been  adopted  by  the  President.  Most 
of  the  adverse  criticism  arising  from  the  operators'  re- 
fusal to  accept  the  President's  plan  in  its  entirety  is 
based  upon  their  apparent  unwillingness  to  give  the  men 
any  opportunity  for  an  expression  of  opinion.  I  am 
afraid  this  criticism  cannot  be  met  by  anything  except 
some  organized  means  of  such  expression.  While  we 
ourselves  may  be  perfectly  sincere  in  our  statement  that 
at  present  the  men  have  an  opportunity  to  present  their 
views  to  the  higher  officials,  it  is  difficult  to  convince  the 
public  of  that  fact,  and  consequently  public  opinion  is 
hostile.  This  public  opinion  is  an  important  factor  in 
the  situation  and  has  got  to  be  reckoned  with. 

Please  understand  that  again  I  am  merely  thinking  out 
loud,  and  send  this  to  you  for  what  it  may  be  worth. 

It  is  perfectly  obvious  from  this  letter  that  Mr.  Murphy's 
motive  is  to  influence  public  opinion  rather  than  to  bring 
about  any  change  in  the  Colorado  regime. 

Highly  important  as  showing  the  bent  of  Mr.  Welborn's 
mind,  and  his  conception  of  what  constitutes  collective  bar- 
gaining, is  his  answer  to  Mr.  Murphy.  On  October  9  he  writes 
as  follows: 

I  have  yours  of  the  5th  instant  asking  what  I  think 
of  the  idea  of  having  at  each  mine  a  committee  consist- 
ing of  a  representative  of  the  operator  and  a  representa- 
tive of  the  miners,  which  should  be  charged  with  the  duty 
of  enforcing  the  statutes  and  the  regulations  of  the  com- 


177 

pany  looking  to  the  safety  and  comforts  of  the  miners 
and  the  protection  of  the  company's  property. 

I  think  such  a  plan,  or  a  modification  of  it,  might  be 
employed  to  advantage.  I  have  also  considered  with  fa- 
vor a  suggestion  you  made  when  I  was  in  New  York,  of 
paying  a  prize  of  a  trip  to  Denver,  for  efficiency  in  some 
particular  line. 

Yesterday  and  day  before  Mr.  Weitzel,  our  manager 
of  the  fuel  department,  was  in  Denver,  when  he  and  I 
went  over  your  suggestion  last  referred  to  and  decided 
to  perfect  a  plan  along  that  line.  It  so  happens  that  we 
also  considered  a  part  'of  the  suggestion  contained  in 
your  letter  of  the  5th,  which  had  not  then  been  received. 

There  are  a  number  of  things  in  connection  with  coal 
mining  operations  much  to  be  desired.  Some  of  them  are 
noted  below : 

Regularity  in  work. 

Efficiency. 

General  observance  of  rules  and  laws. 

Care  to  guard  against  accidents. 

Loyalty  to  the  company's  interests. 

Cleanliness  in  the  homes. 

Mr.  Weitzel  and  I  thought  that  we  might  possibly  de- 
velop a  system  of  marking  for  efficiency  in  some  of  these 
lines,  and  offer  a  prize  to  the  one  who  made  the  best  showing 
in  a  year,  or  some  shorter  period  if  that  seemed  advisable. 
My  first  thought  in  connection  with  it  was  that  the  contest 
should  take  place  at  each  mine  independent  of  all  the 
others. 

We  have  already  started  on  a  plan  which  was  suggested 
by  Mr.  Lee,  of  getting  at  the  complaints  of  the  various 
men,  in  some  cases  through  the  doctors,  and  at  one  mine 
through  the  store  manager,  who  maintains  a  most  inti- 
mate relation  with  all  of  the  workmen.  We  have  started 
this  at  only  four  of  the  properties  and  will  try  it  there 
before  extending  the  plan  any  further.  If  it  proves  sue- 


178 

cessful,  we  can  work  from  it  into  something  perhaps  a 
little  broader.  But  I  think  we  must  avoid  now  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  committee,  as  that  would  come  too  near 
one  of  the  demands  of  the  miners '  organization  which 
has  been  frequently  made,  and  is  expressed  through  their 
so-called  truce  proposal  presented  by  the  President. 

I  think,  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  your  idea  of 
having  a  committee  charged  with  the  duty  of  enforcing 
the  statutes  and  the  regulations  as  to  safety  and  comfort 
of  the  men,  it  might  be  well  to  have  the  manager  make  the 
appointment  without  there  being  any  feeling  that  a  part 
of  the  committee  represented  the  company  and  the  other 
part  the  workmen.  There  are  some  mines  at  which  un- 
doubtedly our  manager  could  select  three  miners  who 
would  be  glad,  and  could  be  safely  depended  upon  to  as- 
sume the  responsibility  suggested  by  you,  and  would  in 
every  sense  of  the  word  be  safe.  In  considering  this  for- 
ward work,  which  I  feel  we  must  certainly  keep  in  mind, 
I  am  impressed  with  the  importance  of  so  composing 
whatever  committees  are  found  advisable  as  to  make  it 
appear  that  they  all  represent  the  same  interest;  in  other 
words,  that  there  is  but  one  interest  which  is  in  every 
sense  of  the  word  common,  yet  having  it  understood  that 
the  committee  is  as  free  to  consider  any  complaints  or 
grievances  of  the  men  as  though  it  were  one  entirely  of 
their  own  selection.  I  feel  that  the  existing  relations  be- 
tween ourselves  and  our  workmen  is  such  as  to  form  a 
natural  foundation  for  development  along  that  line.  I 
also  feel  that  every  step  should  be  made  with  very  great 
care,  so  as  to  avoid  impressing  the  men  with  the  feeling 
that  we  are  alarmed  or  think  that  we  ought  to  give  them 
some  representation  which  heretofore  they  have  not  had. 

I  want  you  to  feel  that  your  suggestions  along  that  or 
any  other  line  are  most  welcome,  and  whenever  you  wish 
to  think  out  loud  about  matters  that  concern  the  com- 
pany, I  shall  be  glad  if  you  will  put  your  thoughts  on 
paper  ajjd  mail  them,  I  shall  hope  before  the  winter  is 


179 

over  to  have  an  opportunity  of  talking  with  you  all  again 
and  reporting  progress  that  we  are  making  along  the 
lines  that  seem  to  all  of  us  important. 

On  December  17  Mr.  Welborn  issued  the  following  public 
statement : 

In  my  letter  of  August  20,  1914,  to  Mr.  John  D.  Rocke- 
feller, Jr.,  in  connection  with  a  suggestion  of  W.  L.  Mack- 
enzie King,  the  contents  of  both  of  which  have  been 
made  public  through  the  hearings  of  the  Commission  on 
Industrial  Relations,  I  referred  to  plans  then  under  con- 
sideration of  providing  a  method  (more  systematic  than 
heretofore  in  use)  by  which  our  workmen  could  reach  the 
higher  officers  of  the  company  on  matters  in  which  they 
were  concerned. 

I  made  further  reference  to  the  plan  in  my  letter  of 
September  18,  1914,  to  the  President. 

The  selection  of  Mr.  David  Griffiths  for  the  extension 
and  direction  of  the  plan  puts  it  into  systematic  opera- 
tion, and  we  are  sure  will  meet  the  requirements  in  the 
situation  where  representation  by  committee  has  not 
been  requested.  Mr.  Griffiths  is  peculiarly  fitted  for  this 
work,  over  which  he  will  have  complete  charge.  The  ex- 
tent to  which  he  enjoys  the  confidence  of  the  men  will 
make  him  their  natural  representative  in  any  differences 
that  they  may  have  with  the  foremen  under  whom  they 
work.  If  he  succeeds  in  inducing  the  men  to  select  their 
own  check  weighman,  as  we  earnestly  hope  he  will,  that 
will  give  them  another  representative. 

This   was   accompanied  by   the   following  notice   to   em- 
ployees : 

To  OUB  EMPLOYEES: 

Mr.  David  Griffiths  has  been  assigned  to  the  duty  of 
extending  and  directing  the  work  of  co-operation  and  gen- 
eral welfare  among  our  employees. 

He  will  take  up  his  work  immediately  and  spend  prac- 


180 

tically  all  of  his  time  at  the  mines,  investigating  and  ad- 
justing complaints. 

As  he  is  well  known  to  all  of  you,  he  needs  no  introduc- 
tion, and  I  know  he  will  receive  the  active  co-operation 
of  every  one  connected  with  the  company. 

On  December  18  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Rockefeller  as  follows : 

Since  writing  you  on  August  20th,  1914,  in  answer  to 
your  letter  of  August  llth,  with  which  you  enclosed  a 
copy  of  Mr.  W.  L.  Mackenzie  King 's  suggestions,  we  have 
been  actively  at  work  perfecting  our  plans  to  provide  an 
easy  means  by  which  our  employees  could  present  their 
suggestions,  or  grievances  if  they  had  any,  to  officers  of 
the  company  who  would  see  that  they  received  proper 
consideration. 

Now  that  the  strike  is  over  and  the  chance  for  misin- 
terpretation of  our  motive  is  to  some  extent  removed,  we 
are  putting  into  systematic  operation  the  plan  embodying 
the  results  of  our  experience,  and  Mr.  King's  sugges- 
tions as  far  as  seemed  practicable. 

As  will  be  noticed  by  the  circulars  enclosed,  the  plan  is 
designated  as  the  work  of  co-operation  and  general  wel- 
fare, and  has  been  placed  under  the  direction  of  Mr. 
David  Griffiths,  a  man  peculiarly  fitted  for  the  work. 

Through  our  investigation  among  the  camps,  we  have 
found  that  general  satisfaction  still  exists  and  that  there 
is  no  demand,  and  apparently  no  desire,  on  the  part  of 
the  men  that  they  should  have  what  is  termed  a  grievance 
committee. 

Occasionally  some  man  will  say  that  the  doctor  has  not 
treated  him  right.  Another  will  have  some  complaint 
of  the  treatment  at  the  store.  And  some  will  think  that 
they  should  have  better  working  places  in  the  mines.  But 
these  are  nothing  more  than  isolated  cases,  and  the  senti- 
ment of  the  men  seems  to  be  that  they  do  not  want  a 
committee  for  whose  activities  in  handling  complaints 
they  would  have  to  pay  (according  to  general  practice) 


181 

a  larger  figure  than  the  same  men  would  earn  while  at 
work  about  the  mines.  They  are,  also,  in  the  main,  op- 
posed to  paying  the  small  sum  that  would  be  necessary  in 
order  to  provide  their  own  checkweighmen. 

Three  workmen  have  been  in  my  office  in  the  last  few 
weeks.  One  of  them,  a  miner,  came  to  ask  me  if  we  would 
provide  a  place  in  which  to  keep  an  automobile  that  he 
had  bought.  The  other  two  had  been  called  before  the 
Commission  on  Industrial  Relations  by  a  special  agent 
of  that  Commission,  and  after  testifying,  came  of  their 
own  volition,  and  not  by  request,  to  see  me. 

All  these  men  took  occasion  to  say,  without  questioning 
that  they  were  earning  good  wages  and  were  satisfied  with 
their  condition. 

One  of  them  who  was  quite  talkative,  volunteered  the 
information  that  if  he  had  a  complaint  and  the  superin- 
tendent would  not  adjust  it,  he  would  go  to  the  officer  next 
in  authority,  and  finally  to  me  if  he  did  not  secure  satis- 
faction earlier.  I  assured  him  that  he  should  do  just  as 
he  said  he  would. 

All  of  these  men  said  they  did  not  want  a  checkweigh- 
man;  that  they  felt  they  were  receiving  full  credit  for 
the  coal  they  mined ;  and  they  did  not  want  to  pay  50  cents 
or  one  dollar  per  month  to  employ  a  man  of  their  own. 

I  am  referring  to  these  instances  for  the  reason  that 
they  fairly  represent  the  character  of  discussions  that, 
in  the  main,  take  place  between  the  workmen  and  the  de- 
partment officers  of  the  company  visiting  the  mines. 

From  another  man,  an  Italian,  I  received  a  complaint 
not  long  ago  of  unfair  treatment.  The  investigation  of 
this  complaint  developed  the  fact  that  the  man  had  worked 
in  three  different  places  within  the  past  few  months,  and 
made  four  distinct  complaints  about  his  working  condi- 
tions. The  places  about  which  he  complained  were  readily 
taken  by  others,  who  made  very  good  wages  in  them. 
This  man's  last  complaint  was  made  about  a  working 
place  in  our  Morley  mine.  By  some  re-arrangement  in 


182 

an  effort  to  satisfy  him,  the  Division  Superintendent,  to- 
gether with  the  mine  superintendent  and  the  underground 
foreman,  found  two  other  places,  in  either  one  of  which 
they  would  allow  him  to  work — giving  him  his  choice  of 
the  three.  All  were  good  places  and  all  anxiously  sought 
by  other  workmen,  but  this  man  declined  to  take  either 
or  to  remain  at  the  mine.  The  facts  are  that  he  was  a 
chronic  complainer,  and  would  probably  never  be  satisfied 
any  place. 

This  instance  is  mentioned  to  show  the  extent  to  which 
our  superintendents  go  at  a  time  when  workmen  are  most 
plentiful,  to  satisfy  the  men  in  our  employ. 

These  cases,  a  few  others  that  have  come  under  my 
personal  observation,  and  the  reports  from  four  or  five 
of  our  men  in  the  Fuel  Department  working  in  a  general 
capacity  that  gives  them  access  to  all  the  mines,  convince 
me  that  the  plans  consummated,  which  will  be  under  the 
personal  direction  of  Mr.  Griffiths,  will  more  than  meet 
the  requirements  of  the  men,  and  when  fully  placed  before 
the  public,  ought  to  satisfy  it. 

If  anyone  can  induce  our  workmen  to  select  checkweigh- 
men,  Mr.  Griffiths  is  that  man ;  and  if  he  succeeds  in  this 
purpose,  which  we  earnestly  hope  he  will,  their  check- 
weighmen  will  be  the  natural  personal  representatives 
of  the  other  workmen.  Mr.  Griffiths  will  himself  be  their 
representative  in  any  differences  that  arise  between  the 
workmen  and  either  the  superintendent,  the  doctor  or 
the  store.  He  is  probably  better  known  to  coal  miners  in 
the  state  than  any  other  man  and  enjoys  their  confidence 
to  a  degree  not  equalled  by  that  of  any  other  man  in  the 
state.  He  has  always  been  the  friend  of  the  mine  workers, 
and  will  stand  out  for  them  and  their  interests.  At  the 
same  time,  he  will  usually  be  able  to  correct  the  impres- 
sion of  the  worker  whose  grievance  is  only  imaginary. 

We  are  establishing  club  houses  at  several  of  the  camps, 
not  only  at  places  that  have  heretofore  had  saloons  but  at 
many  other  mines.  We  are  providing,  and  to  some  ex- 


183 

tent  equipping,  the  club  buildings.  The  men  will  form 
their  own  club  organization  at  each  camp  and  operate  it 
with  men  of  their  own  selection. 

Knowing  your  deep  interest  in  the  work  here  outlined 
and  being  uncertain  as  to  when  I  will  be  able  to  see  you, 
I  have  written  you  at  some  length.  After  the  work  in 
its  present  form  is  more  actively  under  way,  I  shall  take 
the  first  opportunity  of  discussing  it  with  you  and  your 

associates. 

Bancroft  Library 

Mr.  Eockef eller  replied  December  30,  1914,  as  follows : 

It  was  a  great  pleasure  to  us  that  Mr.  Herrington  was 
able  to  stay  in  New  York  for  some  days.  I  thoroughly 
enjoyed  coming  to  know  him  more  intimately  and  the 
opportunity  for  a  number  of  leisurely  talks  with  refer- 
ence to  Colorado  interests.  At  my  request,  he  will  tell 
you  more  fully  than  I  could  write  of  a  number  of  things 
which  we  talked  over. 

I  am  enclosing  for  your  information  copy  of  a  letter 
prepared  by  the  Commission,  of  which  Mr.  Low  is  chair- 
man, appointed  by  the  President  to  help  bring  about,  if 
possible,  better  relations  between  the  coal  operators  and 
the  coal  miners  of  Colorado,  which  letter  I  read  to  Mr. 
Herrington  but  retained  to  have  copies  made.  The  Commis- 
sion is  disposed  to  send  this  letter  to  the  president  of 
each  of  the  mining  companies  in  Colorado.  I  have  told 
Mr.  Low  that  the  spirit  in  which  the  letter  is  written 
seemed  to  me  well  calculated  to  assure  the  operators  of 
the  friendly  and  helpful  disposition  of  the  Commission. 
In  due  course,  together  with  the  other  operators,  you  will 
receive  this  letter  from  the  Commission.  It  occurred  to 
me  that  the  accompanying  memorandum  might  contain 
points  which  would  be  suggestive  to  you  in  making  your 
reply. 

Our  feeling  here  is  that,  the  strike  having  been  ter- 
minated, it  will  be  the  wish  of  all  those  connected  with 
the  Fuel  Company  to  introduce  as  rapidly  as  may  seem 


184 

expedient  the  various  progressive  steps  in  such  a  plan 
as  your  further  thought  will  suggest,  looking  toward  the 
prevention  of  a  possible  recurrence  at  any  time  in  the 
future  of  the  disorder  and  loss  on  every  hand  which  has 
resulted  from  the  recent  strike.  At  my  request,  Mr. 
Herrington  told  me  of  the  tentative  plan  which  you  and 
he  had  considered,  and  in  our  several  conferences  I  under- 
took to  develop  the  idea  with  him  more  fully.  We  believe 
that  the  adoption  of  some  such  plan  as  this  will  be  in 
the  interest  of  the  employes  of  the  Fuel  Company  and 
of  the  stockholders,  that  it  will  reflect  credit  upon  the 
President  of  the  Company,  that  it  will  insure  the  cordial 
and  hearty  good  will  of  the  employes  and  that  it  will  win 
for  the  Company  many  friends,  both  in  the  West  and  the 
East,  among  business  men  and  state  and  government  offi- 
cials. Its  adoption  would  only  be  in  line  with  the  position 
which  you  took  in  your  letter  to  me  of  last  August,  writ- 
ten after  the  receipt  of  my  letter  accompanied  by  certain 
suggestions  of  a  plan  for  co-operation.  I  believe  that 
after  it  has  become  effective,  it  will  render  increasingly 
easy  your  work  in  the  management  of  the  Company.  At 
the  same  time,  I  believe  that  you  share  with  us  the  desire 
to  show  all  deference  and  courtesy  to  the  President's 
Commission  and  our  feeling  that  their  approval  of  your 
plans  and,  if  necessary,  their  co-operation  will  help  ma~ 
terially  in  securing  the  approval  not  only  of  the  adminis- 
tration but  of  the  public  at  large. 

On  January  25,  1915,  Mr.  Eockefeller  appeared  before  this 
Commission  in  New  York  City  and  testified  as  follows  re- 
garding the  new  plan : 

The  strike  was  called  off  December  10,  1914.  On  De- 
cember 16,  Mr.  David  Griffiths,  formerly  State  Coal  Mine 
Inspector  of  Colorado,  was  appointed  an  intermediary  be- 
tween the  Company  and  its  employes,  respecting  matters 
of  mutual  interest. 

On  January  5th  a  notice  was  posted  at  all  the  Com- 
pany's mines,  inviting  the  employes  at  each  of  the  mines 


185 

to  assemble  in  mass  meeting  to  select  by  ballot  one  repre- 
sentative to  every  250  employes  in  each  camp,  to  repre- 
sent the  men  at  a  joint  meeting  of  themselves  and  the 
executive  officers  of  the  Company  in  Denver,  "for  the 
purpose  of  discussing  matters  of  mutual  concern  and  of 
considering  means  of  more  effective  co-operation  in  main- 
taining fair  and  friendly  relations. " 

In  the  published  notice  of  these  meetings,  it  was  stip- 
ulated that  in  order  that  the  men  might  feel  the  greatest 
freedom  in  making  their  selection,  they  should  choose 
their  own  chairman  and  neither  superintendents  nor  pit 
bosses  should  attend. 

The  notice  added :  '  *  The  person  selected  to  attend  the 
Denver  conference  shall  be  the  duly  accredited  representa- 
tive of  the  employes,  not  only  at  the  first  Joint  Meeting 
but  at  all  subsequent  Joint  Meetings,  and  in  all  matters  of 
co-operation  between  the  Company  and  its  employes,  un- 
til the  employes  in  like  meeting  shall  designate  some 
other  person  to  represent  them.  It  is,  therefore,  highly 
important  that  the  employes  choose  with  the  utmost  care 
the  one  of  their  number  in  whom  they  have  most  confi- 
dence. " 

I  have  received,  from  the  President  of  the  Company, 
a  telegram  informing  me  that  this  joint  conference  was 
held  at  Denver  on  the  19th  instant,  that  the  meeting  had 
proved  most  satisfactory  to  all  concerned  and  that  its 
spirit  had  convinced  the  management  that  it  would  lead 
to  more  active  co-operation  between  the  Company  and 
its  employes  in  the  future. 

Thus,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Company  has  already 
taken  steps  to  initiate  a  plan  of  representation  of  its 
employes.  It  is  my  hope  and  belief  that  from  this  will 
develop  some  permanent  machinery  which  will  insure 
to  the  employes  of  the  Company,  through  representatives 
of  their  own  selection,  quick  and  easy  access  to  the  offi- 
cers, with  reference  to  any  grievances,  real  or  assumed, 
or  with  reference  to  wages  or  other  conditions  of  employ- 
ment. 


186 

At  a  hearing  on  the  Colorado  situation  in  Washington  in 
May,  1915,  no  further  information  was  obtained  regarding  the 
development  of  this  plan.  Mr.  W.  L.  Mackenzie  King  had  vis- 
ited Colorado  during  March  and  April  and  had  studied  the 
situation  there  as  director  qf  the  Rockefeller  Foundation's 
investigation  in  the  field  of  industrial  relations.  He  made 
it  clear  that  his  object  was  research,  and  that  he  would  study 
the  situation  rather  from  a  theoretic  and  academic  standpoint 
than  with  the  purpose  of  influencing  the  immediate  situation  in 
Colorado.  He  even  refused  to  give  to  the  Commission  a  state- 
ment of  what  he  had  found  the  situation  in  Colorado  to  be, 
and  defied  the  authority  of  the  Government  to  compel  him 
to  answer.  Mr.  Rockefeller's  statement  on  January  25  must 
therefore  be  accepted  as  an  adequate  description  of  the  new 
plan  in  its  present  state  of  development. 

The  correspondence  and  statements  already  quoted  show 
that  so  far  from  being  a  plan  that  provides  for  collective  bar- 
gaining, it  is  a  plan  conceived  and  executed  by  men  who  were 
determined  that  no  element  of  real  collective  bargaining  should 
enter  into  it. 

The  effectiveness  of  such  a  plan  lies  wholly  in  its  tendency 
to  deceive  the  public  and  lull  criticism,  while  permitting  the 
Company  to  maintain  its  absolute  power. 

Reverend  Mr.  Gaddis  continued  to  serve  the  Company  as 
superintendent  of  its  Sociological  Department  until  February, 
1915,  or  several  weeks  after  the  date  on  which  the  new  plan 
became  operative.  Testifying  before  this  Commission  at 
Washington,  he  said 

Of  the  much  advertised  welfare  agent,  "as  a  mediator 
between  the  Company  and  its  employes, "  we  believe  his 
work  will  only  tend  to  intensify  the  despicable  oppres- 
siveness of  the  past  few  years.  One  super  at  least  has 
already  been  informed,  sub  rosa,  that  there  need  be  no 
undue  concern  about  this  new  officer  limiting  their  suzer- 
ainty. He  had  been  in  field  but  a  few  weeks  when  he  ef- 
fected the  discharge  of  a  man  with  a  family  to  support, 
on  the  word  of  a  woman  of  questionable  character.  The 


187 

evicted  employe  was  given  no  opportunity  to  present  his 
side  of  the  case. 

It  is  almost  farce  to  presume  that  a  pet  appointee  would 
fearlessly  and  impartially  bring  things  to  the  surface,  that 
would  disturb  the  imperturbable  equanimity  of  the  one 
who  must  0.  K.  his  monthly  salary  account. 

The  assembling  of  camp  delegates  in  Bowers '  old  office 
on  January  19th  in  which  complaints  were  solicited ;  and 
a  generally  bumptious  good  time  with  free  auto  rides, 
banquet  and  theatre  party  as  a  part  of  the  program; 
in  addition  to  all  expenses  being  paid  to  and  from  their  re- 
spective camps,  was  a  decided  hit. 

Chairman  Walsh:  What  were  the  camp  delegates? 
What  do  you  mean  by  that  ?  Is  that  this  new  scheme  they 
call  collective  bargaining  out  there,  by  which  the  em- 
ployees can  present  grievances  for  adjustment? 

Dr.  Gaddis:   That  is  what  it  is  claimed. 

Chairman  Walsh:  You  call  them  "camp  delegates, " 
and  that  they  had  a  convention.  How  do  you  say  it  was 
done  I 

Dr.  Gaddis:  These  men  were  elected;  and  the  orders 
given  were  from  Denver  that  no  local  officials  should  at- 
tend the  meeting  of  any  camp  where  they  were  elected; 
but  that  the  men  were  to  elect  their  own  men, — that  was 
the  supposition, — to  go  up  there  and  air  their  grievances 
before  Mr.  Welborn  and  Mr.  Weitzel  and  a  mediator,  Mr. 
David  Griffiths.  It  was  said : 

"And  many  of  the  men  showed  a  freedom  such  as  one 
might  expect  from  them  in  a  meeting  exclusively  of  their 
immediate  associates. "  If  two  of  the  members  of  this 
"Denver  Convention "  represented  the  rank  and  file  of 
that  body,  the  norm  of  the  past  years  will  not  be  altered. 
One  of  these  said  members,  has  for  some  time,  made  more 
money  in  his  camp  than  the  super  himself. 

Another  son  of  Ham  who  sat  in  this  first  assembly  of 
coal  camp  Patricians  and  Plebeians,  owned  the  company 
store  a  bill  of  over  $80  which  the  manager  had  almost  dee- 


188 

paired  of  collecting;  and  for  more  than  a  year  this  same 
accredited  subject  had  been  paying  back  the  store  on  a 
$100  advanced  for  his  wife's  funeral  expenses. 

Chairman  Walsh:    Now  this  was  a  negro,  was  he? 

Dr.  Gaddis:    Yes,  sir. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Now,  you  say,  however,  the  men 
were  given  to  understand  that  they  would  choose  these 
men  democratically, — that  is,  the  company  was  not  to 
interfere? 

Dr.  Gaddis :   I  do. 

Chairman  Walsh:  Well,  then,  for  instance,  take  this 
sort  of  a  case,  how  would  it  work  out,  the  criticism  of 
this  man  being  that  he  was  beholden  to  the  company  for 
an  indebtedness?  First,  I  will  ask  you,  is  that  a  negro 
camp! 

Dr.  Gaddis:    No,  sir. 

Chairman  Walsh:  How  did  he  happen  to  be  repre- 
senting the  white  men  there, — a  man  that  was  so— 

Dr.  Gaddis:  I  could  not  say,  Mr.  Walsh.  There  are 
some  things  that  happen  that  I  cannot  explain. 

Chairman  Walsh:    Go  ahead. 

Dr.  Gaddis  (reading) :  A  good  square  kick  could  hard- 
ly be  expected  from  such  sources. 

Again  the  remembrance  of  so  many  of  their  former 
comrades  being  ' '  canned, ' '  or  squealing,  would  not  be  for- 
gotten amidst  the  grandeur  and  informality  of  their  tem- 
porary environment. 

A  few  weeks  after  this  meeting  a  representative  from 
headquarters  inquired  of  a  super  if  "the  men  thought  we 
were  trying  to  put  one  over  on  them?"  There  is  room  for 
suspicion  that  "one  is  being  put  over"  on  the  public  and 
that  the  various  investigating  committees  are  having  dust 
thrown  into  their  eyes;  for,  Presto,  the  lion  has  been 
changed  into  the  lamb. 

If  the  investigating  committees  can  be  kept  out  of  Colo- 


189 
/ 

rado  for  the  next  six  months  or  a  year  the  old  shackles  of 
oppression  will  have  received  so  many  new  rivets,  that 
it  will  take  the  hellish  fires  of  another  -  strike  to  loosen 
them. 

Mr.  Welborn's  conception  of  collective  bargaining  and  of 
an  ideal  arrangement  for  safeguarding  the  wage  earners ' 
interests  is  expressed  in  the  following  sentence  in  his  letter 
of  October  9,  1914: 

I  am  impressed  with  the  importance  of  so  composing 
whatever  committees  are  found  advisable  as  to  make  it 
appear  that  they  all  represent  some  interest;  in  other 
words,  that  there  is  but  one  interest  which  is  in  every 
sence  of  the  word  common,  yet  having  it  understood  that 
the  committee  is  as  free  to  consider  any  complaints  or 
grievances  of  the  men  as  though  it  were  one  actually  of 
their  own  selection. 

This  notion  that  the  interests  of  the  employer  and  employee 
are  common  when  applied  to  distribution  of  product  is  a  fal- 
lacy that  can  hardly  be  advanced  with  sincerity  by  a  man  of 
intelligence.  Yet  it  apparently  animates  Mr.  Rockefeller's 
attitude,  and  he  even  considers  it  consistent  with  the  existence 
of  a  system  of  collective  bargaining.  It  need  scarcely  be  point- 
ed out,  first,  that  the  plan  outlined  by  the  letters  and  testi- 
mony here  quoted  does  not  provide  an  effective  organization 
of  the  Company's  own  employees,  and,  second,  that  if  it  did 
these  employes  would  still  be  unable  to  maintain  bargaining 
equality  without  the  support  of  a  nation-wide  organization 
such  as  only  the  United  Mine  Workers  can  give. 


